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Abstract 
 
 This thesis seeks to understand the nature of a particular kind of sexualised, abject violence 
that emerges in and through identity politics. This violence is practised against or through the body. 
I refer to this type of violence as ‘overkill’ and contend that it performatively constitutes identity in 
abject and sexualised ways through the weaponisation and brutalisation of the body. The thesis is 
situated within the literature on ethnic identities in conflict, which tends to under-theorise how this 
violence emerges and what this violence accomplishes by viewing violence as the outcome of pre-
existing identity divisions. To address this gap, I introduce two theoretical approaches to the 
examination of violent identity politics. The first of these is the concept of performativity as 
formulated by Judith Butler (1990), which views identity as an iterative process constitutive of 
political subjectivity. The second is a theory of abjection as discussed by Julia Kristeva (1980), in 
which she argues that the constitution of identity is an exclusionary process that requires the 
simultaneous production of an other. Taken together, these theoretical approaches allow for an 
understanding of extreme violence as constitutive of a new kind of subjectivity that renders the 
other abject through sexualised discourses. There are two dynamics of overkill that this thesis 
explores: the brutalisation and the weaponisation of the body. Using an empirical study of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, I highlight the brutalisation of the sexualised body; through a second case study 
of the prison protests in Northern Ireland (1976-1981), I draw out the weaponisation of the 
sexualised body. I conclude by demonstrating the need for an understanding of identity as 
contingent upon markers of difference that are sexualised through abjection to establish a better 
explanatory framework for examining political violence. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thank you to my supervisors, Dr. Martin Coward and Dr. Ian O'Flynn, for their guidance, 
encouragement, and the many times they told me to just write the damn thing already. Additional 
thanks to Dr. Michael Morrell and Dr. Heather Turcotte, for inspiring me to do the PhD, and to Dr. 
Kyle Grayson, Dr. Dawn Lyon, Dr. Nicola Smith, Dr. Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Dr. Jen Bagelman, 
and Dr. Ruth Blakley.  
Additional thanks to: The liaison librarian for Politics, Louise Gordon, for pulling resources 
seemingly out of thin air. To Jenny Dawley, Jenny Halcrow, and the rest of the administrative 
support staff for fielding all of my many (usually dumb) questions.  
The road through the PhD is a long one, and one best not travelled alone. Thank you to everyone 
who supported me, encouraged me, and reminded me that there is a world away from my desk: Dr. 
Gerard Thomas, Katie Yokom, Susan Byrne, Holly and Tristan Kobayashi, Dawn Rawlings,  Emma 
Hill, Dr. Cary Monreal, Jurgita Cepulyte, Paul McFadden, Maria Mpakola, Alexis Paton, Dr. 
Russell Foster, Dr. Matthew Johnson, Dr. George Brathwaite, Dr. Anna Canaglia, Benjamin Thorn, 
Craig Johnson. This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
Special thanks to my yoga tribe (Jambo Truong, Conrad Freese, Sarah Fae, Deborah Seth-Jackson, 
Chris Jackson, Stephanie Chapman, Hazel Wilding, Dr. Celia Bryant, Claire Newton, David 
Venus,) for their boundless love, without which I would surely have crumbled; to my incredible 
support network in the US: Matthew Kraft, Anastasia Brewcyznski, and Kevin Coubal; to Dr. 
Andrew Burridge for his unwavering belief and tireless encouragement; and to Amelia Lancet and 
Dr. Jen Elise Prescott for being my most reliable confidantes and fiercest friends, even from the 
other side of the world. 
So many thanks and so much love to the entire Armstrong clan (Heather, Dave, Holly, Samantha, 
Naomi, Adam, Joanne, Joe, Lucy, Karl, Oliver, Bethan, and the next generation) for welcoming me 
so completely into your family, for truly making Newcastle feel like home, and for putting up with 
all of the weirdness that comes with having an academic hanging around (additional shout-out to 
Naomi for reviewing early drafts of my first publication!). 
This would not have been possible without the love, support, and encouragement of my family. 
Thank you to my mother, Diana, for her confidence; my father, Sean, for his unconditional love and 
willingness to read every draft (multiple times); and my brother, Lt. Brendan O'Branski, for his 
confidence, his encouragement, and for inspiring me every day.  
Finally, my deepest appreciation, gratitude, and love to my husband, Benjamin Armstrong, without 
whom this thesis would never have been completed. Thank you for all your support, your 
encouragement, and your understanding. Thank you for never failing to make me laugh, and always 
showing me the beauty of every day. This is only the beginning.  
Thank you all, from the bottom of my heart.  
 
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to Leon Joseph O'Branski, and Patricia Ann Grady 
O'Branski, who never lost faith. 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: NOT ONLY WHY, BUT HOW?: ASKING DIFFERENT QUESTIONS IN THE STUDY OF 
EXTREME VIOLENCE   ............................................................................................................................ 6 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS  ............................................................................................................................................... 7 
OVERKILL AND CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY: EMOTIONAL TRAUMA, INEQUALITY, ABJECTION  ................................................................ 12 
DEPLOYING ABJECTION  ...................................................................................................................................................................... 15 
CASE STUDY SELECTION: WHAT RWANDA AND NORTHERN IRELAND TELL US ABOUT OVERKILL   .............................................................. 17 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  ................................................................................................................................................................ 20 
METHODS  .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 29 
 
CHAPTER TWO: FROM BLOOD TIES TO BLOODSHED?: IDENTITY FORMATION IN 
UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT IDENTITY POLITICS  ...................................................................... 33 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................................... 33 
EXAMINING THE EXISTING LITERATURE   .............................................................................................................................................. 34 
‘TERMINOLOGICAL CHAOS’: DEFINING THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE .................................................................................................... 37 
THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ITS LIMITATIONS   ............................................................................................. 44 
 RESOURCE COMPETITION AND MODERNISATION  .................................................................................................................... 45 
 ANARCHY AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA   .............................................................................................................................. 48 
 GROUP COMPARISON THEORY  ................................................................................................................................................ 53 
 ELITES, FEAR AND ETHNIC TERRORISM  .................................................................................................................................. 58 
 ROBERT HAYDEN AND CHAUVINIST NATIONALISM  ................................................................................................................ 61 
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS INTO ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CAMPBELL, FUJII, AND FELDMAN   ................................................... 64 
NOT ONLY WHY, BUT HOW: THE MISSING LINK IN THE LITERATURE  ................................................................................................... 68 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  ‘THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL’: A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF BODILY 
VIOLENCE  ................................................................................................................................................ 72 
INTRODUCTION  .................................................................................................................................................................................. 72 
MICHEL FOUCUALT AND THE BODY IN POWER  .................................................................................................................................... 74 
PRODUCING BODIES: JUDITH BUTLER AND PERFORMATIVITY  ............................................................................................................. 77 
 A NOTE ON PERFORMATIVITY VERSUS PERFORMANCE  ......................................................................................................... 81 
EMBODIED IDENTITY  .......................................................................................................................................................................... 83 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INSIDER/OUTSIDER BINARY  ........................................................................................................................ 86 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: PERFORMATIVITY, AND POLICING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN OTHERS ........................................................... 89 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: OVERKILL, POWER AND HORROR: EMBODIED ABJECTION AND THE 
ETHNICISED/SEXUALISED OTHER  .................................................................................................. 93 
INTRODUCTION  .................................................................................................................................................................................. 93 
THE ABJECT BOUNDARY BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER  .......................................................................................................................... 95 
PRECARITY, MELANCHOLIA, HOSTILITY  ............................................................................................................................................ 102 
ABJECTION OF THE SEXUALISED BODY AND THE FEMINISED OTHER  .................................................................................................. 107 
THE DELINQUENT IN ‘US’: SEXUALISING AND OTHERING  .................................................................................................................. 111 
‘EXTERMINATE ALL THE BRUTES’: BODILY INSCRIPTION, DOMINANCE, AND OVERKILL  ...................................................................... 118 
CONCLUSIONS  ................................................................................................................................................................................. 121 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: ‘GO AND KILL YOUR NEIGHBOR’: THE BRUTALISATION OF THE BODY IN THE 
1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE  .............................................................................................................. 124 
INTRODUCTION  ................................................................................................................................................................................ 124 
BACKGROUND TO THE 1994 GENOCIDE  ............................................................................................................................................ 131 
‘ALWAYS YELL WITH THE CROWD...IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO BE SAFE.’ .................................................................................................... 139 
SEXUALISATION, BRUTALISATION, DEHUMANISATION: THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE  ................................................................................ 145 
FIGURE ONE ................................................................................................................................................................................... 147 
THE PURPOSE OF VIVISECTION: EXAMINATION AND EXTERMINATION IN VIOLENT IDENTITY POLITICS  ................................................ 150 
RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE  ........................................................................................................................................................... 155 
CONCLUSIONS  ................................................................................................................................................................................. 160 
 
5 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ‘NOR MEEKLY SERVE MY TIME’: THE WEAPONISATION OF THE BODY IN THE H-
BLOCKS AND ARMAGH  ..................................................................................................................... 163 
INTRODUCTION  ................................................................................................................................................................................ 163 
THE ROAD TO ARMAGH AND THE H-BLOCKS: INTERNMENT AND CRIMINALISATION  ............................................................................ 166 
INCARCERATION AND RESISTANCE: PROTEST IN ARMAGH GAOL AND THE H-BLOCKS  ......................................................................... 169 
DEPLOYING THE ABJECT: SCATOLOGY AND DECOMPOSITION AS WEAPONS OF THE BODY   ................................................................. 176 
‘THE COLOUR OF SHAME’: MENSTRUATION AND ABJECT WOMANHOOD IN THE NO WASH PROTEST  ................................................... 185 
LEGIBILITY IN THE WEAPONISATION OF THE FEMINISED BODY  .......................................................................................................... 189 
 
‘THE SAVAGE REDUCTION OF THE FLESH’: ABJECT MASCULINITY IN THE HUNGER STRIKE PROTEST  ................................................. 195 
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................................................. 202 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  ..................................................... .205 
THESIS SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................................................. 205 
CONTRIBUTIONS: ETHNICITY AS INTERSECTIONAL AND THE CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY FOR OVERKILL   ............................................. 210 
CONTRIBUTIONS: OVERKILL AS A SPECIFIC FORM OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE   ....................................................................................... 215 
DEVELOPMENT IN FUTURE RESEARCH PROJECTS  ............................................................................................................................... 218 
 
BIBLOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter One 
Not Only Why, But How: Asking Different Questions in the Study of Extreme Violence  
Introduction  
 On the afternoon of 7 February, 1980, male prison guards in full riot gear entered the 
prisoners' cells in Armagh Gaol, a women's only gaol in Armagh, Northern Ireland (Aretxaga 1995, 
128). The women had been called out of their cells to queue for dinner when male prison officers 
believed to have been brought in from the men's prison surrounded and corralled them into separate 
rooms. They were harassed by both male and female prison officers, beaten and strip-searched 
before being allowed back to their ransacked cells, where they were confined for days without 
access to lavatories (Weinstein 2007, 18).  Twenty-three months earlier, in March 1978, the men in 
HM Prison Maze (colloquially known as the H-Blocks because of the shape of the buildings) had 
begun refusing to leave their cells: going to the toilets left them open to abuse and ridicule from the 
prison guards. When the guards responded by blocking the holes through which the prisoners 
emptied their chamber pots, the prisoners began spreading their excreta on the walls of their cells. 
Conditions deteriorated rapidly and as the condition of the cell walls grew worse, the prisoners 
slowly plunged themselves into darkness and decay.  
*** 
 On 15 April 1994, thousands of men, women, and children were murdered in or on the 
grounds of the Nyarubuye Catholic Church. Valentina Iribagizo, twelve years old at the time of 
massacre, was taken to the church by her parents, who thought it would be safe for her there. When 
the massacre began, she survived because she became so covered in blood that the Interhamwe 
thought she was dead. She lived in the church, surrounded by corpses, and the dogs that came to eat 
them, for three days.  
*** 
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 Each of these vignettes in its own specific way demonstrates a particular type of violence 
that occurs in some cases of violent identity politics, and ethnic violence in particular. Ethnic 
violence as a field of study lacks an obvious common argument that explains, for instance, why 
some ethnically defined tensions erupt into horrific violence while others do not. While the study of 
ethnic violence seems to be constantly changing with new conflicts bringing new evidence and new 
criteria, what seems to remain relatively consistent is that when these conflicts do erupt into large-
scale violence, this violence is quite often characterised by its extreme nature. Often, the bodies of 
individuals are explicitly targeted in ways that they would not be in, for instance, a war where 
bodies are collateral damage. This is based on the assumption that there is a qualitative difference 
between a massacre in a church and the destruction of soldiers on the battlefield. Collateral damage 
does not account for the brutality of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, nor does it explain the horror of 
the Northern Irish prison protests. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the body of the enemy (in 
this case, the Tutsi) was the primary, and effectively the only, target.  The body is always the 
ultimate target of political violence, but the extremity of the violence is in certain cases particularly 
striking. It appears that this extreme violence to which bodies are subjected is rooted in something 
more than struggle, and more even than symbolism – rather, it is intended to communicate 
difference and as a mechanism of dominance.  
 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
 Despite its being a striking and widely discussed feature in some instances of political 
violence, the existing literature on ethnic conflict has so far been unable to account for the visceral, 
abject nature of certain cases of ethnic violence. Many theories of ethnic violence have taken into 
account issues such as modernisation, manipulation by ethnic elites, instrumental concerns, and 
ancient hatreds. I argue that while these factors may explain some parts of identity conflicts, they do 
not account for those instances of conflict that display shocking levels of violence. Because we are 
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unable to account for how this violence emerges, we are unable to predict it, intervene in it, or 
punish it effectively. These instances of violence with which I am concerned appear to target the 
body in specific, aggressive, and highly sexualised ways. Rape and sexual assault occur in 
peacetime, and sexual violence as a weapon of war outside ethnic conflict is common (Cohen 
2013). Still, there appears to be something else happening in these extreme cases of violent identity 
politics, wherein the sexual violence that occurs is often particularly abhorrent – or abject – and is 
intended to show not only the dominance but the total superiority of one group over another. The 
sexualised violence in these kinds of identity conflicts is not about the gratification of the 
perpetrator or perpetrators, but rather about breaking the other group, rendering the group inferior 
and rendering it abject. This abjection of the other is accomplished through sexualised violence 
done to the body of the other.  
 
 This type of abject and sexualised violence is rampant in accounts of extreme identity 
conflicts: narrative histories of the genocide in Rwanda are rife with horrific tales of rape, gang 
rape, and vivisection that detail the brutalisation of the body. In Northern Ireland's prisons, we find 
examples of sexual assault against prisoners culminating in resistance movements that weaponise 
the body in ways that are stunningly abhorrent. It is important to note that this thesis is not an 
attempt to draw a comparison between such cases, but rather each empirical study is demonstrative 
of different facets of extreme political violence, namely the brutalisation and weaponisation of the 
body, that I wish to explore. These cases suggest an intersection in the ways that the sexed body and 
the ethnicised body are mutually constituted and performed in some cases of violent identity 
politics, which I refer to as the intersectionality of embodied identities. I argue that by investigating 
and understanding this mutual constitution and intersectional performance, we gain a better 
understanding of how some identity-based conflicts produce certain types of extreme violence. 
Introducing and examining the relationship between performativity (as part of the normalising 
project of disciplinary power that produces dynamic and exclusionary modes of identification), the 
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gendering and sexualisation of the body (as sometimes opposing, sometimes complementary forces) 
and abjection explains how bodies become brutalised and weaponised in specific ways in these 
types of violent identity politics.   
 
 That these types of violence require investigation is based on a simple, core intuition – that 
something that causes so much human suffering is reprehensible, and attempts should be made to 
understand and explain it, to work towards some kind of predictive framework. The aforementioned 
examples of such violence have been met, largely, with horror by the international community. 
Though the legal response has not been the same, the colloquial responses to the specific instances 
of violence –the storming of Rwandan churches to massacre those seeking shelter inside, the No 
Wash Protest in Armagh Gaol – has been one of more or less universal horror.  This horror, 
however, also paralyses, and explanations for and responses to this violence have so far been 
unsatisfying. Examining these types of violence may help us gain an understanding of how such 
extreme political violence comes about, and with enough examination, we may be able to recognise 
the types of identity formations that could become radicalised to produce such extreme violence, 
and with this knowledge prevent such violence from occurring. An explanation for these kinds of 
violence through the identification of certain commonalities may prove beneficial to scholars and 
policy makers working on related issues of political violence, such as mediation, intervention, or 
post-conflict reconciliation. More importantly, it may also prove more practically useful in 
providing a sense of when conflict may be intervened in to prevent extreme violence, by illustrating 
certain commonalities in the radicalisation of identity.    
 
 Rather than examining potential contributors to conflict such as the interests of the elite in 
order to explain why violence may arise from identity politics, I propose an alternative starting 
point – examining how identities can intersect in such a way that when they are radicalised, they 
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produce extreme forms of violence. Because these identity-based conflicts appear inherently 
different to other conflicts, I work towards crafting a theory of how identities come to be in such a 
way that this violence may arise. I argue that when ethnicisation and sexualisation intersect with 
one another, this extreme violence is produced. This also bridges the gap between scholarship on 
ethnic identity and ethnic conflict, in particular the disconnection between the two that allows 
theories of ethnic conflict to assert that identities are constructed while treating them as enduring 
elements. The keys to this are, I will argue, the concept of performativity (Butler 1990), as it 
accounts for the way in which identity is both constructed and normalised so that it appears natural 
and enduring. The second is the concept of abjection (Kristeva 1982), as it accounts for the horror 
that arises from discerning the identity of the self in relation to the identity of the other.  
 
 My hypothesis is that this type of violence arises as the result of the abject sexualisation of 
the other, and the performance of this abject sexualisation through the brutalisation and/or the 
weaponisation of the body of the other.  More specifically, the other undergoes an ascribed process 
(which is to say that its production comes from an external group) of sexualisation that largely 
serves to feminise the other, rendering them deviant or perverse in order to dominate them. Given 
that the sexualisation of the other is connected to the self's ability to dominate it, then the self's 
feelings of abjection are inextricably tied to and associated with the sexualised other, and the self 
visits this association on the other through these specific forms of violence.  
 
 In Rwanda, for example, in the months leading up to the genocide, Tutsi women were 
depicted as sexual deviants, and commonly as succubi or ‘seductress-spies’ (Human Rights Watch 
1996, 181), who intended to seduce Hutu men from ‘their’ women, to enslave Hutu men in the 
service of their own families, and who would ultimately choose, if availability permitted, European 
men, humiliating their Hutu suitors. Their sexuality was said to be their weapon, something that 
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Hutu men and women alike needed to be on guard against the predatory sexuality of the Tutsi, even 
in normal interactions (Human Rights Watch 1996, 17). The realities of the Tutsi women's 
disaggregated sexualities and individual sexual practices were completely irrelevant to the mythic 
production of their alterity, characterised by an exoticised sexuality. This otherness, which was 
framed in terms of the threat of domination and superiority, made Tutsi women vulnerable targets 
for sexual assault and for murder, as they were both discursively dehumanised and made 
threatening. The Tutsi women were therefore made vulnerable on two counts – their status as ethnic 
others with the deviance of practice attendant to that make them targets of destruction, and their 
status as women renders them targets of domination. The Tutsi women were brutalised because of 
their ascribed otherness and the attendant abject femininity. 
 
 While the 1994 Rwandan genocide addresses the brutalisation of the body in violent identity 
politics, the prison protests in Northern Ireland illustrate the weaponisation of the body. In the case 
of the No Wash Protest at Armagh Gaol, the abuse that the women suffered was entirely sexualised 
and intended to dominate through, for example, the restriction of menstrual sanitary products. 
(Fairweather, McDonough, and MacFadyean 1984, 222). The Armagh women were rendered 
deviant not only as republicans but as women who defied gender roles, and so the corporeality of 
their sexualised womanhood was turned against them.  The prisoners in Armagh Gaol were 
therefore abjected on two counts – as women in prison, and as republicans. Their abjection was 
communicated to them through shame and punishments that were focused upon menstruation. 
When they joined the No Wash Protest, or more appropriately started their own, the Armagh 
women were able to weaponise their menstruation as an attack against the abjection they faced both 
inside and outside the prison. In this instance, the Armagh women weaponised their own ascribed 
otherness, weaponising their abject femininity. Both cases demonstrate one way in which the 
intersection of ethnicisation and sexualisation through abject produces extreme violence.  
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 In the next section, I will start to lay the foundations  for the theoretical framework and 
conceptual foundations of this project, which is to introduce a specific conceptual understanding of 
the abject and sexualised violence that we see in some cases of violent identity politics, and which I 
have called overkill. Overkill, which I have defined as violence that performatively constitutes 
identity in sexualised and abject ways through the brutalisation and weaponisation of the body, is 
contingent upon certain conditions of possibility. It eliminates agency and produces a subaltern 
subjectivity through abjection and sexualisation. To do this, overkill must emerge from certain 
conditions of possibility, which include emotional trauma between groups, gender inequality that 
manifests as pre-existing systemic exclusion, and conditions of abjection. The absences of the 
conditions of possibility that allow for overkill explain why this kind of violence does not occur in 
all situations of ethnicised tension or conflict. 
 
Overkill and Conditions of Possibility: Emotional Trauma, Inequality, Abjection 
 The concept of ‘conditions of possibility’ is a way of conceptualising the constitutive 
structure of reality – conditions of possibility are not the cause to an effect, but rather formation that 
allows an understanding of causation to emerge. In the work of Michel Foucault, conditions of 
possibility are also referred to in the context of the episteme, the ‘specifically discursive apparatus’ 
(1980, 197) that determines the conditions of possibility of its contemporary knowledge.  The 
episteme is, therefore, the constellation of discursive productions that contextualise and inform the 
conditions of possibility for social relationships. Pierre Bourdieu writes that while social 
interactions are often empirically studied, ‘the truth of any interaction is never entirely to be found 
within the interaction as it avails itself for observation’ (Bourdieu 1989, 16). In summation of this, 
there is a philosophical precedent for considering social interactions, and in particular social 
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interactions defined in terms of power relations, to be entrenched within the existent 
power/knowledge matrix, and reliant upon certain conditions of possibility.  
 
 The first condition of possibility that I will outline is emotion. Sara Ahmed (2004) discusses 
the politics of emotions, and emotive and affective states in the formation of identity and 
understanding. She argues ‘emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow 
us to distinguish an inside and an outside...it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and 
others, that surfaces or boundaries are made’ (Ahmed 2004, 10). She goes on to say that ‘[t]he work 
of emotion involves the 'sticking' of signs to bodies’ (Ahmed 2004, 13). Ahmed's work on the 
politics of emotion is interesting because of her clarifying reduction of her claims to the question 
‘what sticks?’ (Ahmed 2004, 89). She interrogates the ‘stickiness’ of emotions i.e. the extent to 
which meaning is ascribed to objects that in turn evoke a reaction. Emotions such as love or disgust 
‘stick’ to surface and provide a means of reading that surface, and they communicate the social 
positionality of that surface.  
 
 Overkill is a communicative form of violence. At the level of brutalisation, it produces and 
communicates difference; at the level of weaponisation, it militarises the difference in response to 
abjection and brutalisation. Both practices require an affective response in order to be effective. 
Brutalisation uses abject, sexualised violence to produce its victims as abject and sexualised. In 
Rwanda, rape was used to humiliate the Tutsi, as well as to harm the victim of the abuse. These 
events required a present emotive receptor that goes beyond a reaction to human suffering. Rather, 
it required a connection to the specific suffering of the victims, the Tutsi in this case. The rape of a 
Tutsi child needed to be felt by the Tutsi community, to illustrate the complete dehumanisation and 
powerlessness of the Tutsi people. It also needed to be felt by the Hutu community, so that the 
abjection and dehumanisation of the Tutsi reconstituted Hutu subjectivity as dominant and superior. 
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The weaponisation of the abject, sexualised body also requires and emotionally engaged audience 
that will be impacted in order to achieve its aims. The Hunger Strike Protest was impactful largely 
because of its ability to rally support in people outside the prison, which served not only to 
crystallise Irish identity but also to create a strong sense of anti-Britishness (Blatherwick 1981, 1- 
2). 
 
 The next condition of possibility for overkill is a systemic and pervasive system of gender 
inequality. The gendering and sexualising of the other is a critical condition of possibility for 
overkill. The sexualisation that occurs in overkill relies upon a pre-existing understanding of the 
feminine as subordinate to the masculine. The purpose of sexualisation in overkill is to render the 
other subordinate, inferior, to produce their bodies as public space for humiliation – in other words, 
to feminise. Without a pre-existing systemic exclusion of women (and marginalised masculinities), 
the feminisation of the other cannot take place, as it does not have a foothold. Patriarchal structures 
in Northern Ireland not only prescripted what were considered acceptable forms of participation for 
women, but made the participations of nationalist women a difficult navigation. Begoña Aretxaga 
argues that militant nationalist women ‘become anomalies’  and are representative either of the 
support for men or of women who ‘act like men’ (Aretxaga 1997, 10) . This abject sexualisation 
takes root in epistemic socio-cultural understandings of the feminine as both lesser and object (to 
the exclusion of recognition as a subject). The feminisation of the other in this context crosses the 
boundary between sexualising and gendering, which are not the same process but can and do often 
inform one another as both confer a kind of dominance.  
 
 The final condition of possibility necessary for overkill is a connection to abjection. 
Abjection occupies an interesting position not only to discussions of political violence, but also to 
socio-political relationships writ large. Abjection, according to Kristeva (1980), is one of the ways 
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in which we understand our culture, by determining what is outside of our culture. What is 
considered abject cuts across a variety of mediums – the abject can encompass practices, bodies, 
material items such as food, or bodily functions such as excreta and menstruation. Furthermore, 
practices and functions that are abject can render the body that performs them entirely abject, and 
menstruation illustrates this point. The emotive power of the abject comes from its being just 
beyond the reach of comprehension and legibility. In the case of overkill, abjection serves a 
productive function, by placing bodies in proximity to an abject – through abject bodily violence in 
the case of Rwanda, or excreta in the case of the Northern Irish prison protests. In order for the 
abjection necessary for overkill to take root (and to produce the emotive impact that it must), there 
needs to be a pre-existing lexicon of abjection. For instance, certain sexual practices but already be 
produced as deviant in order for their projection on to the outgroup to effectively render the group 
as deviant and abject. 
 
Deploying Abjection 
 Abjection is the terror and disgust of being confronted with the other, whether that is on a 
bodily, micro-level or a macro-social level. Abjection is formed through exclusion and repulsion. 
The exclusionary nature of abjection is a critical component of its importance for overkill. 
Abjection is a means by which identity is formed and the cohesion of the ingroup formed against 
abjection is maintained. In other words, abjection is a means of defining who we are by defining 
who we are not. Barbara Creed (1986, 45) says that Julia Kristeva's (1982) essay, Powers of 
Horror, attempts to ‘explore the different ways in which abjection, as a source of horror, works 
within patriarchal societies, as a means of separating the human from the non-human, and the fully 
constituted subject from the partially formed abject’. Two elements here stand out – the use of the 
abject for the separation of the subject from the abject, and its deployment in patriarchal societies. 
Abjection is both the border that separates us from them, and this includes practices done by ‘them’ 
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as well as those done by ‘us’ i.e. violence, and what defines those beyond the border of us. 
 
 The role of the abject within patriarchal societies is also important because of its connection 
to gendered and sexualised norms as a means of policing identity performance. The abject-feminine 
repeatedly emerges in the discussion and illustration of overkill, in the discursive production of the 
other meant to subordinate and confer dominance, in the sexualising and sexualised violence 
experienced by the other. Abject sexualisation is a primarily feminising production of the other in 
order to confer dominance, and it is worth noting that this sexualisation is conferred upon the other 
through sexualised violence. This will be discussed in terms of rape in the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide, and in terms of the mirror searches in HMP Maze in Northern Ireland.  
 
 Abjection, therefore, covers a variety of processes that occur in overkill – it defines how the 
other is perceived and produced as well as the violence that is done to the other. This abject 
violence further constitutes the other as abject. It finds resonance in our understanding of the abject 
as something that does not belong to our subjectivity and is therefore frightening, but at the same 
time the abject repulses us, it also attracts us – there is a dual operation of fear and fascination that 
ensures our attention remains fixed on the abject. Abject violence in overkill, specifically in the 
brutalisation of the body, is an attempt to do more than kill or harm the other, but is a means of 
conferring utter dominance, complete humiliation with or without the death of the other. As a 
condition of possibility for the weaponisation of the body, which follows from brutalisation, 
abjection defines the violence that the body-weapon commits in order to produce the maximum 
emotive impact upon its opponent.  
 
 In the next section, I will highlight each of the case studies, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
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and the Northern Irish prison protests between 1976-1981, respectively, in order to discuss what 
facets of overkill they illustrate. It is important to point out that this is not intended to be a 
comparative study of two cases, and so no comparison between the two will be drawn. Rather, each 
case study has been selected because of its ability to clearly illustrate two processes of overkill. 
 
Case Study Selection: What Rwanda and Northern Ireland Tell Us About Overkill 
 The first case study focusses on the brutalisation of the body in overkill, illustrated by the 
1994 Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan Genocide occupies a special place in the history of political 
violence because of the extremity of the violence that took place, and because of the speed with 
which the genocide was carried out. The violence that occurred, that was done to the victims’ 
bodies, was done at close range, was often highly sexualised, and was extreme. In addition to the 
well-known attacks on the victims that were done with machetes (Melvern 2004, Hatzfield 2008), 
there was the widespread use of sexual assaults and the use of vivisection (Appadurai 1998). The 
tremendous amount of attention paid to inflicting terrible suffering and humiliation on the bodies of 
the victims makes the 1994 Rwandan genocide a disturbingly clear illustration of the brutalisation 
of the body in overkill.  
 
 The first visible means of brutalising the Tutsi came through their discursive production as 
abject. In Chapter Five, this will be illustrated primarily through recollection, as well as transcripts 
of radio broadcasts from the state-supported radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, 
as well as editorials published in Kangura magazine that have been translated into English. Tutsi 
were commonly referred to as inyenzi which translates to cockroach. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, this was an intentional comparison that not only dehumanised the Tutsi, but produced 
them as a despised creature, gaining resonance for the dehumanisation of the Tutsi by juxtaposing 
them with a deplored insect with connotations of disease and filth. In addition to this juxtaposition,   
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Tutsi sexuality was produced as deviant, sometimes in the same piece (Human Rights Watch 1999).  
The propaganda campaign leading up to the 1994 genocide provides multiple and clear illustrations 
of the dehumanisation and discursive production of the Tutsi as abject.  
 
  Abjection is also visible not only in the discursive production of the Tutsi, but in the kinds 
of violence that occurred during the genocide as well, specifically sexualised violence and the 
practice of vivisection. Vivisection refers to the dissection of a still living being and is argued by 
Arjun Appadurai (1998) to have played an important role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide by 
providing a means by which the genocidaires could point to and prove difference between the Hutu 
and Tutsis. The vivisectionist violence of the genocide was also highly sexualised and occurred 
alongside the staggering amount of sexual violence that occurred and was itself abject. Because of 
the extremity of the violence and the tendency towards sexual violence, the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide provides clear illustrations of the intersections of ethnicised and sexualised embodiment as 
conferred upon the body by brutal, abject violence.  
 
 The second case study examines the weaponisation of the body in overkill, using empirical 
illustrations from the prison protests that occurred in HMP Maze (also known as the H-Blocks) and 
Armagh Gaol between 1976-1981. The men and women incarcerated and participating in the 
protests were Irish republicans resisting what they saw as the illegal occupation of Ireland by the 
British. Ex-prisoners held in both the H-Blocks and Armagh recount tales of abuse that particularly 
in the case of the male prisoners was strikingly sexualised. I discuss this sexualised violence against 
both women and men in the prisoners as a means of feminising the prisoners in a bid to subdue and 
pacify them. The prisoners resisted their abjection and feminisation first through the Blanket and 
then the No Wash Protest.  
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 The No Wash Protest is particularly interesting because of its weaponisation of the 
feminised body and a mimesis of the alterity the prisoners faced as a result of the incarceration. The 
No Wash Protest involved in addition to a refusal to wash, the refusal to ‘slop out’ i.e. to dispose of 
their bodily wastes, which they instead smeared over the walls of their cells. This is one illustration 
of how the weaponisation of the body in overkill operationalises the abjection that is produced 
through the brutalisation of the body. The No Wash Protest was ultimately a failed exercise, largely 
because of its weaponisation of the feminised body and because the language of the protest, the use 
of faeces and menstrual blood, was too far beyond the comprehension of the people working in and 
outside the prison to understand. It ended with the Hunger Strike Protest which resulted in the 
deaths of ten young men. The Hunger Strike Protest still uses the language of the abject – the 
transformation of the virile male body into a corpse – but it is articulated from a position of 
militarised masculinity. In this way the weaponisation of the body through the Hunger Strike 
Protest is reclamation of agency, dominance, and of masculinity.  
 
 I will reiterate at this point that the two case studies presented in this thesis are in no way 
meant to be compared to one another. Rather, each of the cases provides a clear illustration of one 
of the facets of overkill that I draw out in this project and they are presented to illustrate one aspect 
of this phenomenon. The weaponisation of the body is interesting in this regard because it is reliant 
on the brutalisation of the body, which is to say that the weaponisation of the body occurs as a result 
of its brutalisation. Weaponisation is the radical deployment of the abjection that occurs in 
brutalisation, and as I argue in Chapter Six, it is successful in the case of the 1981 Irish Republican 
Hunger Strike in which it is driven by the reclamation of the strikers' (and more broadly the 
republican prisoners') masculinity. Further research beyond the scope of this project will examine 
the extent to which successful bodily weaponisation is typically a reclamation of masculinity and/or 
the resistance of marginalised masculinities and femininities against a normalised-hegemonic 
masculinity.  
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 This thesis will begin by tracing the gap in the literature on ethnic conflict. That gap is 
around the existing literature's unsatisfactory interrogation of the following question: why does this 
abject and sexualised violence occur in some cases of violent identity politics? After discussing the 
gap in the existing literature, I will present two conceptual frameworks that help address this gap, 
which are the understanding of identities as performative and intersectional, and an understanding 
of abjection, to demonstrate that the identities that become radicalised towards overkill or as a result 
of overkill emerge from a constellation of difference markers that make up what we consider to be 
‘ethnic’ identity. From here, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the Northern Irish prison protests will 
be discussed in order to provide an empirical illustration of the concepts discussed in the preceding 
two chapters. Finally, the thesis will conclude by restating the contribution to the existing literature, 
discussing the ways in which overkill emerges as a specific form of political violence, and 
discussing the ways in which overkill and the intersectionality of ethnic identity can be developed 
in future projects.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 To begin addressing this research question and hypothesis, I will introduce the current 
literature on ethnic identity and violence to identify the gaps in this field of scholarship. Much has 
been written about ethnicity, ethnic identification, and the nature of ethnic violence, but an 
examination of this body of literature reveals a disconnection between the literature on ethnic 
identity and the literature on ethnic violence. More specifically, it appears that despite 
acknowledging that ethnic identities are socially constructed, the ethnic violence literature largely 
continues to treat ethnic groups as though they were enduring historical realities and not simply 
enduring in the minds of group members. In the case of Rwanda,  the categories of ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ as ethnic groups are acknowledged to be largely inventions of colonisers (des Forges 1999), 
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with the terms ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’, and ‘Twa’ indigenously referring to much more fluid group 
classifications. Yet reports such as those published in The New York Times (see Gray 1994), and 
Human Rights Watch (1998) covering the genocide in Rwanda refer to the Hutu and Tutsi as 
distinctive, recognizable groups with a history of ‘bad blood’ between them. Group identities can be 
and often are exacerbated around ethnic tensions, with clear contemporary motives and causes such 
as economic resources or political gains, but the resulting conflict is then explained in terms of the 
groups' historic continuity. Investigating violent identity politics in such a way that traces a line 
from identity formation through to its radicalisation may provide a more holistic view of conflict.   
 
 More importantly, it appears that scholarship on violent identity politics has been largely 
unable or unwilling to account for the sheer horror of some instances of ethnic violence, which 
seems to produce a much more visceral type of violence then other types of conflict, and one that is 
largely inflicted upon bodies that are characterised in certain ways. In other words, some instances 
of ethnic violence include bodily violence on a shocking scale, and the ethnic conflict literature has 
not taken major steps in determining how these attacks on the body come about. The critical 
literature on ethnic violence has done the most to move research in this direction – Allen Feldman 
(1991) argues for the body to be the focal point of analysis in political violence, Lee Anne Fujii 
(2010) argues for the communicative value of extra-lethal violence, and Arjun Appadurai (1998) 
highlights the importance of vivisectionist violence for ‘discovering’ and producing ethnic 
difference. These contributions will be discussed at the conclusion of the literature review chapter, 
and will highlight the contribution of this project by outlining what overkill takes into account that 
previous critical understandings of ethnic violence have not – namely the intersectionality of 
ethnicisation and sexualisation in producing abject bodies and abject violence.  
 
22 
 
 After examining the literature on ethnic violence to identify the gaps which I aim to fill, I 
will introduce the concept of performativity. Performativity as laid out by Judith Butler (1990) 
claims that identity is based entirely upon the continuation of certain normalised practices. I will 
discuss the role of the gendered body in Foucauldian analysis of power and violence as it informs 
an understanding of performative identity and the role of the body, ending with an argument for the 
merits of performativity in examinations of bodily political violence. Because one of my central 
claims is that the ethnicised body and the sexualised body are similarly constituted and similarly 
performed, which leads to the abject violence we see in ethnic conflict, this chapter will set up the 
theoretical grounding of my thesis – simply put, that performativity has much to offer scholars 
interested in the performance of identity and the embodiment of identity in political subjects. 
Performativity is, I will argue, the best way to attempt to bridge the gap between ethnic identity and 
ethnic violence, as it demonstrates how individuals form their identity, the tensions inherent in the 
assignation of unstable categories and what is lost in this, and the intersection between different 
modes of identification. Performativity also allows for a discussion of abjection in the formation of 
identity, and the importance of adherence to and the dangers of transgression from normalised 
practices of identity in the production of the self and the other.  
 
 Once I have shown how the concept of performativity helps us to understand violent identity 
politics, I will examine the roles of sexualisation, pain and embodiment in identity politics as 
integral to the performance of radicalised, violent identity. Taken together, I believe that the 
sexualisation of the ethnicised body, radicalised in times of serious tension and stress, can become 
weaponised in ways that directly reflect this sexualisation. This process of sexualising the 
ethnicised other taps into feelings of abjection that are produced in association with that other. The 
ethnicised other, I argue, fosters more than just a feeling of difference, but also a feeling of precarity 
and insecurity that makes it a target for the visitation of physical manifestations of that abjection in 
the form of violence. Abjection is the terror and disgust of being confronted with the other, whether 
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that is on a bodily, micro-level or a macro-social level. Abjection is formed through exclusion and 
repulsion.  
 
 To support this claim, I will be examining Julia Kristeva's Powers of Horror (1982), as well 
as Judith Butler’s Precarious Life (2004) and Frames of War (2010), to foster a theoretical 
understanding of the connection between abjection and real political violence. Within this chapter, I 
will also be discussing the use of pain as a political tool as outlined in Elaine Scarry's The Body in 
Pain (1985). This connection, between the sexualised body of the other, the embodiment of identity 
and abjection, and subsequent radicalisation I argue is the key to understanding the particular type 
of violence that is evident in some cases of ethnic violence. I have called this violence ‘overkill’, to 
reflect its extreme, abject, and sexualised nature, and to indicate that this violence is more than 
instrumental or even symbolic in its attempt to eradicate and destroy. Rather, in addition to 
eradicating the other, overkill seeks to humiliate and to subordinate so thoroughly as to deny the 
subjectivity of the other.  
 
 Having situated my work within the field of violent identity politics and ethnic violence 
studies in particular, and within a framework  of a performative theory of abjection and identity in 
Chapters Three and Four, I will examine two different dynamics of violent identity politics: the 
brutalisation of the body through the 1994 Hutu-led genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the 
weaponisation of the body through protests that erupted within HMP Maze at Long Kesh and 
Armagh Gaol in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s. The intention of this thesis is not to 
compare the two cases, but rather to use each as a means by which to discuss a different dynamic of 
the performance of ethnic identity through sexualised violence. Each adds a different dimension to 
the study of this intersection of sexualisation and ethnicisation, illustrating through its own dynamic 
the ways in which bodies are brutalised in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and weaponised in Northern 
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Ireland, and when identities radicalise and shatter. However, while these cases are different, what 
they have in common is a high degree of intersectionality between the ethnicised body, the 
sexualised body, the production of bodies as abject, and the performance of this abjection through 
abject violence. In other words, they are illustrative examples of what is meant by overkill, though 
they best illustrate different stages.  One key difference between these two cases that is important 
for this thesis that that in the first case of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the abjection of the Tutsi is 
the result of the machinations of another group (the Hutu). In Northern Ireland, the protagonists 
take on their abjection – they 'abject' their own bodies to render them as weapons as a result of the 
abjection and brutalisation they received whilst in prison/  
 
 The first empirically focussed chapter presents the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a case study 
in which the body is brutalised through sexual violence, mutilation, and vivisection. In 1994, a 
group of Rwandans known by themselves and others as the Hutus led a genocidal campaign against 
another group, the Tutsis, lasting approximately one hundred days and resulting in the deaths of an 
estimated 800,000 people, namely Tutsis and moderate Hutus. International reaction to the 
Rwandan genocide was quite similar to that of the Bosnian crisis, namely that it was result of 
primordial tensions that had spilled into the twentieth century, as illustrated by some of the 
journalistic reports from both conflicts, published in the The New York Times (Gray 1994; Sudetic 
1994, Burns 1993), calling to mind the ancient hatreds hypothesis of ethnic violence. The United 
States was reluctant to become involved in the conflict because of its exploits in Somalia, and a fear 
that the American voting public would not accept military engagement in ‘another’ African war 
zone (Sciolino 1994). Sciolino (1994) for The New York Times wrote: ‘no member of the United 
Nations with an army strong enough to make a difference is willing to risk the lives of its troops for 
a failed central African state with a centuries-old history of tribal warfare and a deep distrust of 
outside intervention’.  
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 The genocide in Rwanda is interesting for this study in terms of the way the body as a target 
of violence was utilised, but also given the extreme intimacy with which it was carried out. The 
identities of the perpetrators were not concealed and victims often knew their attackers. The method 
of killing was also quite intimate, as the genocidaires largely favoured the machete. There is no 
barrier in the Rwandan genocide behind which the weaponised body may gain distance from its 
target,  the brutalised body. This method of killing was hand-to-hand and face-to-face. And while 
this certainly speaks to the extreme brutality of the genocide, and the human element of horror, it 
also implicates the body of both perpetrator and victim in ways that are different to Northern 
Ireland. Appadurai (1998) argues that the brutality and the mutilation of the victims by the 
genocidaires was an attempt to understand what made the other so different to the self, a hunt to 
understand what the real, biological differences between us and them could be.  
 
 In addition to the extremely personal method of killing, the Rwandan genocide featured a 
highly sexualised construction of the other, particularly with respect to Tutsi women. Prior to the 
genocide, a competitive opposition between Tutsi and Hutu women was discursively produced, 
where the former were largely considered to be more beautiful and more attractive (Human Rights 
Watch 1996, 16). Their beauty was connected to their outsider status, as the Tutsis were mythically 
constructed as more European than their Hutu counterparts as part of the Hamitic hypothesis 
(Mamdani 2001). Tutsi women were particularly emphasized as differences were to become more 
and more defined, and their differences took on a highly sexualised nature. Tutsi women thus 
occupied a position of unattainability which stirred resentment from both Hutu men and women, 
and were primed to be viewed largely as sexualised others. Further illustrating this, as the genocide 
loomed  larger in the nearer future, Tutsi women were represented as sexually depraved, 
representations that were splashed throughout political cartoons (see Figure 1). Rwanda therefore 
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highlights the sexualisation of the other during ethnic violence, while also adding a new dimension 
of abjection of the other in terms of the violence committed more generally.  
 
 The second case study illustrates the weaponisation of the body that can occur as a result of 
the brutalisation of the body in overkill. During ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, prison inmates 
convicted of paramilitary activity were held under what was called Special Category Status, which 
afforded them many of the rights and privileges granted to political prisoners. This status was 
especially important to republican prisoners who saw themselves as engaged in a struggle against an 
illegitimate, colonising power because it added political legitimacy to their claim. Under Special 
Category Status, they were implicitly recognized as freedom fighters, not as criminals. The removal 
of Special Category Status under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s program of criminalisation 
was a serious issue of legitimacy and identity. The practicalities of the criminalisation program 
included the instatement of prison work and the enforcement of the prison uniform (limited to the 
men in Long Kesh) among other things, but the implications of criminalisation ran much deeper 
than simply refusing a uniform – by refusing the uniform, the prisoners at Long Kesh were refusing 
an admission of criminality.  
 
 The refusal of the prison uniform, and with it the refusal of acknowledgement of criminal 
status, sparked a sustained period of violence and resistance within Northern Irish prisons, 
particularly HM Prison Maze (also called Long Kesh or the H-Blocks) and Armagh Gaol. It is 
important to note that while there was widespread violence throughout Northern Ireland during this 
period, and many lives were lost as a result of the conflict, the events of Northern Ireland did not 
involve the same style of systematic slaughter experienced in Rwanda. It is apparent therefore that 
abjection and bodily violence can occur in ethnic conflicts that are not defined by genocidal 
programs, and the body may become weaponised or brutalised even to the point of death without 
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the desire for the destruction of the entire group.  Violent identity politics of this nature need not fall 
into the category of genocide in order to exhibit such extreme forms of violence.  
 
 Protests occurred in other prisons throughout the period, but these two locations saw the 
most dramatic and infamous events. The protests began in the H-Blocks with the Blanket Protest in 
1976, in which prisoners refused a uniform and instead wore their prison-issue blanket. It escalated 
to the No Wash Protest in response to brutal and consistent assaults on the prisoners, which were 
largely sexual in nature. After years of the No Wash Protest, the prisoners in the H-Blocks played 
their strongest card, sending ten men to their deaths in a hunger strike that included many more 
strikers and volunteers. While the men’s protest was viewed as appalling and the prison system 
lambasted for its treatment of the prisoners, the women’s was viewed as something much more 
deeply scarring, for the women were not only surrounded by their own urine and faeces, but also by 
their own menstrual blood. The presence of menstrual blood complicated the view of the women’s 
protest, for it made the No Wash Protest an issue that was both republican and feminist, challenging 
the normative silence around menstruation as their bodies were materialised as sexualised women 
(Aretxaga 1997). The No Wash Protest in both prisons used effectively the same tools (bodily 
waste), but were met with different responses, and ultimately, both failed. I will discuss how two 
apparently similar protests produced such radically different responses because of the 
communicative power of the abject.   
 
 It is the protest action of the republican prisoners that will be the focus of this case study of 
Northern Ireland. These protests represent a mode of bodily weaponisation in which the intended 
target of violence, the state, is out of reach, and the body of the perpetrator is effectively the only 
weapon available to them. The hunger strike in particular demonstrates this, as it is intended to 
effect political change. The prison protests also demonstrate the degree to which sexualisation and 
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subsequent hierarchies contribute to violent identity politics. As my analysis will demonstrate, the 
dynamics in place within the prisons were ones that relied on the feminisation and the subordination 
of the republicans, both male and female. This feminisation in turn relied upon sexualised violence 
and domination. The prison protests problematised this feminisation in both prisons and, wielded by 
both sexes, the body became weaponised, and potentially re-masculinsed, through a process of 
becoming abject. This illustrates the intersectionality of the sexualised and ethnicised body through 
its weaponisation. 
 
 I will conclude by showing the ways in which this project addresses a gap in the existing 
literature on identity and violent identity politics. I am interested in investigating and understanding 
the relationship between ethnic identity and violent identity politics in order to better categorise 
extreme violence and to understand how it may come about. So far, the existing literature has not 
accounted for the extremity of the violence, or the considerable attention to the sexualised body in 
these cases. This has left a lacuna in our ability to understand and predict or to intervene upon such 
cases of extreme violence. In order to adequately address and respond to this kind of violence, we 
must first be able to understand it. 
 
 This sexualisation of the ethnicised other is largely absent from the discussion of ethnicity, 
despite the sexualisation of the other consistently appearing as a notable element of violent identity 
politics through sexualised violence. Both concepts of performativity and abjection demonstrate the 
importance of sexualisation in establishing the identity markers and parameters of both the self and 
the other. Furthermore, performativity allows us to examine the tendency of identities to intersect 
with one another, which accounts for the high degree of sexualisation in ethnic conflicts, and the 
high degree of sexualised violence. 
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 Addressing this gap does more than add to the discussion of ethnic or violent identity 
politics. An understanding of how extreme violence can erupt from identity formation and 
radicalisation can allow us to observe patterns in violent identity politics, patterns that may provide 
a predictive framework for the intervention upon these conflicts before they erupt into overkill. This 
is the main contribution of this project – in categorising the kinds of identity formation and 
abjection that allow for the radicalisation of identity necessary to produce overkill, it may be 
possible to recognise these processes before the violence begins.   
 
Methods 
  The initial iteration of this project called for interviews to be conducted with ex-prisoners in 
Northern Ireland, based on the desire for primary data collection and for the data to reflect the 
experiences of the subjects. Concerns arose with this methodology, the first being the imbalance 
that would result between the two case studies.  Because of funding, time, and language constraints, 
it was not possible to conduct similar interviews in Rwanda – narrative data from the 1994 
Rwandan genocide would have to be collected from existing living history projects. As is the case 
with Northern Ireland, there is a wealth of living history, narrative, and interview data that has been 
collected, archived, and made accessible. A collection of open-ended interviews that have been 
translated into English are available for researchers at the Columbia University Library in New 
York City, and I was able to access these interviews as a Visiting Scholar in the winter of 2013.  
 
 Another major concern with interview collection in Northern Ireland was the ethical 
approval required for the project to move forward. The project itself raised concerns around risk and 
safety. The people who would be interviewed were considered vulnerable adults because of their 
time spent in prison, and so the ways in which this would be navigated needed to be taken into 
consideration. The emotional and physical safety of the interviewees needed to be considered. 
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However, given that they were imprisoned on charges of violent crimes, the interviewer was 
theoretically also in a position of precarity. Despite the fact that there was little chance of real 
danger to either interviewer or interviewee, the application for ethical approval forces the researcher 
to consider the potential of doing harm, and in particular emotional harm, in the process of data 
collection.  
 
 In the end, only two interviews were conducted and neither was usable for the project. One 
was not usable because of its content: the subject had requested to be a part of the project but was 
not actually imprisoned in Northern Ireland at the time. The second interview was unusable because 
the interviewee withdrew her consent to the interview after it was completed. The interview was 
unsuccessful even without the withdrawal of consent, but the withdrawal meant that even trying to 
salvage some of the data impossible. While this seemed like a catastrophe at the time, it forced the 
reconsideration of the rationale behind conducting interviews and how this would work within the 
project, rather than simply assuming that interviews were the best way to conduct original research.  
 
 In large part, the interview was unsuccessful because it was difficult to conduct a semi-
structured interview around questions of gendered, sexualised, and ethnicised identity without 
priming the interviewee. Questions about gendering proved particularly difficult in this regard, 
which makes sense when considering Judith Butler's (1990) argument that performative structures 
create the things they seek to name makes sense – processes of gendering are obscured so that they 
continue to operate in power relations. Because the goal of the data collection was to determine 
whether or not there were iterative processes of gendering, sexualising, and abjection occurring, 
priming the interviewee to answer in such a way that answers were framed in order to match the 
interviewer's expectations or hopes – in other words to contaminate the data.  
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 The reconsideration of the methodology of the project required a reconsideration of what the 
conceptual positioning, which is so heavily reliant upon performativity, required. Both case studies 
have been previously investigated not only by journalists and scholars but by legal analysts and 
living history archivists. Living history projects, such as the Dúchas Living History Project, the 
Prison Memorial Archive, and the Rwandan Genocide Memorial, have done a great deal of work 
collecting and preserving narratives of memory and extreme political violence. The Dúchas Living 
History Project and the Rwandan Genocide Memorial have collected these living histories via 
interviews that are audio and video recorded, respectively. These interviews are structured around 
very broad, very open ended questions such as ‘where were you living?’, and the interviewee is 
given the space to recount as much of their experience as they wish. This is important, because it 
allows victims of violence (and perpetrators of violence) to relay their own narration, and their 
words can be used to discuss their own experience. The generality of these questions is also 
important because the interviewee has virtually no discursive exposure to what the interests of the 
interviewers might be. Therefore when these histories reveal processes of ethnicisation, 
sexualisation, and/or abjection, they are more organic, less at risk of the interviewer contaminating 
the process. The Prison Memories Archive operates in a similar fashion; however, the histories 
collected have a spatial element as well, as interviewees are often brought to the prisons before 
telling their stories. 
 
 Supplementing this narrative data, there is a significant amount of archival and ephemeral 
data surrounding both conflicts. The University of Texas in conjunction with the Genocide 
Memorial at Kigali have transcribed hundreds of hours of radio broadcasts and have digitised 
archival issues of magazines. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also digitised 
much of the testimony, evidence, and decisions. In Belfast, researchers have access to the Dúchas 
Living History Project on the Falls Road, as well as the Irish Times microfiche archive and the 
indomitable Linen Hall Library's Political Ephemera Collection, as well as the Cardinal Thomas o 
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Fiaich Archive in the rectory of Armagh Cathedral in Armagh. This archive contains a substantial 
collection of ephemera, a good deal of it collected after the No Wash Protest and Hunger Strike 
Protest and related largely to protest action over strip searches. This primary data supplements the 
narrative history data by demonstrating the discursive productions of the subjects in a way that is 
divorced from recollection. 
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Chapter Two 
From Blood Ties to Bloodshed?: Identity Formation in Understanding Violent Identity 
Politics 
 
Introduction 
 
 This thesis seeks to understand how extreme, sexualised violence emerges in some instances 
of identity politics through an investigation of the intersectionality of ethnicised identity and 
sexualisation in abjection. This project is important to the overall study of political violence as it 
attempts to identify and understand the conditions under which identity may become radicalised to 
produce extreme violence, and what this new, radicalised identity seeks to communicate and 
accomplish. In order to arrive at this understanding, I have classified this violence as overkill to 
illustrate that it reconstitutes the political subjectivities of both the victim and perpetrator through 
the abjection of the sexualised and ethnicised body. 
 
 This chapter will examine the existing literature on violent identity politics in order to 
identify the gaps that this project will address. The existing literature frames violent identity politics 
in specific ways that fail to address some of the issues that I find particularly compelling within the 
field, namely why violence that occurs during some struggles over identity is so virulent or, as Lee 
Ann Fujii labels it, ‘extra-lethal’ (see Fujii 2012). Fujii uses this concept of the extra-lethal to ‘refer 
to face-to-face acts of violence that are intended to transgress shared norms about proper treatment 
of persons and bodies’ (Fujii 2012, 1). Over the course of this project, I will propose the use of the 
term 'overkill' to describe these types of violences, in order to account not only for the extra-
lethality of Fujii's analysis, but to highlight that these acts of violence are of a distinctly abject and 
sexualised nature. To do this, I will begin by examining the literature on the formation of large 
group identity, specifically ethnic identity, before moving on to a discussion of previous work on 
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ethnic violence as a sub-set of violent identity politics. This is to understand what has been under-
theorised in the existing scholarship in violent identity politics, namely extreme violence, and how 
it relates to identity formation and identity conflicts. Because the conflicts I am interested in are 
often framed as ethnic conflicts, I will be focussing upon the literature on ethnic identity and ethnic 
conflict.  
 
Examining the existing literature  
 Thomas H. Eriksen (2001, 42) defines identity politics as ‘political ideology, organization, 
and action that openly represents the interests of designated groups based on 'essential' 
characteristics such as ethnic origin’. The study of identity politics forms a significant and 
important part of the overall body of political scholarship, but the existing explanations of the 
formation of identities that become politicised and then potentially radicalised towards violence is 
varied, and contains considerable contradictions and disagreements. Mary Kaldor (1999) defines 
identity politics as ‘movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial, or religious identity for the 
purpose of claiming state power’ (Kaldor 1999, 76). Her definition is consistent with Eriksen's 
(2001) and my own interpretation of identity politics as a struggle for political control by a group 
defined according to ascribed criteria. Kaldor's definition, with its emphasis on mobilisation, moves 
closer to an understanding that resonates with the radicalisation towards conflict. 
 
Some of the literature that will be examined in this chapter on ethnic and ethnonationalist 
violence has highlighted single factors, such as economic competition (Gellner 1981), that may 
have causally contributed to some conflicts. As a result, many of these investigations have left a 
number of questions still unresolved, questions such as how identity politics can sometimes produce 
extreme forms of violence. In fact, suggesting that there may be a ‘cause’ of ethnic conflict is itself   
misleading, because the presence of two or more ethnic groups in a single geographic location does 
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not always, inevitably, spark a conflict–two groups may engage in conflict with one another in one 
location and coexist peacefully in another. Furthermore, violent identity clashes are dynamic, 
variable events that are inextricably rooted in the contexts out of which they arise, and we are 
therefore unlikely to find one root, and importantly one static cause that translates across so many 
varieties of contexts. There are, however, certain key similarities that appear across many of the 
conflicts that erupt into overkill. That identity politics must be present in order for violent identity 
politics to emerge is perhaps an obvious statement, but what is not obvious is what is meant by 
identity particularly in the context of ethnicity, nor how it arises and how it becomes radicalised 
from identity to violent identity. My argument is that the performance of intersecting identities in 
some cases, namely ethnicised and sexualised identities, produces a new kind of political subject 
that is radicalised to violence when combined in abjection. Abject, sexualised violence is performed 
as part of a new kind of political subjectivity, but this sexualisation as a process through which 
ethnicisation occurs is under-theorised by the existing literature.  
 
 I understand intersectionality to mean the mutual constitution through mutual performance 
of overlapping dynamics, and in the context of overkill, the ethnicisation and sexualisation of the 
body of the individual. Viewing ethnicity in this way, as intersectional, disrupts the idea of ethnic 
classifications as fixed, and problematises the idea of ethnic group affiliation as an inherently causal 
variable in violent identity politics. While an understanding of the ingroup members’ affiliations to 
one another is paramount to the formation of the group, my argument is that the markers of 
difference that define group boundaries are often sexualised, thereby linking the performances of 
the ethnicised to the performances of the sexualised. This is to say that ethnicity, sexualisation and 
abjection intersect with one another. This suggests the importance of understanding how identity is 
constituted and how differences are performed for the study of violent identity politics.  
 
36 
 
 In the ethnic conflict literature, ethnic identity is primarily accepted as a socially constructed 
concept, the formation of which is largely attributable to the contemporary socio-historical moment. 
The extent to which ethnic identity is ‘constructed’ or ‘primordial’ was debated between Ernest 
Gellner and his former student Anthony Smith at the Warwick Debate, held at Warwick University 
on 24 October 1995 (Bellamy 2003, 4). Smith contends that ethnic groups ‘can trace a lineage back 
to antiquity’ but that these roots ‘need only be subjective’ (Bellamy 2003, 4), while Gellner argues 
that ethnic groups ‘claim an ancient heritage...that is actually a wholly modern construction’ 
(Bellamy 2003, 4). However, it appears that when debates shift to discussions of ethnic conflict – 
that is conflict between two groups of different ascribed ethnicity – ethnic identity is treated as 
historically enduring, and temporally fixed.  Despite acknowledging the role of the social in the 
construction of ethnic groups, constructivists such as Gellner (1981) treat ethnic groups as cohesive 
and fixed in order to explain how they interact with each other and the world around them.  
 
 This lack of engagement with the nature of identity formation in discussions of identity-
based conflict has left considerable holes in the literature on violent identity politics, as the 
emergent rationales (e.g. instrumentalism, modernisation, elite entrepreneurship) are unable to give 
a satisfactory account of not simply why violence occurs but why this kind of violence occurs. 
Specifically, it is unable to account for the ways in which this violence, characterised by its 
sexualisation of the other and the high level of attention that is paid to the bodies of the targets of 
violence, occurs in these types of conflicts. The underlying assumption is that there is a qualitative 
difference between this type of violence – overkill – and other kinds of violence because of the 
extreme and abject nature of this violence, but that this difference has been adequately explained by 
the exiting literature. The extraordinary character of this violence is gaining some recognition in the 
existing literature, which has moved the conversation on from more traditional conceptions of 
violence. Tom Nairn (1997) highlights this in his critique of modernism specifically, citing ‘the 
suspicion that modernisation theory was simply over-rational and ‘bloodless’ as an explanation for 
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processes in which so much non-reason is typically manifested, and so much literal blood has been 
spilt’ (9). He contends that modernisation theory ‘accounts for the material or vested interests in 
nationalism rather than its ‘spell’...articulated around high-cultural politics rather than low-cultural 
glamour and popular identity’ (Nairn 1997, 9).  
 
 Nairn (1997) aphoristically says ‘the old presuppositions of modernism are losing their hold; 
but no one knows what new ones will replace them’ (in Bellamy 2003, 7). More recently there has 
been work into the role of the body in ethnicity as part of a wider focus on ethnic conflict. This has 
examined the ethnicised body specifically as it pertains to the extra-lethal forms of violence that 
occur in some instances of violent identity politics. Arjun Appadurai (1998) relates the idea of 
uncertainty over verifiable differences between groups to what he calls the practice of vivisection in 
the Rwandan genocide. His use of vivisection is critical for imparting what he considers one of the 
key aims of extreme brutality, which is discovery (Appaudrai 1998, 11). He argues that vivisection 
was utilised in the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a means by which one group, the genocidaires, could 
pinpoint a pseudobiological difference that distinguished his group from the other, the Tutsi 
(Appadurai 1998, 11). I agree with his point, but would take it a step further in pointing out that 
much of the violence in these conflicts takes on a distinctly sexualised form, which suggests that it 
is worth examining the intersection of the sexualised identity with the ethnicised identity as it is 
played out through and on the bodies of individuals.  
 
'Terminological Chaos': Defining the Terms of the Debate 1 
 In what follows, I will focus upon the ethnic group that has a political aspiration2, in order to 
                                                 
1. The phrase 'terminological chaos' appears in Connor, Walker (1978) ‘A Nation is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic 
Group, Is a...’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (October): 377-400.  
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narrow the focus of this project to the ethnic group as the ethnonation (or simply the nation). This is 
largely because of the impact of political subjectivity on identity, which contributes to the 
radicalisation of identity. This is not the same as a state, although ‘nation-states’ will combine an 
ethnic and a legal component. A nation may find its boundaries congruent with those of a state (thus 
creating a nation-state), but this is not always the case. When it occurs that these are not congruent, 
the lack of an autonomous state becomes problematic for the nation (as opposed to the ethnic 
group): Anthony Smith (1971) argues that ‘nations can only be fulfilled in their own states’ (20-21), 
and Ernest Gellner (1983) argues ‘nationalism…requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut 
across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state…should not 
separate the power holders from the rest’ (Gellner 1981, 1).  
 
 While Gellner and Smith disagree on the origins of the nation, their definitions of the nation 
share the sense of an aspiration to political autonomy alongside an ethnically charged, territorial 
identification. Additionally, within a poly-ethnic state, there is considerable importance placed on 
the balance of power, in that ethnonations would strive to avoid domination by another group. This 
idea of domination is important to an understanding of overkill, as this kind of violence 
communicates the domination of one group over another. In order to arrive at an understanding of 
how groups of individuals become ethnicised, and how this ethnicisation interacts with other 
identifications through abjection to produce violence, I will begin by examining how the ethnic 
group is produced by reviewing the existing literature on ethnic identity groups and the formation of 
ethnic identity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 The need for the distinction between ethnic group and ethnic nation is a source of contention in the literature, in part 
because it is difficult to conceive of an ethnic group that is devoid of political aspiration. Rothschild (1987, 115) 
suggests that the creation of this distinction serves to devalue the political aspirations of those groups seeking 
statehood with respect to others who may not. For the purposes of this thesis, referring to the nation as an ethnic 
group with a political aspiration is an analytical device to allow for the examination of literature that uses both terms 
without agreeing upon a difference between them.  
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 In the existing scholarship on ethnic groups, nationalism, or ethnic conflict, an immediate 
problem consistently arises – the existing scholarship has yet to settle upon an agreed definition of 
the central terms. Anthony Smith wrote ‘ethnic communities, so easily recognizable from a 
distance, seem to dissolve before our eyes the closer we come and the more we attempt to pin them 
down’ (Smith 1986, 2). At a distance, it appears that ethnic groups can be viewed as distinct 
entities, with people falling neatly into categories such as Hutu and Tutsi. On closer examination, 
the reality of the situation is that ethnic group identification is fluid and membership is often 
externally ascribed (Eltringham 2004). Additionally, many of the characteristics that define ethnic 
belonging are absent in some cases. Joseph Rothschild defines ethnic groups as ‘complex collective 
groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties and who 
perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socio-
economic structures of their state and society’ (Rothschild 1987, 115). Rothschild goes on to 
highlight the importance of ‘grievances...and anxieties’ in the contemporary imagination of the 
ethnic group (Rothschild 1987, 115). His understanding of anxiety and grievance as important to the 
contemporary understanding of the ethnic group is important, but he does not include the external 
ascription of the ethnic group in his definition. This external ascription of identity is important for 
understanding how groups become abjected.  
 
  According to Anthony Smith, an ethnie consists of : 
1.Symbolic, cognitive, and normative elements common to a unit of population.  
2. Practices...that bind them together over generations. 
3. Sentiments and attitudes that are held in common and which differentiate them from other 
populations (Smith 1986, 97).  
 
This differs in some respects from Frederick Barth’s (1969) definition of the ethnic group as a 
people that: 
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1. Is largely biologically self-perpetuating [due largely to practices of endogamy]. 
2. Shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms. 
3. Makes up a field of communication and interaction. 
4. Has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as constituting a 
category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. (Barth 1969, 10-11).  
 
Despite the considerable degree of variation, a few important similarities emerge from these 
definitions. One of these is the emphasis on the psychic dimension of ethnic identification. By 
psychic I mean the psycho-emotional internalisation (Butler 1999, 19) of ethnic identification. 
Additionally, both Smith and Barth highlight what they respectively call ‘normative elements’ and 
‘fundamental cultural values’. There is a distinctly social element to the formation of the ethnic 
group, but one that is intrinsically felt by the individual. There is also a normative element that 
dictates the conduct of the individual, prescribing the actions of the individual in accordance with 
the larger social order. 
 
  In explaining the difficulty in providing a concise definition for either ethnicity or 
ethnonationalism, and in an attempt to explain the sometimes unpredictable effects that it has on 
global politics, Walker Connor asserts that its ambiguity stems from the fact that the core of a 
nation is ‘intangible. This essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in 
the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way’ (Connor, 
1978, 91). Connor stresses the psychological nature of nationalist sentiment, citing Freud’s 
examination of the unconscious (Connor 1993, 203), and criticising the scholarly community for 
demonstrating such ‘scant respect for the psychological and emotional hold that ethnonational 
identity has upon the group’ (Connor 1987, 73). He argues for the importance of cultural symbols in 
‘triggering’ what he calls the ‘nonrational core of the nation’ (Connor 1993, 203). These assertions 
of the psychic and normative cores of ethnic affiliation are important to the radicalisation of identity 
41 
 
towards overkill, as they allow for understandings of nonrational attachments to groups as well as 
the importance of norms as markers of difference.  
 
There are two predominant schools of thought concerning the origins of the nation and the 
impetus behind ethnic identity formation. The divide between the constructivist school of thought 
and that of the primordialists was amusingly cast in the Warwick debate by Ernest Gellner 
(Mortimer 1999, 31) and Anthony Smith (Mortimer 1999, 36) as a debate over whether or not 
nations have navels. Gellner argues that the analogy makes perfect sense—if Adam were created by 
God, as a creationist would argue, then he would be missing a navel (Mortimer 1999, 32), as navels 
are the by-product of the umbilical cord and therefore birth as we understand it. Likewise, if nations 
were a natural phenomenon concurring with the creation of man, nations would not have their own 
navel, which in this case is understood as traceable bloodline. Smith's understanding of the navel of 
the nation differs slightly from Gellner’s in that for Smith it represents ‘the memories and traditions 
and myths’ of the nation (Smith 2004, 79).   
 
For primordialists, particularly Anthony Smith, the point of departure from the modernists is 
the psychic importance of so-called premodern ethnic roots within groups, and not their actual 
existence. This is to say, whether or not the past happened as it is recalled is irrelevant to the fact 
that nations assign themselves these deep, intractable roots. According to Hale (2004), the real 
argument between the primordialists and the constructivists is not, in fact, simply a matter of 
ancient versus modern; rather, it is the extent to which ethnicity elicits an emotive response (Hale 
2004, 462), by either elevating or suppressing in estimation the strength and durability of 
psychological bonds. It makes sense, then, for Anthony Smith to have re-titled primordialism as 
‘ethno-symbolists’ (Bellamy 2003, 4). It appears then that the debate between primordialists and 
constructivists can be recast as the divergence between the historical and the contemporary. This 
42 
 
division is rooted in the conflicting epistemological context of the ethnic—where one side analyses 
the past historical foundations of a group, the other examines its arrival at the current historical 
moment.  
 
There are considerable issues with primordialism as a tool for theorising ethnic 
identification, nationalism, and ethnic rivalry. Anthony Smith himself criticises primordialism as 
‘untenable,’ accusing it of ‘assum[ing] what is to be explained: why human beings are so widely 
differentiated by ethnic origin and culture’ (Smith 1996, 457). Primordialism also fails to offer an 
explanation for why ‘groups evolve or devolve, how some people are able to assimilate to other 
ethnic groups, and why some ethnies are ferociously, militantly xenophobic while others are more 
relaxed’ (Smith 1996, 457). However, social constructivism, an umbrella term for a number of 
theories of ethnic groups that take ethnic groups to be largely a modern and social construct, may 
only tell that part of the story that is relevant to a modern historical moment. By focusing upon the 
constructed elements of ethnic identification (and thereby those elements that may be de-
constructed), constructivism may downplay the strength of ethnic groups’ emotive hold. 
 
 Constructivism does not imply that ethnic associations are not real or are otherwise 
illegitimate, nor does it dismiss the importance of history out of hand. Constructivism focuses on 
ethnic nationalism as a direct result of the contemporary social and political climate rather than the 
result of a genealogical heritage passed down through generations: ‘[m]embership in an ethnic 
groups is a matter of social definition, an interplay of the self-definition of members and the 
definition of other groups’ (Wallerstein 1960, 131). In the following section, I will discuss social 
constructivism in more depth. It is important that social constructivism argues for the ethnic group 
to be understood as a social phenomenon, but equally important of this study is what it leaves out, 
namely the arrival at extreme violence.   
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Modernism as a subset of social constructivism emphasises the importance of the 
contemporary cultural and historic moment in understanding nationalism. Gellner’s modernist 
argument asserts that some nations may have a navel, and some may not, but that ‘[e]ither way it is 
not essential’ (in Mortimer 1999, 32). The nation, modernists argue, is a construct of the recent 
creation of the state, and economic and social revolutions that, along with increasing mobility 
between and among societies, made the human race more anonymous (Mortimer 1999, 33). Ethnic 
groups emerge as a response to this anonymisation, so that people may have a sense of belonging in 
an otherwise isolating world. According to Gellner, what appear to be psychological factors are 
actually psychological response to external, functional factors – belonging to a nation is not 
inherent to mankind, but with the progression to the modern age, it has become accepted as such 
(Gellner 1983, 6). The ‘paradox’ of nationalism is that it must be defined as a consequence of the 
age of nationalism, rather than the other way around (Gellner 1983, 55).  
 
 In Smith’s view, modernism is not so much incorrect as incomplete, and Gellner himself 
stipulates that if the modernist approach only tells ‘half the story,’ then that half is enough for him 
(Gellner 1999, 33). The half of the story that modernism here seems to ignore, and that is 
problematic for primordialists, is the half that unpacks the main concerns that surround questions of 
nationalism and ethnicity—their endurance over time, and their unpredictability in global politics: 
‘[i]n other words, the relationship between pre-modern ethnic ties and modern nationalism is the 
key to a large segment of modern national and international politics’ (Smith 1996, 447). Here, 
Smith is allowing for the modernists' claim that nations may in fact be recent constructs, but their 
roots are not – however the modernist argument would claim those ‘ancient’ roots are invented or 
imagined, not experienced by the people who make up the contemporary nation (Anderson 1983). 
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 What emerges from this confusion over the definition of ethnicity are some important agreed 
upon ideas, and some of which are problematic. The psychic importance of ethnic identification and 
the critical salience of boundaries between groups that are politicised by norms are fundamental to 
understandings of ethnic nationalism and identification. However, the contestability of the term 
'ethnic group', its origins and its foundations, problematise it as a stable category, and therefore as a 
causal variable in conflict. There is something important about ethnic identity for these conflicts, 
but what it is about how such groups are formed that allows for this violence remains under-
theorised. What can be drawn out from this ‘great divide’ (Bellamy 2003, 4) is an understanding of 
the power of the psychic connection of individuals to the ethnic nation, and that it is to some degree 
discursively produced3. I argue that a critical problem with this debate is that both primordialists 
and constructivists treat ethnic groups as cohesive and therefore as stable categories, which does not 
map on to the dynamism of ethnic conflicts. This becomes a problem in the literature on ethnic 
conflict, which uses this problematic vocabulary in order to address a complex question – why do 
conflicts emerge between some ethnic groups, and why do some of these conflicts produce 
particularly virulent forms of violence?   
 
The Existing Literature on Ethnic Conflict and its Limitations  
 I have argued that the theories of primordialism and constructivism are so epistemologically 
divided that in order to speak to one another, theorists have had to treat ethnicity as a stable 
category. This has meant the loss of the dynamism and fluidity of ethnic identification in the gap 
between the natural and the social, the historical and the contemporary. This becomes problematic 
when this term, ethnicity, is used to explain certain forms of violent identity politics. In what 
follows, I will examine the existing literature on violent identity politics in order to understand how 
violence is seen to emerge from ethnic identity. The following themes have dominated scholarship 
                                                 
3 This discursive production can be deduced from Smith's use of 'ethno-symbolism'. 
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and shaped the ways in which scholars and policy makers think about ethnic violence: 
modernisation (Gellner 1983), theories of securitisation (Posen 1993), and more recently, ethnic 
terrorism (Volkan 1997) and chauvinist masculinity (Hayden 1993). The former two appear to 
distance themselves from the question of identity formation entirely, while the latter two nod to its 
constructed nature before treating it as natural, without addressing how its formation informs or 
paves the road to conflict. What emerges from an examination of these theories is that the issue of 
extreme violence remains either unaddressed, or treated as aberrant. My argument is that overkill is 
productive of violent subjectivities that define groups according to sexualised violence that 
communicates difference. In what follows, I will discuss what the existing literature tells us about 
violent identity politics to better understand the scope of what remains to be uncovered.  
 
Resource Competition and Modernisation 
Theories of ethnic conflict that stress conflict's relationship to modernisation call attention to 
two recurring themes: ‘the role of elite ambitions and the role of differential modernization of 
ethnic groups in fostering conflict’ (Horowitz 1985; 2000, 101). According to Gellner (1983), this is 
in large part because of the inherent differences between the structure of an industrial society and an 
agricultural one. Within the former, ‘territorial and work units are ad hoc: membership is fluid...and 
does not generally engage or commit the loyalty and identity of its members’ (Gellner 1983, 63). 
Because identification is no longer provided by any overarching social structure, as would be the 
case in, for example, a feudal society, ‘[t]he nation is now supremely important, thanks both to the 
erosion of sub-groupings and the vastly increased importance of a shared, literary culture’ (Gellner 
1983, 63). Because modernisation is, as Huntington puts it, a process of homogenisation that 
‘produces tendencies towards convergence among societies’ (Huntington 1971, 289), it is not 
surprising that people, particularly those engaged in perhaps the earlier stages of the modernisation 
process, may find this simultaneous devolution of identity combined with an expectation of 
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coexistence with those previously considered outsiders to be threatening, and in response to this, 
would create communities that were defined by the creation of boundaries, and by extension, 
exclusive. Exclusion does not necessarily ensure conflict, but where conflict is present, 
exclusionary identity is necessary in order to understand who belongs to the group, and who is 
outside of it.  
 
Because of this ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1982) familial bond, Gellner refers to ethnicity as 
‘entropy resistant’, which he defines as ‘based on an attribute which has a marked tendency not to 
become, even with the passage of times since the initial establishment of an industrial society, 
evenly dispersed through the entire society’ (Gellner 1983, 64). This implies that while certain 
identities such as social status may become more evenly dispersed throughout a given society over 
time, certain others may not. This will be particularly true for those ethnic groups that emphasise 
endogamy. Such entropy-resistant groups create ‘fissures, sometimes veritable chasms, in the 
industrial societies in which [they] occur...’ (Gellner 1983, 65). From this we can extrapolate that 
those identities that refuse to be assimilated will protect themselves by keeping others out. Looking 
back at the definition of ethnic identity as laid out by Smith (1986) and Barth (1969), and 
understanding ethnic identification as largely dependent upon the structuring and restructuring of 
the boundaries between us and them, this fortification of boundaries will likely occur in areas where 
ethnic group members are more likely to interact with people outside their group, and hence have a 
need to draw these borders.  
 
Modernisation may also increase competition between ethnic groups (Bates 1974, 460), 
particularly when the benefits of modernisation are not felt by all groups at the same time.  Using 
developing countries in Africa as an example, Bates argues that modernity creates an inherent 
dissatisfaction as it is increasingly ‘valued’ (Bates 1974, 460), meaning communities place a high 
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regard on relative modernisation. He continues, saying ‘the goods it [modernity] represents are 
scarce in proportion to the demand for them. The inevitable result is that people compete [for] land, 
markets, and jobs’ (Bates 1974, 460). This creates a new system of stratification, based on 
competition, but one that is also informed and works in tandem with previous systems that formed 
around traditional social structures (Bates 1974, 461-462). Much of this has to do with colonial 
administrations' grouping of peoples according to ‘tribal lines’ that provided administrative and 
land access to specific groups (Bates 1974, 466). Over time, this led to demands by ethnic groups 
for exclusive districts wherein they could control the resources and in turn the benefits of modernity 
and exclude outsiders (Bates 1974, 467). This power seizure along group lines created ethnic 
competition, with groups have differentiated access to resources and power under the colonial 
system, and ‘[t]hose groups which are more wealthy, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be 
envied, resented, and sometimes feared by others’ (Bates 1974, 462).  
 
Bates's (1974) goal is to suggest ‘a way of looking at ethnic behaviour that emphasizes that 
it is a dynamic and rational behaviour’ that addresses the effects of modernity upon previously 
traditional societies (Bates 1974, 475). In doing so, Bates has agreed with Gellner’s assertion that 
ethnic group behaviour is due largely to the impact of modernisation on traditional societies and 
peoples. But like Gellner, in his desire to distance ethnicity from claims of a primordial foundation, 
Bates does not adequately address the symbolic nature of ethnic conflict, instead focusing on group 
desires to gain ground over others that they see as economic competition. While desire for 
economic or resource superiority no doubt plays some role in ethnic conflicts, particularly in 
competitions between nations, competition for resources alone does not explain the ruthlessness 
with which inter-ethnic violence is carried out. For example, as Horowitz (1985) points out, it also 
does not explain why some of the most horrific examples of ethnic violence have been carried out 
in parts of the world that are not considered modern (Horowitz 1985, 103), or do not demonstrate 
sharp economic disparities.  
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While modernisation theories of conflict provide an interesting analysis of the backlash of 
some ethnic groups against the homogenising effects of modernity, and expose how instrumental 
concerns such as economic factors can drive some conflicts, it provides little explanation for the 
types of violence that ethnic conflicts can produce, specifically extreme sexualised violence.  By 
this I mean that while it may explain one potential motive for ethnic violence, it does not account 
for the extremity of the violence with which I am concerned. Even extreme competition does not 
explain why this kind of violence, overkill, occurs, because it does not address the radicalisation of 
identity through the sexualised abjection of the other. Resource competition may be a compelling 
motive for conflict, but it does not account for the sexualised violence with which this thesis is 
concerned. 
 
Anarchy and the Security Dilemma  
The security dilemma in ethnic violence studies is derived from the theory of the security 
dilemma in international relations (Cordell and Wolff 2010, 26; see also Waltz 1979). It is based on 
the assumption that the international system is one of anarchy, and that in order to survive as 
sovereign entities, states must ‘seek security through the accumulation of (military) power’ (Cordell 
and Wolff 2010, 26). This assumption of an anarchical world order and the resulting emphasis on 
security stems from the realist school of international politics, which Barry Posen calls ‘the longest 
standing and most useful school of international relations theory’ (Posen 1993, 27). Posen argues 
that anarchy ‘leads to a competition for power that in turn inspires insecurity in neighbours’ (Posen 
1993, 28). Posen applies this to the ethnic violence that occurred in Eastern Europe after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, arguing that the power vacuum that occurs in the wake of an imperial 
collapse creates an ‘emerging anarchy’ (Posen 1993, 27) that results in a bloody struggle for power 
and security between competing groups. Power, sovereignty, and therefore, security, are seen as a 
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zero-sum game, which makes competitors much more likely to eradicate groups that they see as 
threatening. 
 
Because the security dilemma in international relations essentially describes the way that 
groups view themselves as sovereign or deserving of sovereignty and have a desire to either gain or 
express that sovereignty will interact with one another, it can be used to explain the interactions of 
such groups in other circumstances. The security dilemma of international relations can be used to 
understand the security dilemma of interethnic or intranational relations in a system that bears a 
condition of anarchy, and provided that one or both of the opposing groups have some desire for 
self-rule. The security dilemma in interethnic relations as with international relations claims that 
ethnic violence emerges as the result of a real or perceived threat. David Lake and David Rothchild 
(1996) argue that ethnic conflict is not caused by pre-existing, historical tensions or ‘ancient 
hatreds’ that simply boiled over with the collapse of imperialism, as primordialism may claim, but 
rather that ‘intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future’ (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996, 41). The collapse of the ruling authority is the catalyst for ethnic conflict, because 
it inspires new fears about the security of the ethnic groups that are left behind after the collapse of 
a higher authority. At the core of these conflicts, the authors argue, is ‘ethnic fear’ (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996, 42).  
 
In a strong state, strategic violence is the prerogative of the central authority (see Weber 
1921), which is for clear reasons not the case in a failed or weak state (Fearon 1995, 384). When 
this decline occurs, or threatens to occur, groups begin preparing to fight for their survival, and 
these preparations, an integral part of what Lake and Rothchild identify as the strategic dilemmas 
important for ethnic conflict, may actually put the cycle of violence into motion (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996, 43). Anxiety about the use of violence by others as a means to gain political or 
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economic control may arise, and in the rush to ensure ones’ own safety, the security dilemma 
emerges: ‘what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make 
one less secure’ (Posen 1993, 28). This is because ‘[r]elative power is difficult to measure and is 
often subjectively appraised’ (Posen 1993, 28), and measures taken by one group to increase its 
security will inspire a reaction in its opposition.   
 
Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue ‘[a]s information failures, problems of credible 
commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive... and conflict 
becomes more likely’ (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 41). They suggest that the fears which set these 
strategic dilemmas in motion arise from a weakening of the state, which need not be as catastrophic 
as the collapse of a state or empire, but may be as subtle as uncertainty for the future (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996, 44). This weakening of the central authority of the state, real or imagined, sets up 
the three strategic dilemmas that Lake and Rothchild argue must exist, either alone or in tandem 
with one another, in order for ethnic conflict to emerge. At the start, they argue, is ‘competition for 
resources’ (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 44): because the state holds the power to allocate resources, 
any perceived weakening of the state will naturally inspire groups to begin competing to ensure 
that, should the state wither, their needs will still be met. Lake and Rothchild stipulate that since 
violence uses up so much of the resources that competing ethnic groups are trying to secure, this 
competition is not enough to guarantee an eruption of violence (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 46).  
 
The second dilemma, ‘[i]nformation failures’, occur whenever one group possesses 
information that it intentionally withholds from the competing group (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 
47). This creates ‘problems of credible commitment’ as fears that the other group will break 
promises for peace or cooperation in the future grow from this inequitable distribution of 
information (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 48). Groups with the potential to be in conflict with one 
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another have obvious incentives to hide aggressive behaviour (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 47), to 
avoid losing any strategic advantage, and even those groups without aggressive tendencies ‘may 
prefer to absorb even high costs of war today to avoid being exploited tomorrow’ (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996, 48). This begins the third and final dilemma, the security dilemma in interethnic 
relations. Fear that the other group may be hiding aggressive intentions can be enough to incite 
groups to begin preparing for war. In turn this may inspire the outgroup to either begin preparations 
themselves, or to strike first.  
 
 For those theorists that conceptualise ethnic conflict as essentially an issue of security, the 
idea that ethnic conflict is based on divisions of ethnicity is regarded as something of an accident, 
suggesting that where society is previously divided along ethnic lines, competition will naturally 
form itself as one between ethnic groups (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 45). Despite raising and 
explaining the necessary issue of fear that almost certainly plays a major role in explaining the 
particularly bloody quality of ethnic conflict, the security dilemma places a considerable emphasis 
on both static group identification and an incremental and strategic escalation of violence, both of 
which I find problematic in providing either an explanatory or descriptive framework for extreme 
violence. Importantly, Lake and Rothchild (1996) do not ignore factors such as myths, memories, 
and emotions in creating a narrative of the emergence of conflict. According to the authors, these 
emotional factors play a role in conflict, in that they ‘build upon...fears of insecurity and polarize 
society’ (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 41). These internal catalysts, according to the security dilemma, 
create a set of intragroup interactions that nurture fear and hatred as a group is preparing for a 
potential conflict to erupt, and can prove the tipping point from political or economic competition to 
outright bloodshed.  
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 What is problematic here are two assumptions4 – the first is that the security dilemma 
assumes that ethnic groups are sufficiently internally cohesive for fear to be an end point of identity 
expression, rather than a causal variable of identity formation itself. The symbolism upon in which 
these conflicts are grounded is questioned in the security dilemma – Paul Roe (1999, 189) points 
out that both Posen and Stuart Kaufman (1996) question the empiricism of the historical grievances 
in intrastate conflicts. But the stability of the category of the ethnic group itself is not addressed, 
and this foundational premise of a cohesive group that becomes violent assumes a large part of what 
is to be explained, at least for this project. The question that this thesis attempts to answer is not 
only why ethnic groups may become violent towards one another, but why some ethnic conflicts 
become violent in abject, sexualised ways. Given my argument that overkill is productive of violent 
subjectivities, the fear that traditional theories suggests emerges from an existing group is in 
contrast to fear as being a major factor in what forms those groups.  
  
 More recent work on the security dilemma in ethnic conflict has allowed for greater 
variation in both ethnic identification and ethnic fear (Rose 2007, 9). William Rose (2007) cites 
Badredine Arfi (1998)'s argument that earlier iterations of the security dilemma does not 
‘satisfactorily explain the emergence of ethnic fear and violence’ (Arfi 1998 in Rose 2007, 9) 
because it views groups as fixed, and not as variables. Arfi (1998) argues instead that it is the 
restructuring of ethnic groups that creates fear and insecurity (152), and this restructuring and 
concurrent destabilisation confuses the pattern of interethnic interactions, and this is what leads to 
fear of the other group. While I take issue with the causal importance of elite manipulation that Arfi 
argues to be the first step in this restructuring (Arfi 1998, 153), and his framing of intraethnic 
behaviour as a structure under which individual members of a group operate (Arfi 1998, 152), I 
agree with his basic assumption that ethnic groups undergo a dynamic shift in ethnic conflict. 
                                                 
4 Other concerns that the use of the security dilemma to explain ethnic conflict include its applicability to ‘small’ 
conflicts (Xu 2012), and the lack of an anarchical system in intrastate conflict (Kaufmann 1996 in Roe 1999).  
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Where I diverge from his claim is when this shift takes place and how, arguing instead that the 
radicalisation of group identity produces the identity of the group, rather than taking the group as a 
given unit that then changes in response to destabilisation. Instability, I will demonstrate in the 
following chapter on the concept of performative identity, is always inherent in identity formation.  
 
 Furthermore, the security dilemma assumes a strategic and incremental escalation of 
violence that appears misaligned with the violence that occurs in the cases of identity politics with 
which I am concerned.  Overkill is, rather than an incremental or instrumental increase in violence, 
asynchronous, lacking a logic of escalation, and instead erupting quickly and violently. This is in 
large part due to the rational underpinnings of the security dilemma as a whole – there is an 
emphasis on fear as systemic (Ignatieff 1993, 16 in Roe 1999, 190) and systematic, increasing in 
tandem with the actions of the other group. More recent applications of the security dilemma to 
ethnic conflict, such as Rose's (2007) essay, emphasis that the extremity of the violence of ethnic 
conflict stems from the intensity of the insecurity felt by the group (or groups, where alliances 
form). Insecurity and fear as seen in the security dilemma may explain isolated acts of symbolic 
violence that are similar to the types of violence that I have described as overkill, and could go as 
far as to consider them communicative of the group's strength as a deterrent to the other, but would 
regard the repetition, and indeed the day-to-day nature of overkill as strategically profligate.  
 
Group Comparison Theory 
Complementing his emphasis on the psychological factors inherent in nationalist sentiment, 
Walker Connor (1972) provides a possible explanation for the spread of particularly contentious 
forms of ethnonationalism, emphasising the importance of the media in allowing militant 
ethnonationalist sentiment to gain such strong footholds around the world. According to Connor, 
the increased communication with a world beyond a nation’s own immediate borders has, rather 
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than promoting assimilation, produced the opposite, serving rather to further entrench 
ethnonationalist identification by more clearly delineating the boundary between us and them, and 
promoting a message of self-determination (Connor 1972, 1994: 38).   
 
After unpacking some of the more prominent explanations for ethnic conflict such as 
modernism, instrumentalism and pluralism, Donald Horowitz (1985) argues that such theories are 
insufficient for a variety of reasons, in large part due to the fact that they emphasise different 
aspects of ethnic conflict while downplaying those elements of ethnic conflict that do not fit with 
their proposed theory (Horowitz 1985, 140). Of pluralism, a sociopolitical condition of multiple 
groups, in this case ethnic groups, he argues that it assumes a ‘clash of incompatible values,’ while 
those that emphasise modernisation or other economically-based claims credit a ‘struggle for 
resources’ (Horowitz 1985, 140). These are problematic, he says, because they contradict one 
another in the first instance, and focus on wholly different aspects of conflict in the second 
(Horowitz 1985, 140). More problematic is what they do not address, the features that I would agree 
with Horowitz are some of the most important of ethnic conflict: ‘the significance of symbolic 
issues' and 'the important role of ethnic-group anxiety and apprehension’ (Horowitz 1985; 2000, 
140). Because these key issues go unaddressed, the level of violence and ensuing trauma continues 
to leave onlookers baffled. Horowitz asserts that in developing a comprehensive understanding of 
ethnic conflict, scholarship should focus on linking the assets of the above theories (i.e. pluralism 
and economic determinations), which he determines are their accounts of mass and elite concerns, 
respectively, and to account for those two variables that he has determined as vital (Horowitz 1985, 
140). ‘A bloody phenomenon,’ he argues, ‘cannot be explained by a bloodless theory’ (Horowitz 
1985, 140).  
 
Horowitz cites two phenomena—’group comparison’ (Horowitz 1985, 141) and ‘group 
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entitlement’ (Horowitz 1985, 185). Group comparison theory is the more complex of the two. The 
concept of group comparison is familiar from Barth’s (1969) theory of ethnic groups as defined 
principally by the maintenance of those boundaries that separate them from other groups (Barth 
1969, 14). If we accept this, we can understand Iris Marion Young’s (1997) theory of identity as a 
relational construct. Young argues that ‘[g]roup differentiation is best understood as a function of 
structural relations rather than constituted from some common attributes or dispositions of group 
members’ (Young 1997, 385). This suggests that the differentiated identities of groups have more to 
do with differences from other groups than with commonality within a group, and the social 
structure that surrounds them than upon biological or ascribed attributes that members and members 
alone possess. Ethnic identification is a contemporary realisation, not a biological or even social 
certainty. Young’s account also helps to understand why ethnic groups that are geographically 
separated may have different experiences with other groups, even if those other groups are the same 
across regions.  
 
This relational understanding of ethnic identity does more than explain how ethnic groups 
may arise or even interact, as it unpacks Horowitz’s first critical variable in the exposition of ethnic 
conflict, that of group comparison.  Horowitz says that group comparison results in ‘the struggle for 
relative group worth’ (Horowitz 1985, 143).  The question of group worth, he argues, becomes 
salient when groups find themselves interacting with one another, and from these interactions, 
‘[s]tereotypes crystallize, and intergroup comparisons emerge’ (Horowitz 1985; 2000, 143). The 
goal of these comparisons is to create a ‘favourable evaluation’ of the groups in question (Horowitz 
1985, 144), which is important to the group’s, and by extension to the individual’s, sense of self-
worth. These comparisons can stem from colonial structures of power that placed some groups in 
control of their neighbours, or that subjugated entire populations and left all seeking the approval of 
the colonisers. 
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It is reasonably easy to accept the notion that as social beings, individuals pursue a positive 
self-identity that emerges from positive reinforcement garnered from the rest of society (see Cordell 
and Wolff 2010, 38). The desire for a positive group comparison is an integral part of those 
explanations for ethnic conflict that centre on a theory of social identity and social-psychological 
explanations of conflict (see Cordell and Wolff 2010, 37). Ed Cairns (1982, 227) examines the 
conflict in Northern Ireland under the lens of social psychology, applying  a social psychological 
framework to a conflict that he believes has been incorrectly assumed to be  ‘a rational struggle for 
power in economic and political terms’. It is the intensity of the emotions surrounding the conflict 
in Northern Ireland that lead Cairns to believe that there is something more at stake than these 
'rational concerns, but these rational concerns serve an important function to provide tangible 
justification for conflict, and to ensure that it is enduring.  
 
Cairns uses Tajfel’s (1982) definition of social identity, writing: ‘[s]ocial identity will be 
understood as that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership’ (Tajfel 1982, 2). Cairns explains the implications of this theory by 
saying that Tajfel ‘suggests that we tend to structure our social environment in terms of groupings 
of persons...thus simplifying the world we live in’ (Cairns 1982, 278). This definition is left 
intentionally open-ended to allow for an interpretation of social identity as essentially fluid. Cairns 
supports Tajfel’s theory of social identity, ‘because the theory recognizes the powerful influences of 
economic and political processes, rather than attempting to ignore them as other psychological 
theories of conflict do’ (Cairns 1982, 295). It is through this that we begin to see emerge a much 
more complex understanding of ethnic conflict.  
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Cairns applies this understanding of ethnic violence as a multi-dimensional social reality to 
the situation in Northern Ireland, where the conflict has been treated as one of racial bias, and yet 
where those 'stereotyped cues' are 'slowly learned' rather than being readily visible to either side 
(Cairns 1982, 280). He argues that 'what exists in Northern Ireland is in many ways closely 
resembles a racial situation but it is essentially a ‘social construction of ethnicity,’ which is 
historically based' (Cairns 1982, 280-281; see also Burton 1978). Cairns goes on to say that this 
construction provides evidence for Tajfel’s conditions for important social categorization (Tajfel 
1974). The first of these ‘is that the division of the social world is made along lines which produce 
two clearly distinct and non-overlapping categories’ and that ‘there exists a serious difficultly...of 
passing from one group to another’ (Cairns 1982, 281).  
 
The social comparison and differentiation in the case of Northern Ireland appears 
particularly strong, given that ‘observers have been surprised to note that...the potentially cross-
cutting categories of sex and class are relatively unimportant’ (Cairns 1982, 281). Put another way, 
the process of differentiation and the maintenance of the ethnic boundary is so strong and so 
psychologically salient that it has managed to overshadow other forms of identification that may 
have allowed individuals to view themselves as something other than utterly distinct from the 
opposed group. I disagree with his argument and point to the gendered divisions and gendered 
violence in Northern Ireland. The impact of these comparisons is either a sense of a group’s 
inherent superiority, or an imposed inferiority and an accompanying victimisation. (Cordell and 
Wolff 2010, 39). This struggle for dominance is the result of a sense of group entitlement, also 
mentioned by Horowitz (Cordell and Wolff 2010, 39; Horowitz 1985, 185), and combines the 
desire for the instrumental powers (i.e. 'rational' explanations) as well as symbolic powers (Cordell 
and Wolff 2009, 39).   
 
58 
 
Social comparison theory brings us closer to an understanding of violent identity politics in 
its emphasis on a perception of distinct boundaries between groups, as well as through its allowance 
for tension and conflict as emergent from this boundary. What it does not provide is an account for 
the high degree of sexualisation of the other in extreme cases of violent identity politics, nor does it 
speak to the degree of abjection that is important in determining these boundaries. It is possible to 
deduce that the abjection of the other may be a function of the value placed on the other with 
respect to the self, but this presses the theory to its extreme. Suggesting that groups will view 
themselves as superior to other groups does not evoke the extremity of the violence that this project 
investigates, and most importantly does not account for the intersection of ethnicised identity with 
sexualised identity – and in fact, social comparison theory under Cairns claims that ethnicised 
identity supersedes any other large-group identification. All of these concerns make social 
comparison theory unsatisfactory for examining the types of violence with which this thesis is 
concerned. It is a considerable gain in terms of its emphasis on the boundary between groups, but 
does not investigate the formation and policing of that boundary enough to explore its utility in 
extreme violence. 
 
Elites, Fear and Ethnic Terrorism 
 More recent theories of ethnic conflict began moving the discussion towards explanations 
that consider psychological factors, providing a more complex understanding of the emotional tie to 
the ethnic group. Vamik Volkan (1997) expands upon the idea of elite manipulation as a factor to 
include the tie that the elites feel to the group. Volkan (1997) also asserts that while the number of 
ethnic conflicts may be decreasing with time, the conflicts that do arise are more violent in nature, 
and that if ethnic wars are on the decline, then ethnic terrorism is on the rise (Volkan 1997, 16). 
Volkan contends that this is because more terrorist attacks are being carried out by groups defining 
themselves along religious or ethnic, rather than secular lines (Volkan 1997, 16). He defines ethnic 
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terrorism as ‘situations in which terrorist leaders have excessive attachment to their large-group 
identity and seek to enhance it through widespread violence’ (Volkan 1997, 157). Ethnic terrorism 
emerges as a new category for two reasons, the first being that it allows for a wider range for targets 
of violence, including sites of cultural importance, and smaller scale attacks. It also suggests an 
increased dependence on a single leader or handful of leaders. The fact that terrorist groups are 
more often than not led by one, or perhaps only a few, individual(s) makes it an interesting platform 
for examining the role of elites, albeit in a small setting, in contemporary ethnic conflicts. The role 
of elites in ethnic conflict has often been demonstrated as a means for the personal gain of a few at 
the expense of the masses, and ethnic terrorism offers an evolution of this idea to address new forms 
of violence. Volkan offers a psychological investigation of those who seek control of an ethnic 
terrorist group, and his introduction of psychological analysis of terrorist leaders provides an 
interesting and new dimension. 
 
While psychological study of a terrorist organization’s leadership would be, at the very 
least, difficult5, Volkan cites the work of political psychologist Jeanne Knutson, who found a 
common thread amongst terrorist leaders in Northern Ireland: ‘all had been the victims of terror 
themselves, all had experienced violations of their personal boundaries that damaged or destroyed 
their faith in personal safety’ (Volkan 1997, 160). Because of these experiences of personal 
victimisation, ‘terrorist leaders tend to shore up their internal sense of self by seeking the power to 
hurt and by expressing their sense of entitlement to power’ (Volkan 1997, 161), and those who take 
a prominent role in terrorist organizations ‘have a psychological need to ‘kill’ the victimized aspects 
of themselves and the victimizing aspects of their aggressors’ (Volkan 1997, 162). We see this fear 
of domination and/or subjugation by a foreign other in Posen’s security dilemma, but here Volkan 
has scaled it down from an explanation of mass anxiety to that of the individual. In doing so, he 
                                                 
5 Recently, there has been more work done on the strategy and psychology of, in particular, violent dissident groups 
in Northern Ireland (see Horgan 2013). 
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allows researchers to see how memories of past victimisation can inspire actions of extreme 
aggression, not only in groups but within the individual. 
 
 Ethnic terrorism is rarely a successful venture (Volkan 1997, 159). While it may seem 
obvious that terrorism would have a limited impact in terms of creating real social and political 
change, the underlying reason for its lack of success is somewhat more subtle  —’the very fact that 
a terrorist leader clings so tightly to the terrorist group...works against the efficacy of the group’s 
officially stated goals’ (Volkan 1997, 163). The terrorist leader cultivates an inflated sense of large-
group belonging, and creates the terrorist cell as a response to a perceived need in the large-group 
community. The group, and the leaders’ role in aiding the group, are the primary sources through 
which the terrorist leader draws his/her identity. If the terrorist group were to actually meet its aims, 
‘it would no longer be needed and would eventually dissolve’, creating an ‘identity vacuum’ for the 
leader (Volkan 1997, 163). This crisis of identity is similarly picked up in discussions of abjection 
and precarity in identity formation, to which I will turn in Chapter Four, wherein the self is bound to 
the other in order to understand its identity.  
 
Volkan also provides an explanation for why masses paradoxically choose to follow ethnic 
elites even when there is no possibility of any real gain for them, material or otherwise. Volkan 
describes ethnic belonging as being huddled under a large canvas tent, which serves as an additional 
layer of protection against the outside world (Volkan 1997, 164). When terror ‘shake[s] the ethnic 
tent, individuals beneath it respond by strengthening their investment in ethnicity’ (Volkan 1997, 
164). In other words, when individuals perceive that their identity is threatened, members of the 
ethnic group may respond by firming up their ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, Volkan asserts 
‘[t]hat a leader is able significantly to influence a large group’s identity is a clear indication that the 
followers have internalized his message’ (Volkan 1997, 181).  
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Volkan’s psychoanalytical approach to ethnic terrorism and the role that a charismatic leader 
may have offers a more varied depiction of the role of elites in inciting ethnic violence than simply 
casting them as opportunistic manipulators of symbols in pursuit of the benefits of modernisation, 
instead carefully tracing the transition from victim to aggressor in individuals. He is also able to 
account for the ruthlessness with which ethnic violence can be carried out, particularly with respect 
to actions that perpetrators claim were orders passed down along a hierarchy. His depiction of these 
leaders as victims of terror who are determined not to be victimised again finds connection to both 
the role of chauvinist nationalism in ethnic conflict and is part of the basis of psychoanalytical 
approach to ethnic conflict. The idea of ethnic terrorism brings us closer to an understanding of the 
emotive weight of ethnicity, and its addition of the idea of victimisation to the construction of the 
group in general and the leader specifically is compelling. What it does not account for is the role of 
individual members of the groups who are not leaders – Volkan's hypothesis does not provide a 
satisfactory account of violence from the top down because of its focus on the leadership of groups, 
nor does it explain the sexualised nature of that violence. Volkan places a tremendous emphasis on 
the ability of leaders to stir people to action, but he does not investigate how they are able to so 
thoroughly manipulate masses as to provoke the terror necessary to produce overkill. He also does 
not account for why or how the targets of ethnic terrorism are sexualised in this process, or why 
sexualised violence in particular is so prevalent. 
 
Robert Hayden and Chauvinist Nationalism 
Robert Hayden (1993) begins bringing the vocabulary of domination and extermination into 
the discussion of violent identity politics, using empirical evidence from an ethnic conflict known 
for the considerable degree of sexualised violence in the civil wars that emerged out of the former 
Yugoslavia. He explains the collapse of the former Yugoslavia as ‘the triumph of chauvinist 
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nationalism’ (Hayden 1993, 73). Intellectuals ‘who abandoned previously held humanistic 
orientations for chauvinistic ones’ (Hayden 1993, 74) fuelled what he calls a ‘transition...from 
regimes of state socialism to one of state chauvinism’ (Hayden 1993, 74). He argues that 
justifications for nationalism come largely from beliefs of the narrators’ perspective as superior and 
the others as inferior (Hayden 1993, 74). These conceptions of internal superiority and external 
inferiority were not limited to ethnic intellectuals—Hayden criticises the standards of anthropology 
that dismissed the civil war in the former Yugoslavia as an Eastern perversion of Western 
ideologies (Hayden 1993, 75). He argues that war broke out ‘not because of eastern pollution of 
western rationality, but because of the political allure of chauvinistic nationalism is what has been 
called an ‘ethnic shatter zone’’ (Hayden 1993, 76).  
 
In order to unpack Hayden's understanding of violent identity politics, I will continue using 
his example of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia also provides an 
example of the type of violence with which I am concerned in this thesis, as the extremity of the 
violence falls very much into the category of overkill. Hayden argues that the interconnectedness of 
the people of Yugoslavia posed a problem for nationalists, and the partial-imagining of a Yugoslav 
community was a crucial component of the extreme blood-letting during the civil war (Hayden 
1994, 6). Volkan, whose work shares much of the base of chauvinistic nationalism, highlights the 
tendency for terrorist groups towards ‘a campaign of internally directed terror’ (Volkan 1997, 159), 
meant to silence opposition within the group and to create the imaginary of a unanimous voice. This 
imaginary was likewise necessary for nationalists in Yugoslavia, who were determined to prove that 
the ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia could not coexist under any arrangement that left them in a 
unified polity, which Hayden refers to as ‘empirical nonsense’ (Hayden 1994, 8). There were mixed 
regions that saw neighbourly interactions and, more importantly, mixed marriages, but to the 
nationalists with their plans of secession, ‘these mixed territories were not only anomalous, but 
threatening [emphasis added], since they served as living disproof of the nationalist ideologies’ 
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(Hayden 1994, 6). This more than anything, he argues, led to the extreme violence of the civil war, 
as ‘the mixed regions could not be permitted to survive as such, but their populations, which were 
mixing voluntarily, had to be separated militarily’ (Hayden 1994, 6). The single-minded emphasis 
on self-determination made the homogenisation of the populations of the republics an absolute 
necessity (Hayden 1994, 16), making the drive towards homogenisation by ethnic cleansing of 
territories an ideological necessity. Violence became an inevitability closing in on the republics 
from two fronts: the fervent need to expunge the other by bureaucratic and military means, and the 
resistance of the minority population to discrimination and/or forced resettlement.  
 
For Hayden, chauvinist nationalism is the incendiary mechanism through which ethnic 
difference erupts into ethnic war. Chauvinist nationalism is an intrinsically exclusionary doctrine 
that necessitates the dominance of the inherently superior ingroup over the inherently inferior 
outgroup. Through Hayden’s exposition of chauvinist nationalism, we are able to connect the 
intense fear of ethnic conflict with its sometimes seemingly disproportionate violence through its 
fears for and focus upon the purity of the ethnic nation. While he does not problematise ethnicity 
itself as a category, instead taking ethnic identification for granted, Hayden comes closest to my 
understanding of dominance and superiority in the traditional ethnic conflict literature, but he also 
leaves the question of how this identification leads to violence unaddressed. This epistemological 
shift in the understanding of ethnic violence that emerges after the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia from a modernist interpretation to one that is understood as a largely social or 
psychological phenomenon, and therefore distinct from other types of conflict, is immensely 
important. What emerges from this is an acknowledged inability to pin ethnic violence to one 
overarching catalyst. Ethnic conflict is a multi-faceted, richly layered category of violence, one that 
is based upon a dynamic and fluctuating categorisation of people.  
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Critical Interventions into Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict: Campbell, Fujii, and Feldman 
 More recently, there has been a turn towards critical understandings of ethnic identity 
formation and radicalisation towards conflict. In some ways these have begun as a critique of 
constructivism. Although constructivism accounts for the formation of identity in terms of the 
impact of the social –as opposed to the natural– to a greater degree than primordialism, its 
differentiation from primordialism is not as complete as it may appear. This becomes apparent in 
treatment of concepts such as culture or identity as fixed variables. As Lee Ann Fujii (2010) notes, 
‘constructivist scholars end up reifying identity or treating it as something people simply have, even 
as they acknowledge that the context...is subject to change’ (Fujii 2010, 2). In the context of 
political violence, this becomes particularly problematic because ‘[w]hen reifying groups, it 
becomes all too easy to link outcomes of violence to the supposed properties that inhere in groups’ 
(Fujii 2010, 3).  
 
 Here Fujii draws out a major issue with primordialist assumptions about the foundations of 
ethnic groups that are tacitly accepted by constructivist interpretations of violent identity politics, 
which I discussed earlier in this chapter. When groups are treated as internally cohesive, 
interpretations of violent identity politics slip back to primordialist assumptions about how those 
identities come about. Modernist approaches such as Gellner's refer to a certain coherence of groups 
the creates the conditions for competition. In turn this leads modernism to treat violence and 
competition both as inevitable, and as the result of identity groups that are formed prior to conflict. 
Extreme violence becomes an aberration, which obscures the attempt to examine what it may be 
trying to accomplish.  A framework for analysing ethnic violence must take great account of the 
emotional, visceral elements of ethnic violence while not reifying the category of ethnic groups and 
allowing it to stand as a causal variable 
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 One of the strongest critiques of constructivism was written by David Campbell (1992), in 
response to constructivist contentions with post-structuralism as framework for international 
relations. He argues that ‘[o]nce social practices are signified as culture and rendered as a 
substance, they are intelligible as variables’ (Campbell 1992, 217).  This is problematic because 
culture, and what constitutes it is 'under theorised...Considered briefly to be one of a number of 
‘summary labels for social factors’, ‘culture’ is figured as no more than that which is not material’ 
(Campbell 1992, 217). This means that identity itself is ‘rendered....as a variable that can be 
inserted into already existing theoretical commitments’ (Campbell 1992, 218). The critical 
complaint with constructivism, therefore, is that it takes an under-theorised concept, which 
Campbell identifies as ‘culture’ and which I have discussed as 'ethnicity', and uses it as a fixed 
variable in order to explain other phenomenon.  
 
 In the next chapter, I likewise argue that the theory of performative identity be applied to 
ethnicity. The groundwork for this has been laid with the work of Fujii (2010), who discusses the 
performance of identity in the context of extra-lethal violence. She argues '[i]f we start with the 
notion of identity as performative all the way down, then violence becomes a type of identity 
performance, rather than an expression of extant identities’ (Fujii 2010, 24). This is an important 
contribution to not only the wider literature but this project in particular, as it suggests that violence 
is constitutive of the violent subject, and not the other way around. This is important for my 
understanding of overkill as a means of conferring identity both on aggressor and victim. Fujii, 
however, focuses her research on violence that ends in the death of the victim (Fujii 2012), but that 
goes beyond simply killing, taking into consideration brutal murder as well as the desecration of 
corpses.  
 
 In a similar vein to Fujii, Allen Feldman (1991) also argues for performative understandings 
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of identity as particularly informative for the understanding of violence; however Feldman is 
concerned with identity not only as performative, but as embodied. His book about the conflict in 
Northern Ireland locates violence as spatial, and he goes as far as to call the book 'an ethnography 
of surfaces' (Feldman 1991, 2), wherein the primary space or surface is the body. In many ways my 
understanding of ethnic identity is in agreement with Feldman, given his focus upon identity 
formation as performative and embodied, but there are key moments of departure. Published prior 
to Campbell's (1992) strong critique of constructivism, Feldman (1991, 1) uses the same language 
of constructivism that Campbell finds problematic, notably his use of the term 'culture' and its 
precarious position as a variable. Feldman (1991, 1) locates violence in Northern Ireland within a 
'political' and 'material' culture that exists in tandem with 'an ensemble of performed practices'. I 
find this problematic largely because it closes the space for intersections of identity markers, where 
a mode of 'culture' is delineated as a set of markers rather than a constellation of markers of 
difference.  
 
 In connection with this, Feldman does not examine the impact of sexualisation or gendering 
on embodied violence, which is particularly striking given his careful and thorough analysis of 
interview data that explicitly and repeatedly references sexualised violence, from mirror searches to 
the use of prisoners' naked bodies as a means of humiliation (Feldman 1991, 193). Just as 
sexualised violence is absent from his discussion, also absent is the impact of gendering, as his 
analysis focuses exclusively on male prisoners to the exclusion of female prisoners – women are 
only brought into the discussion as they highlight the brutalisation of the men. For example, one 
interviewee describes the tit-for-tat humiliation of being arrested by a female officer, whilst 
assuming that she is likewise embarrassed to be in his presence as he is wearing only his dressing 
gown (Feldman 1991, 99). This is an important exclusion for this project, because it misses what I 
consider to be a key contribution of performative understandings of ethnic identity formation, which 
is its intersectionality with other difference markers.  
67 
 
 
 Following his critique of constructivism in Writing Security (1992) Campbell argues for a 
different conception of ethnicity in National Deconstruction (1998). Ethnicity in his later work as 
an non-referential signifier are a precedent for my own conception of ethnicity as a constellation of 
difference markers rather than as stable categorisation. Campbell argues that ‘[e]thnicity is...better 
understood as a component of the representational politics of identity/difference – particularly the 
identity of  'others'‘ (Campbell 1998, 92). Campbell attributes ethnicity to power and power 
relations, and that claims about the existence of ethnicity are less about a stable, instrumental 
variable, and are instead designed to ‘effect specific inclusions or exclusions, thereby recalling 
themes concerning the violence of representation and the order of intelligibility’ (Campbell 1998, 
93). He goes on to say that the violence with his argument is concerned, the Serb-Croat war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, was intended to ‘produce a society in which the divisions between people 
could be clearly seen and enforced’ (Campbell 1998, 93). Violence is in this way performative of 
difference, particularly as it distinguishes between ingroup and outgroup members. Campbell also 
destabilised the idea of ethnicity in his arguments, which foundationalises the understanding of 
identity politics in overkill. Violence in Campbell's work is constitutive of identity – overkill adds 
to this understanding of violence that it renders the other abject through sexualisation and 
sexualised violence.  
 
 There have been many important contributions to critical understandings of ethnicity and 
ethnic violence, and in particular some that have called for understandings of ethnic identity and 
ethnic violence as performative. It is within this body of work that this project is situated. I argue 
for ethnic identity to be viewed as performative, and for ethnic violence, and in particular extreme 
ethnic violence, to be considered as constitutive of subjectivity rather than as the by-product of a 
cohesive or pre-existing subject. However, the intersectionality of identity that becomes 
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comprehensible through a performative lens is under-theorised in much of the critical ethnicity 
literature, particularly with respect to the intersection of ethnicity as a constellation of difference 
markers rather than as a causal variable and the sexualised difference markers. It is here that an 
understanding of this violence as overkill, and therefore as performative of intersecting difference 
markers, makes a significant contribution to the existing literature. This intersectionality allows for 
the mutually informing performances of embodied ethnicisations and sexualisations in abjection – 
and this is the critical contribution of this thesis. This intersectionality and attendant sexualisation of 
the other is crucially left out of these discussions, and it is this sexualisation that defines the type of 
violence with which this thesis is concerned.  
 
Not Only Why, But How: The Missing Link in the Literature 
  There are consistent themes that are addressed in the literature on ethnic identity formation 
and ethnic conflict. These include the psychological pull of ethnic ties, and the emotional impact of 
identification that is felt by the ethnic community. Whether socially constructed or otherwise, it is 
undeniable that under certain circumstances, people feel their ethnicity strongly, and form a 
considerable emotional attachment to their group. The radicalisation of identity politics into 
extremely violent identity politics arguably lies in this emotional attachment, but how exactly this 
emotional attachment comes about remains unclear from the existing literature. Though it sheds 
light on the emotional gravity of ethnic affiliation by framing ethnic groups as familial in nature, 
primordialism is unable to account for violent identity politics wholly because of its assumption of 
the naturalness of ethnic identity, which is contradicted by the fact that ethnic identity is not always 
salient in the individual or within the group, and ethnic conflicts are themselves dynamic events. 
Ethnic groups express their identities differently according to different geographic or social 
contexts, and more problematically, people can move from one ethnic group to another – it was not 
uncommon in pre-1935 Rwanda, for instance, for people to change their ethnic affiliation according 
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to their circumstances because these groups were originally a different type of social categorisation, 
which were generally economic (Mamdani 2001, 98). These classifications became ‘racialised’ and 
‘naturalised’ by colonisers, in particular the Belgians (Mamdani 2001, 77). There are too many 
empirical contradictions to primordialism for it to underpin any theory of violent identity politics. 
 
 As has been previously shown, constructivism addresses the differential salience of ethnic 
affiliation, and allows for a permeability of ethnic group boundaries. It also dismisses the notion of 
ethnic affiliation as granted a priori, as an extension of the family. These are important departures 
from primordialism, as is the fact that constructivism privileges the specific contemporary cultural 
and historic moment in which ethnic groups operate, and out of which violence can emerge. While 
it does considerably more than primordialism to account for the permeability and malleability of 
identity, constructivism also struggles in this regard and remains too static a theory to account for 
much of what occurs in violent identity politics. It suggests a sort of top-down imposition of 
identification, where individuals are subjected to externalities such as modernisation or the 
manipulation by ethnic elites. While considerably more dynamic than primordialism, constructivism 
as a theory still remains too static to account for such a fluid phenomenon as identity formation and 
identity politics. 
 
 Another important factor that emerges from these discussions of ethnic identity is the 
relational nature of that identity, which suggests that in order to construct a coherent understanding 
of what a group's identity is, the group must have a collinear definition of what it is not. Identities 
cannot exist in a bubble, separated from their external context and from the groups that surround 
them and with which they must interact. Both primordialism and constructivism allow for this 
border and in fact include it in their respective definitions of ethnic groups, but after acknowledging 
its presence it is left unaddressed. I argue that this border does more than allow for the existence of 
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groups through a process of delineation, but rather propose that the formation of this border is 
inextricably linked to the formation of identity and the radicalisation of identity in violent identity 
politics. This border is formed through a process of separating the self-object from the other-abject, 
and it is through this process of abjecting the other that extreme violence can emerge.  
 
 Finally, there is the importance of the normative structures that inform identity that emerges 
from both primordialism and constructivism. While Barth (1969) does not explicitly use the 
language of normative identity, the idea fits with his discussion of 'share[d] fundamental culture 
values' (Barth 1969; 1998, 10-11). Normative identity, particularly as outlined by Foucault (1976), 
serves two purposes in its formation of ethnic identity. The first of these is the prescriptions it 
places on the behaviour of group members, which is to say that normative structures inform the 
appropriate performance of identity within the group. The second is its implication that what is 
outside the group is negative or abnormal. Normative behavioural prescriptions define what ‘good’ 
behaviour is for members of the group and carry a negative assumption about behaviours that do not 
fit this model. From this emphasis on the normative, we can begin to see where negative 
assumptions about outsiders or others take their root.  
 
 The problem that arises from the existing literature is the lack of a coherent understanding of 
how the formation of ethnic identity leads to violent identity politics. There is an acceptance of the 
performance of identity as being context-specific, and this contextualisation extends to discussions 
of violence. What is not clear is what about the formation of contextually formed groups that leads 
to violence under certain conditions. There is a failure of communication when violent identity 
politics is discussed, for largely these discussions ignore what has come before in the literature on 
identity formation. Theories such as modernisation and the security dilemma point to ethnicity as 
being a social phenomenon, but when they discuss ethnic groups in conflict, identity is treated as a 
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given, as a natural fact rather than a social one. While work has been done into the psychological 
impacts of ethnic group affiliation (Volkan 1997), this is still treated as a natural piece of human 
identity. 
 
 My contention is that addressing this gap in the identity literature also bridges the gap 
between identity formation and violent identity politics. Why groups will conflict with other groups 
is not, I argue, the important question, but rather scholars should be interrogating how conflict 
emerges from within these groups. How identity is radicalised brings us much closer to an 
explanation for extreme violence. What is needed is a concept of identity that allows simultaneously 
for its dynamism and the feelings of naturalisation that it inspires. Performativity provides an 
account for the psychological underpinnings of large-group identity formation, and also accounts 
for the ways in which one identity can intersect with another and inform its performance. This is 
important as not all individuals will perform their identity in the same way – the gender of the 
individual in question will impact strongly upon the ways in which they interact with not only their 
own group but with outsiders, and will necessitate different  behavioural norms. In explaining the 
psychological underpinnings of identity formation, performativity also accounts for what is left over 
in the formation of identity, which is to say that it provides an explanation for how the other is 
constructed alongside the self. This is key to understanding how identity is radicalised in order to 
produce extreme violence, and with its understanding of identity as productive and its emphasis on 
the creation of and adherence to social norms, performativity provides an interesting lens for 
examining the nature of overkill.  
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Chapter Three 
 'The Personal Is Political': A Performative Theory of Bodily Violence 
 
Introduction 
 This project addresses the extreme violence that emerges in some instances of identity 
politics. I will argue that where extreme violence emerges out of violent identity politics, there is a 
concurrent sexualisation and abjection of the body of the other. Central to my argument is that we 
gain a greater understanding of how this violence emerges by examining identity politics through a 
theoretical framework of performativity as was introduced in the previous chapter, following an 
examination of the existing literature on ethnic identity formation and ethnic conflict. Ethnicised 
and sexualised identities are both large group identities that rely on a high degree of normalisation, 
naturalisation and repetition. Both are constituted in ways that evoke a high degree of emotional 
attachment. Acceptable performances of identity become increasingly restricted through the 
emphasis on normalised behaviour, and pronounced when there is a potential for conflict to arise, as 
identity groups fortify their borders in response to the external threat of the other. Where ethnicised 
and sexualised identities are performed together, groups can become radicalised and produce the 
abject violence characteristic of ethnic nationalism. These performances, as well as their violent 
effects, are always visible at the level of the body. This chapter will introduce and explore the 
concept of performativity and the recognition of politicised identity as embodied, theories that have 
evolved from Michel Foucault through Judith Butler's work, and its usefulness in the examination 
of political violence and ethnic conflict.   
 
 So far, I have examined the existing literature on ethnic identity formation and violent 
identity politics in order to identify any gaps that could account for how extreme violence emerges, 
and what this violence attempts to do. I first examined the two primary schools of thought with 
regards to the formation of identity, primordialism and constructivism. While the former takes 
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ethnic identity to be natural and historically enduring, the latter takes ethnic identification to be the 
product of its social environment. What is compelling about ethnic identity as a field of study, 
however, is that it is empirically demonstrative of its contemporary nature, meaning that it appears 
clearly grounded in its contemporary time and place. However, it appears to act as a natural 
component of human identity. I take ethnicity to be a changeable, dynamic concept of one kind of 
group identity that is best understood as a constellation of intersecting markers of difference – an 
umbrella term for a large group differentiated by myriad potential markers of difference. I argue 
that ethnicity is best understood not a natural or a fixed category, and not a causal variable in 
violent identity politics, but is rather part of a constellation of markers of difference that make 
violent identity politics possible.  
 
 Campbell (1992, 226) argues 'identity is an inescapable dimension of being, rather than an 
epiphenomenal property', and proposes that a post-structuralist framework, specifically a 
performative concept of identity, is more revelatory of how identity operates because performativity 
'see[s] culture as a signifying part of the conditions of intelligibility that establish the conditions of 
possibility for social being' (221). Though undeniably important, Campbell's application of Butler's 
concept of performativity to international relations has been criticised, notably by Cynthia Weber 
(1998), for failing to address the role of the sex/gender binary in international relations. She argues 
'[t]he unintended effect of Campbell's use of Butler is to performatively underplay and/or exclude 
sex, gender, and sexuality from International Relations investigations of sovereign nation-states as 
performative effects of discourse' (Weber 1998, 79).  
 
 Performativity as a concept argues that identity is productive of itself, while at the same 
time, it requires the appearance of being natural and enduring. Performativity argues identity to be 
exclusionary through the creation of and dependence upon norms that intersect with one another – 
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in the cases of the violence studied here, this intersectionality is between ethnicised and sexualised 
identities. These norms establish the boundary between the inside and the outside of the group, with 
those things, practices, or people that fall outside that boundary considered dangerous and 
threatening. Performativity also highlights the importance of the body in discussions of identity 
politics – identity is reliant upon performance and exclusion, and these both require bodies. Bodies 
are the materiality of identity. In what follows, I will unpack a theory of identity as embodied and 
performative, arguing that it allows us to understand how sexualised violence occurs (through the 
sexualisation and abjection of the other), and how new, violent subjectivities are produced through 
overkill. 
 
Michel Foucault and the Body in Power 
 
The body as a unit of analysis in the examination of power relations emerges in the work of 
Michel Foucault (1977). Here I will examine Foucault's docile bodies thesis, his view of the sexed 
body and its construction in relation to power dynamics, and the emphasis on normalisation to 
situate the body in an examination of power and to open an understanding of the body as a pivotal 
concern for the study of power-effects such as identity and violence. This will demonstrate the 
pivotal role that the body plays in political dynamics, as well as the impact of the manipulation of 
the body, examining how it creates the political subject. The political subject is the result of the 
productive and juridical nature of power. Power is always a productive force, while juridical power 
is one sub-set of power. These effects of power operate in tandem, and on the body, and will be 
explained below.  The title of his seminal work on disciplinary power, Discipline and Punish, was 
suggested by Foucault himself when the original title, Surveiller et Punis, proved a challenge to 
translators (Foucault 1977, 1). Surveiller has no direct translation to English, falling somewhere 
between 'surveillance' and 'observation', and is the translation by Foucault of Bentham’s 'inspect' 
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(Foucault 1977, 1). That in the end he chose 'discipline' as the closest understanding of surveiller 
reveals two things about his intention: first, that this word should indicate that this type of power 
include discipline, but also a sense of an omnipresent eye on the bodies of those under its power –
surveillance as a policing of norms. It suggests that discipline of the body is not only about rigorous 
psychological control, but a control through a visualisation of the body that relies upon the 
materiality of the body. It is this materiality of the body that will be particularly important for this 
thesis – I am concerned with the physicality of identity performances, arguing that in order to better 
understand how the body is utilised as a weapon or target in violent identity politics, it is more 
useful to begin with an understanding of identity as an embodied practice.  
 
In Discipline and Punish, a work that is part historical account, part philosophical 
excavation of the punitive systems of justice, Foucault (1977) argues that the body is useful to 
society only inasmuch as it can be rendered 'docile' (Foucault 1977, 138); that is 'subjected and 
practised…a body manipulated by authority rather than imbued with animal spirits' (Foucault 1977, 
159). Disciplinary power renders the bodies of individuals 'docile', meaning that the body 'may be 
subjected, used, transformed, and improved' (Foucault 1977, 136).  Foucault uses examples of the 
student and the soldier to illustrate this discipline of the body (Foucault 1977, 166-168), 
highlighting in particular the obedience with which they perform expected duties at the appropriate 
moment: '[a]t the word take, the children, with their right hands, take hold of the string by which the 
slate is suspended…' (Foucault 1977, 167). Foucault illustrates that the actions of the children’s 
bodies are coordinated to commands, with an understanding by the students of the regimentation of 
their movements and obedience to that regime. The body of the individual is trained and 
conditioned in such a way that it (the embodied individual) responds to external commands by 
acting in a prescribed fashion, and failure to adhere to these prescriptions will result in punishment. 
In this way the body is rendered docile, meaning that it follows the prescriptions of the external 
authority. This is important for the study of normalised identity, as it predicts that individuals will 
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largely docily adhere to norms of behaviour once they have been trained, practised, or as Foucault 
(1977) says, drilled to be docile.  
 
 Foucault conceptualises the body as both the object and the source of power. Power 'allows 
bodies, gestures, discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted as something individual' 
(Foucault 1997, 30).  Bodies, then, are intelligible in as much as they are invested with power: '[t]he 
individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same time....the individual is a relay: power passes 
through the individuals it has constituted' (Foucault 1997, 30).  Bodies6 do not only give substance 
to power, but power just as importantly makes particular bodies possible. Power, through the 
prescription of normative behaviour, is the means by which bodies are made legible, coherent 
within society. According to Butler (1997), Foucault is concerned not only with 'the body of the 
prisoner, but...the materiality of the body of the prison' (Butler 1997, 34). She concludes that 
because the prison without the vestiges of power is merely a building, 'the prison is materialized to 
the extent that it is invested with power, or, to be more grammatically correct, there is no prison 
prior to its materialization...' (Butler 1997, 34). Spaces, then, can and do manipulate and produce 
the bodies that occupy them. The manipulation of the body according to Foucault determines the 
nature of its subjectivity – some bodies are discursively produced as criminal, degenerate, while 
others are labelled normal (see Foucault 1976). Control over the body in the Foucauldian model will 
yield control of the individual made material by that body, and reveals the inscription of power on 
the body. Power infuses the bodies of individuals and, as Campbell (1992, 221) points out, makes 
                                                 
6 I use 'bodies' rather than 'people' in order to highlight the importance of the material body in politics and in power, 
and to avoid creating a distinction between the mind and the body. This is to reject a voluntaristic interpretation of 
identity as related to the body, where voluntarism would imply that individuals may opt out of certain identity 
markers. Voluntarism as understood by dualism (specifically Cartesian dualism as proposed by Descartes 1641) is 
argued by Butler (1990 and 1993) to create a false separation of the mind and the body, whereas performativity 
encapsulates the adherence to identity markers as a 'strategy' of maintaining cultural legibility which is inherently 
unstable. Butler also argues that Beauvoir (1949) presents a dualist understanding of femininity in her book The 
Second Sex, though Sara Heinämaa (1997) argues that Butler's assessment of Beauvoir's concept of ‘becoming’ as 
voluntarism is a misreading. Heinämaa (1997) presents Beauvoir's The Second Sex as fundamentally 
phenomenological, and if we accept her reading of Beauvoir alongside Butler's suspicion of free will and agency in 
identity performance, we can begin to collapse the distinction between the mind and the body as false binary.  
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bodies socially intelligible.    
 
Producing Bodies: Judith Butler and Performativity  
 Foucault's (1977) juridical power thesis, in its establishment of the productive nature of 
power, is a precursor to Judith Butler's (1990) concept of performativity. She explains 'juridical 
systems of power produce the subjects they consequently come to represent' (Butler 1990, 3). This 
means that the subject, through the adherence to the norms of juridical power, continuously 
reiterates the legitimacy of those norms. Performativity as a concept holds that identity is produced, 
rather than constructed. Butler also argues that juridical power 'effectively conceals[s] and 
naturalize[s]...the political construction of the subject [that] proceeds with certain legitimating and 
exclusionary aims' (Butler 1990, 3). In particular, what stands out as important to the discussions of 
identity such as ethnicity and gender are the issues of naturalisation, internalisation and 
legitimation. This suggests that identities such as these rely upon the concealment of the 
construction of their norms in order for them to appear natural and enduring, and upon a 
normalisation of performances that is policed through this legitimation and exclusion. Their 
naturalisation renders them legitimate, shrouding their operations in the discursive production of 
their enduring nature. Because certain performances of identity are naturalised as appropriate, those 
that fall outside are excluded.  
 
 Butler (1990) argues that identity is not merely a social construct but, in accordance with 
Foucault's productive notion of power, produces those subjects that it is in turn produced by.  
Performativity posits that identity is the result of existent power dynamics, whereby preconceived 
notions of proper identity materialisation (social norms) create the ways in which identity 
materialises. It does this repeatedly, over time, as identity continues to be acted out, again and 
again. Rather than existing outside of the body, identity norms are created by the very bodies they 
78 
 
claim to define and control, and the process of naturalisation that emerges from repetition of 
normative behaviours creates a sense of the norms' endurance. Heteronormative assumptions about 
gender are a good starting point for considering this. Women, for instance, are often considered 
nurturing, suited as caregivers, and this is often connected to pregnancy and childbirth. It 'makes 
sense' for women to be natural caregivers because of their ability to produce children, and because 
of its roots in biological determinism this appears natural. Women tend to fill employment roles that 
require care as a specification, such as nurses or carers7. 
 
 The political subject, Butler says, does not simply act out identity repeatedly the way that an 
actor performs a part, but rather ‘this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the 
temporal condition for the subject’ (Butler 1997, 95) – in other words, the acts make the subject, not 
the other way round. This is important because performance of identity is not the end point of the 
subject, meaning identity performances are not the actions of a fully formed subject; rather, it is 
performance itself that constitutes identity and subjectivity. Ritualised acts, the repeated material 
expressions of identity performed over time result in the materiality of identity. This identity 
becomes subsumed by the body that it claims to identify and is so accepted, so seemingly natural 
that it appears to be  (to borrow from the ethnicity literature) biologically perpetuated, which in turn 
renders the operations of power inscrutable. In the case study of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
killing made the actor a 'Hutu' – the actions of the genocidaires and the Interahamwe rendered what 
it meant to be Hutu, and the rape of Tutsi women by Hutu men was used as a sort of rite of passage 
(see Human Rights Watch 1996).   
 
 The issue of naturalisation is critical to performative identity. One of the effects of this 
                                                 
7 This is reflected in the 25 September 2013 report by the Office for National Statistics, which reported that in the 
United Kingdom, 82% of those working in care or leisure were women, and 77% of those working in administrative 
or secretarial roles were women. Managerial roles were dominated by men at 66%.  
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naturalisation is that the identity-markers themselves escape questioning, are held apart from 
examination (Butler 1990, 3). The identity becomes the cause of actions and interactions rather than 
their effect. This is the point at which assumptions about violence as the endpoint of cohesive 
identity groups that are foundational social constructivist interpretations arise. Performativity 
problematises the assumption that categories such as ethnicity are stable (see Campbell 1992), and 
that actions are the result of a pre-formed, fixed identity, allowing for the contributions of an 
understanding of violence such as overkill as a constitutive factor of identity.  When violence is 
treated 'as a surface expression of ‘deeper’ socio-economic and/or ideological contexts...[it] is 
denuded of any intrinsic semantic or causal character' (Feldman 1991, 19).  
 
 Butler (1990) highlights critical arguments surrounding the problems theorising the 
embodiment of identity. She writes '[b]odies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to 
the mark of their gender' (Butler 1990, 12). This means that a body does not become a body until it 
has an assigned identity (in the case of her argument, gender), and therefore an assigned role in 
society. That body must then be maintained in accordance with social normative prescriptions of 
behaviour. She goes on to pose the question: '[t]o what extent does the body come into being in and 
through the marks of its gender?' (Butler 1990, 12). Gender is one of the first markers that an 
individual embodies – bodies are gendered in utero before becoming a physical body, when parents 
begin preparing a nursery or buying clothes for the unborn baby.  
 
` Butler demonstrates that the gendering of the body is not an interpretation of behaviours 
through biological cues, but rather a process by which a person is said to be a body that can be 
socially understood. To defy these expectations causes considerable trouble – there is a considerable 
amount of violence that is done to the transgender community, with the Trans* Violence Tracking 
Portal, a project aimed at identifying violence that specifically impacts the trans* community, 
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identifying 102 murders reported between January and April 2014 (TVTP 2014). Transphobia is a 
striking example of the dangers of defying gender norms, as violence, fear, and derision towards 
trans* individuals comes not only from those who appear to adhere to normalised gendered 
prescriptions of behaviours, but also from the LGB (lesbian, gay, bisexual) community and from 
feminism8.  Naturalised identities, then, carry with them certain prescriptions of behaviours that can 
be difficult to resist.   
 
 Butler asks '[i]s materiality a site or surface that is excluded from the process of 
construction, as that through which and on which construction works...I want to ask how and way 
'materiality' has become a sign of irreducibility...' (Butler 1997, 28). One of her hypotheses is that if 
materiality, specifically that of the body, is premised within 'a problematic gendered matrix' (Butler 
1997, 29), then the process through which 'matter is rendered irreducible simultaneously 
ontologizes and fixes that gendered matrix in its place' (Butler 1997, 29). By making the body a 
fixed ontological starting point, other processes, including but not limited to sexualising, become 
fixed. In Bodies that Matter, Butler (1997) attributes more to the materiality of the body, arguing 
that performance doesn’t materialise a sort of underlying essence, but rather that performance is the 
essence, that as the visual display of identity, it is the identity. This idea of the relationship between 
identity and its embodiment, is critical, for I argue that this materialisation produces the types of 
bodily violence that we see in some instances of violent identity politics. Performativity provides 
                                                 
8 In the UK, the Stonewall organisation (http://www.stonewall.org.uk/) has been accused of ignoring the concerns of 
the trans* community through their stance against homophobia, which here includes anger/fear towards bisexuals. 
Stonewall has answered these accusations by acknowledging that while it does not lobby directly on trans* issues, it 
recognises the considerable discrimination levied against trans* people and has allied itself with a number of trans* 
organisations. In addition to ignoring the trans* community, some online communities and organisations such as 
Gender Identity Watch (http://genderidentitywatch.com), which is presented as a watchdog community for 
legislation that may police gender identity, actively deny that Trans* individuals should have access to protections 
or even to the solidarity associated with feminism and feminist activism. The literature on transphobia reveals some 
striking commentary on transsexuality specifically that consists of thinly veiled rage – Sandy Stone (1987) quotes 
Janice Raymond (1979) as defining male-to-female transsexuality as rape by deception. This considerable resistance 
to a trans-inclusive feminism is particularly interesting given the resistance to normative gender prescriptions 
associated with feminism.  
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the epistemological groundwork for a theory of embodied violence, as it allows us to understand 
that it is through violence that political subjectivities are conferred and solidified.  
 
A Note on Performativity versus Performances 
 To reiterate, performativity can be summarised as the concept that identity 'is the stylized 
repetition of acts through time' (Butler 1988, 520), 'that discourses constitute the objects of which 
they speak' (Bialasiewicz et all 2007, 406), as subjects perform the discourse that claims to name 
them, and that under performativity '...identity amounts to the repeated and public actions, activities, 
and practices that make them real' (Fujii 2010, 7). While this last point is certainly a significant 
component of what it means to be performative, that there is a 'dramatic' (Butler 1988) element to 
identity performances, there is some danger in suggesting that performativity amounts to nothing 
more than an acting-out of identity. There is more that performativity has to offer-- for example, the 
ability to examine the nature of subjectivity, the nature of power dynamics with respect to how 
identity is performed, and the impact of normalized identity on the unknowing and perhaps 
unwilling subject. That the subject is treated differently is an important starting point in drawing a 
line between the concepts of performativity and performance, '[p]erformativity is a discursive mode 
through which ontological effects....are established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of 
the naturally existing subject' (Bialasiewicz et all 2007, 408), while by contrast, '[p]erformance 
presumes a subject' (Bialasiewicz et all 2007, 408).  
 
  Reducing the performative to performance, I argue, suggests a superscripted identity that 
individuals play out that overlays a ‘real' identity – Fujii for instance references the use of 
traditional dance in order to appear 'exotic' for an 'audience' (Fujii 2010, 8). Performativity, by 
contrast, argues that there can be no ontological distinction between the performed and the ‘real’ in 
the mind of the subject, and in fact it is the performed and the performance that create the subject, 
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and in turn the subject that determines what will be performed. Performance can be said to occur 
within the performative structure, as it presumes the subject that is made through performativity and 
'occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the infrastructure of 
performativity' (Bialasiewicz et all 2007, 408). The acts that are repeated by the subject in order to 
shape identity are performed in the sense that they are actioned. These repeated acts of culture are 
what Butler would refer to as 'performance which is performative' (Butler 1988, 528). But I argue 
that the most important thing about these performances is that the subject does not know that they 
are not natural – they are not, for the subject who performs them, disingenuous. That the performing 
subject believes these acts to be natural is of critical importance, for without this internalised 
understanding of these stylised acts as natural, they cannot be understood as enduring, or adherence 
to them as obligatory. Their normality, their natural state, keeps them in operation.  
 
 The subject could no more disavow the performance of its identity than it could disavow its 
being possessed of a body, because the body makes its performative performance possible, and its 
performative performance makes the body legible. The body, the site of inscription, is as crucial to 
identity as the existence of alterity, abjection, the other. It relies upon its performative performance 
in order to give itself meaning not only to be recognizable and accepted by society, but also the 
subject relies upon these performances to give itself meaning in order to be recognisable to itself. 
To suggest that performative acts are a play before an audience or is otherwise an affectation strips 
the subject of the markers of its own materiality. Identity performance, even in the adoption and 
mimesis of alterity or otherness, is not a knowing, ingenuous projection from the Self, but rather is 
identity itself.  Moya Lloyd (2007) notes that attempts by various theorists, including but not 
limited to Julia Kristeva (1982), to create some kind of signifier or 'radical element' (53) that is 
outside of culture is rejected by Butler as 'an effect of discourse that is presented as if it were not' 
(Lloyd 2007, 53).  
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Embodied Identity  
 In keeping with my argument that sexualised and ethnicised conceptions of the body are 
intersectional with one another through their performative nature, I also understand these identities 
as embodied. The normative behaviours that inform the performance of identity rely upon bodies to 
be known, read and done. There can be no sexualisation or ethnicisation without making recourse 
not only to a body, but to a body that behaves in a particular way or set of ways under changing 
circumstances. Thomas Csordas (1990, 5) argues for embodiment as a paradigm and 
epistemological foundation of the social sciences in particular, understanding 'that the body is not 
an object to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered as the subject of culture'. This 
reflects previous arguments about the nature of subjectivity, that an understanding of embodied 
identity is not an end point, but is rather constantly produced and reproduced within a constellation 
of norms and markers of sameness and difference. This is in contrast to previous ways of thinking 
about the body as 'fixed, material entity subject to the empirical rules of biological science, existing 
prior to the mutability and flux of cultural change and ...characterized by unchangeable inner 
necessities' (Csordas 1990, 1).  This new understanding of the body has marked a shift in the ways 
in which the body is theorised, as the idea of biological rigidity is increasingly seen as problematic 
and the internalisation of social conditions and norms is increasingly recognised as the means 
through which bodies begin to 'matter' (Butler 1993).  
 
 Bringing the body to focus as materialised by social constraints is an important process for 
theorising the political subject, because separating the body from the mind allows for social forms 
of power to make recourse to 'naturally occurring' phenomena of the body that the mind may 
interpret. Social forms of power that manifest in the body are safe in relative obscurity. It is through 
the body that power is reified, and the study of power is by necessity the study of power as an 
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embodied force. Theorising the body  presents a necessary shift and a complex challenge, for while 
'[t]here is no innate body ... there are bodies' (Eistenstein 1996, 32), meaning that while there is 
nothing outside of signification that leads us to an understanding of bodies, and yet bodies remain. 
The challenge is to create a theory that addresses the dichotomous roles of the body as something 
that is contextually created and as something that simply is. My argument is that, viewed through 
Butler's lens, while a body may be, everything that is understood about that body, from its sex to its 
ethnicity, is discursively produced. This argument is also made by Cynthia Weber (1998), who 
argues that Butler ‘is not saying  that there is no materiality to the body...Rather, she is saying that 
the identity of any body, the ways we understand the materiality of the body, does not pre-exist all 
manners of performative expressions...’ (Weber 1998, 80). 
 
 According to Foucault (1977), it is always the body that is at issue in questions of power. In 
writing about the political violence of Northern Ireland and bringing the issue of the body to the 
forefront of the discussion, Feldman says of Foucault's work '[t]he body becomes a spatial unit of 
power, and the distribution of these units in space constructs sites of domination' (Feldman 1991, 
8). He goes on to argue '[r]eserved spaces of political representation and the political formation of 
the body are coextensive historical developments. Domination's reality is organized through the 
logic of mythic instantiation, and the body is a central medium of the political instant' (Feldman 
1991, 8)9. What this means for the study of the relationship between the body and power is that the 
body becomes itself the operation of power, and grounds it in the contemporary political and social 
                                                 
9 Approaching instantiation, specifically mythic instantiation, from a critical art historical perspective gives a clearer 
understanding of a metaphysical concept. I understand instantiation in this context to be related to Aristotelian 
instantiation, which claims that objects are reflective of a universal. From an art historical perspective, instantiation 
collapses the distinction between the discourse of images and the discourse of words. Subjectivities are conferred 
upon the spoken, rather than the seen (Mitchell 2003, 60). Instantiation in this context is the assumption of the object 
to be a 'place-holder' for an ideal (Mitchell 2003, 58). Reading Feldman (1991, 8) in this way reveals that power and 
domination operate by appearing as a 'place-holder' for a mythic ideal or universal, and this instantiation takes place 
through the body of the political subject. It is through the body of the political subject that power becomes real in the 
contemporary historico-political moment.  
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moment. The body is the enforcer of power, and also the recipient of the forces of power. It is 
through the actions of the body that power and its prescriptions and normalisations are acted 
continuously, and are therefore continuously reproduced. It is through the body as a political 
artefact that power is, in a word, done.  
 
 The prison protests in Northern Ireland provide an example of this. Feldman (1991) makes a 
compelling case for the primacy of the body in political subjectivity, and this is visible in the 
struggle for control over the bodies of the prisoners in the H-Blocks. The protests shifted from the 
creation of a repellent surface to protect the Blanketmen from the prison guards to a complete denial 
of the prisoners' bodies through the Hunger Strike Protest, which shrank the bodies of the strikers 
until they were unreachable corpses. There is, therefore, an intimate relationship between the body 
and power, and by extension the body and violence. Power exercises itself and makes itself known 
on the bodies of its subjects especially through violence – there are no bodies without power, just as 
there is no power without bodies (see Foucault 1977, Butler 1997, Feldman 1991). It would be 
impossible to discuss power, society, culture, or violence without making recourse to the body, for 
it is only through the body that such things exist. The body of and as the political subject receives 
violence, it bears the immediate markers of violence, and after a time, the scars of that violence. 
 
 Feldman writes that the body impacted by political violence is itself invested with political 
agency (Feldman 1991, 7), and that '[t]he body, altered by violence, reenacts other altered bodies 
dispersed in time and space; it also reenacts political discourse and even the movement of history 
itself' (Feldman 1991, 7). Power, and its attendant violence, is an historicising force that grounds the 
body within its current historical moment while making recourse to the past. The body made 
political agent by violence bears the scars of that violence, and carries that memory forward into the 
future, which can in turn make present and future claims to violence appear more legitimate as 
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retribution for past injustices. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu Power movement 
claimed the historical power of the Tutsis over their own people in order to cast the genocide as 
revenge for the past and insurance against its happening again. An editorial published in Kangura 
argued ‘[a]dministratively, the Tutsi regime has been marked by two factors: their women and 
cows. These two truths kept the Hutu in bondage for four hundred years. Following their overthrow 
in the 1959 social revolution, the Tutsi have never given up’ (Kangura 40 1994). The essayist then 
goes on to claim the ‘identical’ nature of the ‘inyenzi’ of the 1990s, and the 1960s.  History for the 
Hutu was not to repeat itself, and the bodies of the Tutsi would be inscribed with the superiority and 
dominance of the Hutu through overkill.  
 
The Importance of the Insider/Outsider Binary 
One thing that emerges from the examination of violent identity politics is the necessity of 
the radicalised exclusion of abnormality to protect the ingroup. The achieved end for the regulatory 
state is not an organised, serialised mass of obedient bodies, but a regularised, normalised mass that 
remains productive in all the economies in which a human body operates. While the mechanisms of 
power existent in modes of the disciplinary and the regulatory may differ, there are important points 
of overlap, particularly between delinquency and (both in tandem and explicitly concerning) the 
sexualised nature of the body that Foucault contends is a 'matter for discipline, but also a matter for 
regularization' (Foucault 1997, 252). Producing this regularised society is not possible without some 
conception of the irregular, and this relational understanding of production is omnipresent – the 
importance of boundaries in ethnic groups (Barth 1969), and affiliations of community (Young 
1990). The division that arises, Foucault’s 'binary division and branding …the constant division 
between the normal and abnormal' (Foucault 1977, 2004; 3), makes visible a contrast to normalcy, 
an ab-normalcy, and in doing so makes this ab-normalcy a part of the regulatory state’s production 
of delinquency. The disciplinary power economy creates the idea of the omnipresent delinquent and 
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weaves this fear and understanding of delinquent behaviours into the population of the regularised 
body politic.  
 
Campbell (1992) describes the relationship between fear, delinquency, and the regulation of 
the body politic in relation to state security and foreign policy. In international relations, he argues 
‘danger...disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk’ 
(Campbell 1992, 3). His understanding of identity as important for the production of threat is 
particularly important to my own argument about relationship between identity formation and 
extreme violence. Campbell argues that identity is relational, and is understood in terms of 
difference to outsiders (Campbell 1992, 9), and that dangers and threats can be interpreted from 
‘[t]he mere existence of an alternative mode of being’ (Campbell 1992, 3). He applies this 
understanding to the production of the state, arguing that ‘central to that regulation and 
normalisation, and to be understood as a privileged instance of the stylized repetition of acts, is 
foreign policy and the articulation of danger’ (Campbell 1992, 11), providing a model of the body 
politic as regulated by the imposition of norms. Foucault speaks of this as a 'discourse of battle' 
waged 'by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to 
define the norm, and against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage' (Foucault 1997, 61). 
It is this ‘true race’, or as Campbell puts it, ‘true identity’ (Campbell 1992, 3) that is regulated 
through norms and through recourse to fear of the delinquent or the abnormal.   
 
 What is interesting in this particular series of arguments is the way in which the idea of 
biology appears in service of a socio-political claim. The use of race as a biological, or at the very 
least a heredity, category resonates with literature surrounding the justification for ethnic 
identifications that exist through claims of familial or blood ties. That 'race' has a connotation of 
such a stark and inevitably insurmountable distinction between groups makes the guardianship of 
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the boundary between them seem more of an imperative:  '[t]his is the internal racism of permanent 
purifications, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization' (Foucault 
1997, 62).  If the boundaries between populations are viewed as utterly insurmountable, their 
permeation will be viewed as dangerous. This also has the effect of deeming any outsider a threat to 
normalisation, as a delinquent, and the notion of 'purification' has particularly aggressive 
implications.  
 
 There is a wide secondary literature that explores biopolitics and ethnicity (though there is a 
conflation of race and ethnicity here that arises from Foucault's use of the term). David Macey 
(2008) relates the themes of Foucault's (2004) Society Must Be Defended, a posthumously published 
series of lectures, many of which relate to themes of security, threat, and otherness, to legislation 
allowing for the indefinite detention of psychiatric patients and/or criminals considered 'Dangerous 
People with Severe Personality Disorder' (Macey 2008, 120). Macey points out that this legislation, 
called the White Paper ('Reforming the Mental Health Act' 2000), does not require that a person 
have been convicted of committing a crime before being referred for evaluation under this act, 
which 'means that individuals suspected of having a severe personality disorder can be detained 
indefinitely' (Macey 2008, 120) for the purposes of keeping society safe. His narrative connects this 
quasi-literal pathologisation of abnormality (quasi- because there is a lack of good diagnostic 
criteria, and treatment options, for personality disorders) to the idea of race, racism, and the 
cohesion of groups under 'race'. Race here extends the conception of race beyond skin pigmentation 
to encapsulate multiple understandings of otherness such as class10 – the contemporary post-
                                                 
10 For more discussion on the overlap of biopower and ethnicity, see Achille Mbembe (2008)'s essay published in the 
same volume. Mbembe relates biopower to 'the state of exception and the state of siege' (Mbembe 2008, 156), where 
the state of exception 'continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalised notion of the 
enemy' (Mbembe 2008, 156). For Mbembe, the 'politics of race' is intimately connected to the politics of death, or 
'necropolitics'. Others, such as François Debrix and Alexander Barder (2012), have expanded the discussion of 
biopower still further as to examine its utility in explaining or accounting for horror and violence. They argue 
'Foucault's emphasis on race (the constitution and further elimination of 'different' or 'other' racial categories or the 
corollary notion of the purification of one's 'own' race or species) is emblematic of how biopower...relates to enemy 
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aspirational working class (the 'chavs') in Britain has been documented to stand in for the other to 
middle class (see Jones 2011). Macey's discussion of Society Must Be Defended tells us two things 
– first is his illustration of Foucault's pathologisation of the other as a necessary component for 
identity divisions. The second is that 'real' differences between races need not be present – the other 
can look exactly like the self and still be dangerous.  
 
 The notion of the membranous boundary that surrounds identifiable populations creates a 
systemic tension within the formation of identity. According to Foucault, it justifies action on the 
part of the social body against encroachment or a threat to the purity of the normalised population, 
and for Butler, the absence of such fluidity would render identity itself impossible. 'Identity,' she 
writes, 'is not thinkable without the permeable border, or else without the possibility of 
relinquishing a border' (Butler 2010, 43). This idea of the necessity of an other in order to define the 
self is familiar: one of Barth’s four criteria for a definition an ethnic group is that the population 
'has a membership… which identifies itself and is identified by others, as constituting a category 
distinguishable from other categories of the same order [emphasis added]' (Barth 1969, 10-11).  
Groups must internally recognize what makes them distinct from one another. Social boundaries are 
encouraged in order to repel delinquency within the population, and this border is often policed by 
abjection, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
 
Concluding Thoughts: Performativity, and Policing the Boundary between Others 
 In this chapter, I have introduced the concepts of performativity and embodiment in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
life' (Debrix and Barder 2012, 101). More on their treatment of alterity and enmity is discussed in the conclusion to 
this thesis. 
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provide a new perspective on the formation of identity in such a way that it allows for an 
understanding of identity as simultaneously natural in appearance, and dynamic, as appearing to be 
comprised of discrete categories of difference while being comprised of a matrix of intersecting 
markers of difference.  This chapter focused upon bringing the body into discussions of identity and 
violent identity politics. Having discussed other understandings of ethnicised identity formation and 
how it leads to conflict, I argued for a shift in the focus from primordialist or constructivist 
understandings towards an understanding through the lens of embodiment and performativity. To 
unpack these concepts, I examined the works of, in particular, Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, to 
highlight the importance of the body in any discussion of power, and the importance of the body in 
discussions of identity.  
 
 Foucault's work on power, in particular biopolitics, surveillance, and regulation, is of 
particular importance to my argument that the intersectionality of sexualised and ethnicised identity 
in abjection produces certain kinds of extreme violence, which I have labelled 'overkill'. Foucault's 
biopower thesis not only highlights the importance of the body in discussions of power and 
violence, but it also explains the concepts of regulation and surveillance as a means of policing the 
body politic and ensures that norms are abided by. Normative assumptions about identity markers 
are important for the understanding not only of how identity formation occurs, but for introducing 
questions about transgression or failure to adhere to norms. Butler (1990) discusses this in terms of 
heteronormativity as part of her concept of performativity, and it will be picked up again in Chapter 
Four in my examination of abjection and the abject.  
 
 Having discussed Foucault's theories of the body in power and biopolitics, I moved on to 
discuss Judith Butler's concept of performativity. Unlike social constructivism, performativity 
provides a different way of looking at group identity that explains how something socially 
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constructed could exercise the pull on the individual that we associate with large group, seemingly 
natural or biologically imparted identities such as ethnicity and gender. These categorisations carry 
with them an imperative of social legibility and thus require of the individual a certain type of 
performance. In this way identities such as gender and ethnicity exhibit a high degree of 
intersectionality – they operate in similar ways to one another, and they elicit similar emotional 
responses in the subject, and their performances inform one another. While the overlap between 
gender and ethnicity has been noted in the literature (see Ashe 2007), using performativity as a 
theoretical approach to examining the materiality of ethnicity allows us to approach that 
intersectionality on a deeper level – it allows for sexualised and ethnicised identities to be viewed as 
correlative, perhaps even causal, not simply synchronistic. The parameters of each are defined by 
their performances, and transgressions against the normative claims of these parameters are met 
with aggressive responses, particularly instances of inter-group combative struggle. In Butler's 
work, we find this within her discussions of heteronormativity and the dangers of illegibility, and in 
ethnic conflict, we see this not only in its aggression, but in the ways in which aggression takes as 
its target bodies that are sexualised in particular ways.  
 
 Performativity rejects the idea of a natural subject existing prior to signification. The only 
means by which a body can be given a legible meaning is through the existent power structures that 
produce the discourses through which we come to ‘know’ the world around us, which for Butler 
poses a substantial risk about our ability to speak within this system at all: ‘[t]o speak at all in that 
context [of power relations] is a performative contradiction, the linguistic assertion of a self that 
cannot ‘be’ within the language that asserts it’ (Butler 1990; 2006, 158). It is through this 
performative contradiction that dominance arises, for as Butler understands it, dominance is the 
‘denial’ of a body that exists prior to language, or put another way, before signification’ (Butler 
1990; 2006, 161). This system of domination also serves to create ‘an artificial ontology, an illusion 
of difference, disparity, and consequently, hierarchy’ (Butler 1990; 2006, 161). Without this system 
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of domination the naturalness of divisions upon which identity relies would be refuted and a 
hierarchic division of subjects impossible to justify or to maintain.  
 
 Expanding upon this, in the next chapter I will elaborate on the exclusionary nature of 
identity to unpack how abject sexualisation arises, in order to understand how overkill emerges 
from violent identity politics. The following chapter will examine further the other that is produced 
and policed through the regulation and surveillance discussed by both Foucault and Butler as part of 
the formation of identity.  To do this, I will discuss Julia Kristeva's (1982) theory of abjection, and 
demonstrate how, when abjection combines sexualisation and ethnicisation of the other, extreme 
violence becomes possible.  
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Chapter Four 
Overkill, Power and Horror: Embodied Abjection and the Ethnicised/Sexualised Other 
 
Introduction   
 This project explores the relationship between large-group identity formation and the 
particularly virulent forms of violence that occur in some instances of identity politics, arguing that 
it is the intersection of the ethnicised and sexualised body in abjection that produces this extreme 
violence, which I have called overkill. So far, I have demonstrated that the existing literature on 
ethnic violence does not satisfactorily account for the ways in which ethnic identity formation can 
lead to the radicalisation of identity. I have argued that this is because the literature on ethnic 
conflict has not engaged with the literature on ethnic identity formation in such a way that it 
explains how violence, and extreme violence in particular, can arise. To address this gap, I have 
proposed that ethnic identity be viewed as performative, meaning that ethnic identity should be 
viewed as productive of ethnic groups. In addition to accounting for a key problem in the literature 
on ethnic identity, that ethnic identity appears simultaneously natural and constructed, performative 
understandings of ethnic identity account for the ways in which identity can become radicalised 
when groups are faced with one another.  
 
 Having demonstrated the value of engaging with identity politics through the conceptual 
foundation of the performative embodiment of identity, I will begin exploring the concept of the 
abject as part of the construction of the self and the other. This allows for an understanding of how 
the production of group boundaries and group differences rely upon the exclusionary production of 
the outsider as abject by exploring how identity is produced by the individual. This exclusion 
creates a sense of precarity towards and abjection of the other, and these processes account for the 
particularly aggressive violence that sometimes occurs in violent identity politics. The presence of 
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the other has been previously documented within discussions of ethnic identity and ethnic group 
formation as a necessary condition for the understanding of one's group in relation to what is not 
within one's group (see Barth 1969). This chapter will focus upon the experience of abjection in the 
face of the ethnic other, and the sexualisation of the ethnic other in such a way that it embodies that 
abjection. The abjection of the other makes violence against the other conceivable.   
 
 The abject can be understood as the foil to or opposite of the subject and as a necessary 
condition for the understanding of the self (Kristeva 1982). When faced with the abject, the self 
experiences a virulent reaction, and a need to destroy or flee from the abject. I will explore the 
relationship between abjection and otherness or othering, the use of abjection in creating and 
maintaining social boundaries, and will conclude by examining the effects of the abject embodiment 
of the other in radicalising ethnic identities in the context of ethnic violence. I will move on to an 
evaluation of the sexualised body, discussing the understanding of the sexed body as a cultural 
construction and a performative entity in its own right. The sexualised body is particularly 
interesting in the examination of the workings of power on the body, as it occupies two spheres of 
domination – the stark division of bodies into two categories (male and female) that interact with 
the parameters of power in different ways, and in the normalisation of sexuality and the appropriate 
expression of sexual desire.  
 
 In what follows, I will examine the relationship between embodiment, othering, and 
abjection, discussing the ways in which the body of the other is discursively produced as abject and 
subsequently becomes a target for violence. I argue that the targeting of the other is the result of its 
abjection that includes the sexualisation and ethnicisation of the body, and that as a result of this, 
the body of the other becomes the real embodiment of abjection to the self. I will then discus the 
role of the precarity of the body in Butler's work (and of the self, by extension), the impact of 
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melancholia on the formation of the other and the abject, and emphasise the hostility, rage, and fear 
that these dynamics can and do produce to show how it links to this kind of conflict, overkill. I will 
conclude this chapter by examining the relationship between the abjection of the other, the 
ethnicised and sexualised embodiment of alterity, and violence. The primary argument of this thesis 
is that during some cases of violent identity politics, the body of the other becomes sexualised and 
ethnicised in such a way that it becomes abject in the eyes of the subject. This abjected, 
ethnosexualised other creates a feeling of vulnerability and precarity that radicalises ethnic identity 
to the point that extreme violence erupts. Post-structuralist interpretations of violence, evolving 
from the ideas of Butler, allow for an examination of how this fear and the attendant melancholic 
rage that is created by the precarity of the self in relation of the other (or put another way, the 
subject in relation to the abject), that results in this extra-lethal violence, overkill, that is attendant to 
some identity conflicts. These conflicts utilise the sexualised body of the other specifically as 
brutalised, and potentially evolving to the weaponisation of the body following its brutalisation. 
This will lead to my understanding of this extreme violence, which I have labelled overkill.  
 
The Abject Boundary Between Self and Other 
 In her later writings, Butler (2004a; 2009) discusses the ideas of melancholia and precarity 
in relation to the presence of the other, and the subsequent violence directed at the other. Her 
discussion of melancholia is based on her interpretation of Freud (1917 in Butler 2004a, 20-21), and 
suggests that our relationship to what we are is contingent on what we are not – that is, the psyche 
is haunted by what it has lost in order to gain its social legibility. Similarly, the psyche is aware of 
its fragility in relation to the other, as it is both constituted and potentially destroyed by what it is 
not. I argue that this highly emotive construction of the subject yields a highly emotive response 
when it is threatened with destruction, and when turned outward, towards an ethnicised other, can 
yield the extreme forms of violence. In her later works Butler carries her theory of performativity to 
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its next logical phase, through the examination of the violence inherent in othering. Our reaction to 
the other is one of abjection.  
 
 Abjection is a complex term in that it can be understood and used to refer to one or a number 
of things related to physical objects and emotional reactions, but what is consistently understood 
about abjection or the abject is the combination of horror, disgust, and terror that it inspires. 
Abjection, in its simplest iteration, is the horror experienced by the self when faced with the non-
self, or rather the part of the self that it does not wish to acknowledge. Bodily waste, soiled food, 
and deviant behaviour all take on the status of the abject. Julia Kristeva (1982) writes that ‘[t]he 
abject has only one quality of the object- that of being opposed to I’ (Kristeva 1982, 1). There are, 
according to Kristeva, two roles that the abject plays in the construction of the psyche. On the one 
hand, the abject is an affront to the super-ego11, its antithesis and opposite (Kristeva 1982, 2). 
Because it is within the scope of our understanding of reality (the ego), but is abhorrent to the 
normative, perfectionist desires of the super-ego, the abject repulses by highlighting the reality of 
that which is abject, highlighting how close the self is to that with which it is disgusted. Abject 
functions, abject objects, abject bodies, and abject deeds incite a reaction within the self to flee, or 
to destroy the abject.  
 
  Abjection is more than mere disgust, but disgust combined with terror, horror, and shock. 
Abjection does not refer to any rational level of anxiety or fear or even disgust, but is described by 
Kristeva (1982, 2) as that which 'beseeches a discharge, a convulsion'. It is the basest of reactions, 
one that demands violence, in whatever form – fleeing, shaming, or destroying. Abjection, and its 
                                                 
11 The super-ego is one of the three strata of the psyche according to Freud (1923). In contrast to the Id, which is given 
over to more primitive, hedonistic desires, and the ego, which is largely pragmatic, the super-ego is that part of the 
psyche that governs the Self towards a normative outcome. It is helpful to conceive of the super-ego as a policing 
force, a conscience that steers the psyche towards its best possible self.  
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connection to the sexualised body and political violence, will be the focus of this chapter, beginning 
with an introduction to the connection between abjection and the body. 
 
 One of the interesting things about abjection is that there is a certain amount of attraction, 
even desire, when faced with the other, and a need to preserve the life of the other. Abjection poses 
a paradox in the dependence upon the existence of that thing that I am not in order to understand 
what I am. The need for the other is tied to the need to exist. Butler argues 'a boundary is given up 
or overcome precisely in order to establish a certain connection beyond the claims of territory' 
(Butler 2009, 43-44). This connection, according to Butler, is due to what she considers to be a 
shared precariousness of human existence. This shared precariousness, as well as any existent 
boundary, defines the relationship of the self to the other, as the (perhaps tacit) acknowledgement of 
both 'our' and 'their' precariousness instigates and/or perpetuates struggles for domination and cycles 
of violence.  This adds an understanding of precarity, of vulnerability to harm, that forms part of the 
foundations of group identity consolidation. While precarity is present in any body that is exposed 
to any other body, because any other body could potentially do our body harm (Butler 2004a, 28), it 
takes on particular connotations in the arena of the socio-political: 'precisely because each body 
finds itself potentially threatened by others,' Butler writes, 'who are, by definition, precarious as 
well, forms of domination follow' (Butler 2010, 31). The threat of domination by a body not our 
own, or to recall Foucault, a body that may ‘pose a threat to the biological heritage' (Foucault 1997, 
61) of our body, makes increasingly more salient our own precarity, which in turn signals and 
motivates the self to lash out against the invading body with violence.  
 
 This dual reception of the other will be discussed in terms of the psychological push and pull 
felt when confronted with the abject. We may not utterly destroy the other, no matter how 
convinced we may be that the continued existence of the other will ultimately result in our own 
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destruction. The reason that we may not, or our nation or ethnic group may not, destroy our other 
has more to do with what we share than what we want to take from one another, or even the threat 
of retaliatory violence from either the other or some other external party, though Butler admits that 
this latter consideration is undoubtedly valid as well (Butler 2010, 43). What is critical to Butler is 
'that the subject that I am is bound to the subject I am not, that we have the power to destroy and be 
destroyed, and that we are bound to one another in this power and this precariousness' (Butler 2009, 
43).  
 
 In addition to being a target of disgust and repulsion, abjections are also '[t]he primers 
of...culture' (Kristeva 1982, 2). This means that the abject is, and 'generates' (Tyler 2009, 78) the 
boundary that determines what is inside the cultural norm, and what is not. Given that the super-ego 
is associated with culture because of its normative impetus, and its policing of the acceptable versus 
the unacceptable, the abject represents that which is outside culture – it is itself a boundary. Though 
things that disgust may often be considered 'unclean', Kristeva asserts that it is 'not lack of 
cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order' (Kristeva 1982, 
2). The abject is not simply the opposite of law, as 'there can be a grandeur in amorality' (Kristeva 
1982, 2), but rather, '[a]bjection...is immoral, sinister...a terror that dissembles....' (Kristeva 1982, 
2).  
 
 The terror inherent in abjection stems from the fact that it represents and polices the line 
between self and what is outside the self, and rather than simply remaining outside of the self as an 
opposition that can be acknowledged and ignored, it figures as part of our selves that we wish to be 
rid of – it represents how that boundary may be traversed, or even disappear. There is a danger in 
the abject in that it tempts us with the loss of our self; however, through the fact that we are 
repulsed by the abject, it ensures that this border remains intact. Laura Wilcox (2014) uses the 
99 
 
example of the 'leaky' (67) female body, a reference to the abjection of menstruation, which she 
links to discussions of suicide bombers. According to Wilcox, the abject of the body of the suicide 
bomber disturbs the sovereignty of the state, and demonstrates the disruption of 'system and order' 
(Kristeva 1982, 2) that the abject always threatens. 
 
 The body and the abject are inextricably linked because the body and the self are 
inextricably linked. Lisa Blackman (2008) writes that in the confrontation with the abject, for 
instance spitting saliva out of the mouth, '[t]he inside literally becomes outside, threatening the very 
borders and boundaries between the inside and outside that are central to the maintenance of the 
human subject as a unified, self-contained individual' (93). Maintaining this notion of the 'self-
contained individual' is critical for the maintenance of self and other (Blackman 2008, 93). 
Furthermore, it is through the embodied performances of identity that the body is created and that 
political subjectivity is materialised. It is also through the body that abjection is experienced. 
Abjection and much of what is considered abject stems directly from the body: vomit, excreta, and 
corpses all implicate the body directly, as the body is their source. Winfried Menninghaus goes on 
to argue that in Kristeva's work, this distinction between what belongs to the self and what belongs 
to the other is always determined by disgust, and that '[t]he scandal of filth, of refuse, of the unclean 
consists in the infiltration...that reveals the body's laboriously achieved identity as brittle and 
deceptive' (Menninghaus 2003, 373). 
 
  Abjection in this way polices the boundary of identity, as it prevents us from taking on the 
identity of others. Kristeva also points out that '[f]ood loathing is perhaps the most elementary and 
most archaic form of abjection' (Kristeva 1982, 2), and she uses the example from her childhood of 
being repulsed by skin forming on a glass of milk to illustrate this as one of the most basic of 
abjects. Food (or prohibitions against food) is often a signifier of culture, a means by which a body 
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quite literally takes in its cultural identity and/or rejects other identities. The rejection of certain 
foods as abject directly relates to our unwillingness to allow our bodies to take on something 
potentially poisonous, which is to say poisonous to the self, for 'disgust brings eminent affective 
powers to bear: it processes elementary civilizing taboos and social distinctions between what is 
foreign and one's own' (Menninghaus 2003, 2).  Food loathing and the anxiety towards food that has 
been consumed or partially consumed by another is intimately connected to the idea of 
contamination or pollution (Miller 1997). 
 
 These examples illustrate the argument that the body is the site of both doing (subjectivity) 
and un-doing (abjection). But the body is also the materiality of social norms, as a territory and 
signifier of power, the site of the reproduction of power. This makes the relationship of the abject to 
the self more problematic. Giving oneself over to the abject would be to fundamentally deny one's 
place in the social normative order, and to disrupt the preservation of that order, as well as to disturb 
the very identity of the self. If the terror of the abject for the individual is tied to its fear of what it 
simultaneously is and is not, and the 'brittle and deceptive' (Menninghaus 2003, 373) nature of what 
we are, then the terror of the abject for the social body is that it threatens the very norms that 
preserve and sustain it. Imogen Tyler (2009) interprets Kristeva's concept of the abject as an 
‘account for ...disruptions within the life of the subject and in particular those moments when the 
subject experiences a frightening loss of distinction between themselves and...others’ (78), which 
can be applied not only to the body of the individual subject, but to the body of the society as well:
 ...abjection can explain the structural and political acts of inclusion/exclusion which 
 establish the foundations of social existence....it is through both individual and group rituals 
 of exclusion that abjection is 'acted out'. Abjection thus generates the borders of the 
 individual and the social body (Tyler 2009, 78).  
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 We can see that abjection demarcates the boundaries of the individual and the social, and 
can be a means by which political agency is gained or disavowed through a disruption of political 
and social order. Menninghaus (2003, 389) notes the ability of the gay rights movement to 
'condemn their own cultural abjection as a repressive function of patriarchal authority'. 
Menninghaus's argument illustrates how abjection can become a politically deployable force if one 
considers oneself to be outside the social order, or if one wishes to enforce the social order against a 
body seen as abject12. The use of abjection as a weapon of resistance and subversion can be seen in 
the prison protests in Northern Ireland, most explicitly in the No Wash Protest. 
 
 The abject, or rather more accurately the abject body, can be politicised either for or against 
the social order. It can be used to demonstrate the failings and transgressions of the other, as in the 
1994 Rwandan genocide, or as a weapon used against the social order, as in the Northern Irish 
prison protests. In the case of the No Wash Protest in Northern Ireland, the prisoners responded to 
being marked as outside the social order through criminalisation and subordination through 
sexualised abuse, which is to say their abjection, by rendering their bodies abject and weaponising 
this abjection by forcing the sterile social order (in this case the employees of the carceral regime) 
to live with faeces and blood. The weaponisation of bodily waste marked not only the bodies of the 
protesting prisoners, but the bodies of the prison guards who were contaminated by it. However, 
more than just the disruption of social norms, the abject refers to the exclusion from social norms, 
and the exclusion from subjectivity.  
 
 While an understanding of abjection and its rejection goes a long way towards 
                                                 
12 This idea of subversion is also presented by both Kristeva (1982) and Butler (1990). Butler criticises Kristeva for 
'locating subversion outside of culture, ' (Lloyd 2007, 54) for according to Butler, 'subversion...must be a cultural 
practice' (Lloyd 2007, 54), meaning that there is no 'outside-culture' in which subversive elements may form. Lloyd 
(2007, 51) argues that according to Butler, 'the politics of performative acts....is a subversive politics', which she 
reads as Butler's 'favouring subversion over reform or revolution'.  
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understanding the extreme violence we see in some instances of violent ethnic identity politics, it 
does not tell the whole story. There is more than disgust and terror present in these cases – there is 
also a strong sense of rage and a need to communicate this combination of affects.  Abjection as 
argued by Kristeva leaves out a full understanding of the fear of the other, for the abject is not just 
repulsive but also dangerous. Other scholars such as Wilcox (2014) and Menninghaus (2003) have 
opened the vocabulary of the abject to discussions of sovereignty and fear, and this project evolves 
still further to bring it to bear on identity formation in the context of violent identity politics. It is 
this fear, which is related to the ambiguity of or uncertainty towards the other (see Appadurai 1998), 
and the interrelated melancholic rage that fills in these gaps.  
 
Precarity, Melancholia, Hostility 
 Ambiguity is inherent in the self's understanding of the abject (Creed 1986). Because the 
abject exists along the boundary of the self/other, it is inherently a grey area, as it is simultaneously 
understood as being not entirely divorced from our understanding of the world, but since it is 
discursively produced as outside the identity of the self, it is marginalised in terms of its legibility. 
We are inextricably tied to the other by virtue of this boundary, for it is through the boundary of 
what we are not that we come to understand who we are. Barbara Creed writes that '[a]lthough the 
subject must exclude the abject, it must, nevertheless be tolerated, for that which threatens to 
destroy life also helps to define it' (Creed 1986, 69). Considering the necessary toleration of the 
other in cases like the 1994 Rwandan genocide is difficult – what this suggests is that there must 
always be an abject, an other, and enemy, in a united group. In ethnic divisions, where the 'real' 
factors that separate groups are difficult to define, this creates a paradox: the self may not fully 
understand how or in what fundamental ways the other(s) are different, but they are still recognised 
as different, and that difference threatens the purity and potentially the survival of the self. 
Appadurai (1998) notes this difference, and most importantly this uncertainty over difference, in the 
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1994 Rwandan genocide as a major contributor to the extremity of the violence. He links the 
practice of vivisection in the Rwandan genocide as an attempt to stabilise 'the signs of bodily 
difference' (Appadurai 1998, 911). Vivisection, like the evisceration of pregnant women, was a 
means of assessing difference in the Tutsi.  
 
 Because the other threatens the purity of the self, the other must be destroyed even if, 
paradoxically, the destruction of the other brings about the destruction of the self inasmuch as what 
is destroyed is the marker of what makes up the self. Butler (2010, 43) notes that '...the subject that I 
am is bound to the subject I am not, that we each have the power to destroy and to be destroyed, and 
that we are bound to one another in this power and this precariousness'. For Butler it is not only for 
the relational understanding of the self that an other is necessary, but rather that '[i]dentity...is not 
thinkable without the permeable border, or else without the possibility of relinquishing a boundary' 
(Butler 2010, 43). This suggests that it is not only the presence of a boundary that is necessary for 
either group or individual identity, but the vulnerability of that border to incursion or even 
disintegration is an integral part of defining what lies inside the boundary. The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide against provides a good example of this – much of the identity of the Hutu was tied to 
memories of exploitation and domination by the Tutsi, which was made more salient as the Tutsi 
women were produced as infiltrators who would enslave Hutu husbands (HRW 1996, 16). This is 
further reflected in the hate speech that circulated prior to the genocide – in a specific example, an 
editorial published in Kangura entitled ‘A Cockroach (Inyenzi) Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly’, 
accuses the Tutsi of attempting to plotting to re-establish rule over the Hutu, saying  '[t]hey are all 
related since some are the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical. All the attacks 
were meant to restore the feudal-monarchy regime' (Kangura 1994). Without this discursive 
production of the Tutsi as consistently attempting to enslave the Hutu, and the Hutu as a formerly 
subjugated people, what it would have meant to be Hutu in relation to the Tutsi remains unclear.  
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 The precarity of the self in relation to the abject is a significant factor in producing certain 
types of political violence, particularly when that abject is embodied by the other through practices 
of exclusion that include the political and the social. The embodiment of abjection by the other, who 
is outside subjectivity having been excluded and produced as other, is readily apparent in ethnic 
violence: in the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, there was a heavy emphasis in the anti-Tutsi 
propaganda upon the rumoured sexual depravity of Tutsi women in Rwanda. Butler writes 
'[p]recarity designates that politically induced condition in which certain populations... become 
differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death' (Butler 2010, 25) – this exclusion and abjection 
make up the process by which the other become dehumanised and therefore more vulnerable to 
injury.  These populations acquire their differential exposure to violence through '[f]orms of racism 
instituted and active at the level of perception [that] tend to produce iconic versions of populations 
who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable' (Butler 
2010, 24). The grievability of a life is connected to its belonging to either the self of the abject – a 
life's grievability is a direct result of its being recognised as part of the self, making the lives of the 
other ungrievable. Butler notes that 'when such lives are lost...since, in the twisted logic that 
rationalises their death, the loss of such [other] populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives 
of ‘the living’' (Butler 2010, 31). 
 
 The life of the other, which is excluded from subjectivity and the loss of which, according to 
Butler, cannot be grieved, is also discussed by Giorgio Agamben. According to Agamben's (1995) 
concept of 'bare life', there is life that is infused with political subjectivity and that which is not. Put 
simply, bare life is 'life stripped of form and value' (Diken and Lausten 2005, 291). Jay Bernstein 
(2004, 3) explains Agamben's concept of bare life as one side of 'a separation... between the 
culturally elaborated normative authority of the good life for man and the mere fact of life, whose 
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goodness appears not as an authoritative claim, but ...as a contingent occurrence beyond the 
governance of reason or the laws of society'. Bare life is that which is outside political subjectivity 
(Agamben 1995), but is also a requirement of the political, because 'this structure of the inclusive 
exclusion of bare life is constitutive of... the political' (Bernstein 2004, 4). This idea of bare life as 
being life which exists without subjectivity or value that can be extinguished in a demonstration of 
power, further supports my understanding of the importance of the production of the other. In 
particular, bare lives illustrate the precariousness of the life of other with relation to the self, 
particularly since it is unequal.  
 
 As the other is precarious in relation to the self, the self is also precarious in relation to the 
other as it fears contamination by the other. 'Each of us,' Butler argues, 'is constituted politically in 
part by the virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies – as a site of desire and physical 
vulnerability, as a site of a publicity at once assertive and exposed' (Butler 2004, 20). She argues 
that this mutual vulnerability leads to forms of domination 'precisely because each body finds itself 
potentially threatened by others who are, by definition, precarious as well' (Butler 2010, 31). When 
the other comes to be constructed as something that threatens the survival of the self, it in turn 
becomes something that must be destroyed, and defines its position of relative precarity by 
acknowledging the precarity of the self in the face of the other. There is, therefore, a certain 
emotive, psychic attachment to the other, as the production of the other is one of the more important 
factors of identification. The self is defined by its position relative to the other even if and as the 
other threatens the survival of the self, and this emotive response carries through to the violence that 
is enacted against the other.  
 
 The emotive response of precarity is connected to another remainder in the exclusionary 
construction of the self. There is a melancholic attachment to the other even as it is rejected and 
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lost, because the other expresses the boundary between the self and what is outside the self – there 
is an emotional investment in as well as an existential connection to the other as it marks this 
boundary. Interpreting Freud's (1917) 'Mourning and Melancholia', Butler concludes that 
'melancholy at first appears to be an aberrant form of mourning, in which one denies the loss of an 
object (an other or an ideal) and refuses the task of grief, understood as breaking attachment to the 
one who is lost' (Butler 1997, 167). The loss of the other is ungrievable from the start. Grief over 
the loss of the other, the lingering question of what might have been given a different identification, 
is one that remains unexpressed, and '[i]nsofar as grief remains unspeakable, the rage over the loss 
can redouble by virtue of remaining unavowed' (Butler 1993, 236). In defining itself in relation to 
the other, the self gives up the possibility of a different type of possible identification, but this loss 
is never acknowledged as such. 
 
 This is the value of the extreme violence in ethnic conflict and what sets it apart from other 
kinds of violence – the violence is intended to communicate these two interrelated processes of the 
abjection of the other and this unspeakable rage at the ungrievable abject. Violence in this context 
becomes a performance of abjection and a performance of rage, and the violence itself, through the 
weaponisation or brutalisation of the body, communicates both of these. The unacknowledged, 
uniterable, and perhaps in terms of the subject the unknowable, loss of the abject-other 'translates 
into a heightening of conscience' (Butler 1997, 183), that gathers intensity and ferocity from 
'aggression in the service of refusing to acknowledge a loss' (Butler 1997, 1983). It is the 
uniterability of the loss of the abject that makes it so powerful in producing this visceral reaction of 
rage. This rage is understood as 'the social foreclosure of grief' through which 'we might find what 
fuels the internal violence of conscience' (Butler 1997, 183), or put another way, 'a loss in the world 
that cannot be declared enrages' (Butler 1997, 185). This melancholic rage is bound to the alterity of 
the other, its uncontrollability through its defiance of social norms. This ungrievable loss creates 
melancholia, which in turn requires 'redirecting rage against the lost other' (Butler 1997, 193).  
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  This combination of embodied abjection with the embodiment of otherness can produce a 
particularly virulent form of political violence because of the cataclysmic tandem reaction of hatred 
and disgust: 
 What disgust adds to hatred is its distinctive kind of embodiment, its way of being 
 unpleasant to the senses. It also subjects hatred's volatility to disgust's slow rate of 
 decay...Hate wishes harm and misfortune on the object of hatred but is very ambivalent 
 about wishing the hated one gone; disgust merely wants the thing relocated and quickly 
 (Miller 1998, 35) 
The potency of this desire to hurt combined with the desire to eradicate has the potential to create 
extreme forms of violence between identity groups. This desire for the other combined with the 
desire to see the other eradicated radicalises the relationship between the subject and the abject-
other and creates a strong destroy-or-be-destroyed sense of peril in the subject. This will, under 
some circumstances, inspire the subject to lash out in violence against the abject other that itself 
takes on abject form, inscribing the embodied abjection of the other upon the physical body of the 
other itself. 
 
Abjection of the Sexualised Body and the Feminised Other  
 Having outlined the concepts of identity, abjection, and precarity, and their connection to 
melancholic rage in the previous sections, in this section, I will discuss the intersection of the 
abjection and sexualisation of the other in the production of violent identity. This intersection 
informs the practices of sexualised violence in extreme cases of identity politics. By sexualised 
abjection, I am referring to the production of the other as abject through discursive allegations of 
deviant sexual behaviours and characteristics. This abject sexualisation provides the critical markers 
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of difference that separate ethnicised groups. I understand sexualised violence to refer to violence 
that weaponises and/or brutalises the sexual morphology of the other. This means that sexualised 
violence is that which targets the sexual characteristics of the othered body, referring to the ways in 
which the body is penetrated, brutalised or degraded, as well as violence addressed at abjecting and 
dehumanising through attacks upon the sexual behaviour of the other.  
 
 Power utilises different bodies in different ways, infusing certain bodies with it while 
defining others according to its absence. Empowered bodies are inherently hierarchical, by virtue of 
establishing a classification of empowered and marginalised. Butler argues that power ‘distributes 
'identity' to male persons and a subordinate and relational ‘negation’ or ‘lack’ to women’ (Butler 
1990, 53). Debbie Lisle (1999, 68), in her examination of gender and its use in constructing 
difference in travel writing, argues ‘traditional notions of gender are one of the most powerful 
mechanisms of difference used to bolster the familiar/foreign landscape…’ Gender differentiations, 
and its hierarchal structure, are so engrained as to provide a lens through which other hierarchal 
differentiations can be read. Lisle refers to this as a ‘gender core’, and it is stabilised ontology that 
allows for further deductions to be made – ‘for example, being a ‘man’ causes one to be rational, 
aggressive, and dominating, while being a ‘woman’ causes one to be accommodating, emotional, 
and complacent’ (Lisle 1999, 70). These normalised assumptions are echoed not only in relations 
between ‘genders’ as unequal in power relations, but among groups that are discursively produced 
through gendered discourse. 
 
 Continental feminist theorists in particular have argued that the feminine is only ever at 
issue in discussions of gender and sex as a foil to the masculine (see Irigary 1985, Beauvior 1976), 
and that this subordination begins with and takes place through an intervention upon the feminine 
that informs the female of her inferior position (Beauvoir 1976, 267). Butler, who makes great use 
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of the work of continental feminist theory in Gender Trouble, claims this process as one central to 
the formation of all gender identity: '...gender identity appears primarily to be the internalization of 
a prohibition that proves to be formative of identity' (Butler 1990, 86). This is what Beauvior refers 
to when she famously wrote that one is not born a woman, but becomes one (Beauvoir 1976, 267), 
for '[o]nly the intervention of someone else can establish an individual as an Other [emphasis 
added]' (Beauvoir 1976, 267).  Irigary (1985) argues that it is impossible even to speak of 
femininity with any sincerity, as this will always and can only be done through masculine 
discourses (Irigary 1985, 126). This leads to an understanding of marginalisation and othering as 
contingent, dependent upon feminisation. Marginalisation renders the subject subordinate, denying 
the subject characteristics such as agency or dominance. It strips the individual of such 'masculine' 
characteristics as dominance and renders the individual subordinate, passive, and even inferior – 
possessing feminised characteristics.  
 
 There is a further relationship between the sexualised, specifically the feminised, body and 
issues of domination and power. Discussing the gendering and sexualising of the body in tandem is 
not to conflate the two terms – while each is distinct from the other, they do inform one another and 
can occur in tandem, particularly in discussions of power relations. To fully understand this 
relationship, it is useful to reiterate the performative nature of sexuality and the sexualised body in 
particular, to understand how social interventions materialise bodies as others. The notion of a 
biological sex that is granted a body before birth, prior to its subjectivity, is pernicious, for it reifies 
assumptions about the illegibility of the body that are rooted in biological determinism. Political 
feminism that argues for equal opportunities for women and an acceptance of gender as a cultural 
construct frequently confronts the spectre of biological determinism that asks, for instance, if 
women are better nurturers given their role as bearers of children. LGBTQ activism is affronted 
with the same sorts of questioning that asserts heterosexuality as biologically productive and 
therefore 'natural'.  Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) argues that '[a]s we grow and develop, we literally 
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...construct our bodies, incorporating experience into our very flesh' (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 20). She 
argues for the 'ero[sion of] distinctions between the physical and the social body' (Fausto-Sterling 
2000, 20), which problematises the assumption that physical distinctions between bodies, whether 
sexual or ethnic, inherently 'matter'. It is difficult to ask questions of social norms that do not run 
into this notion of some things being fixed ontological points that are irreducible. Of these 
questions, the cultural construction of biological sex – by which I mean not sexual practice, but the 
male/female determination – face potentially the most difficult obstacles. This is also seen in 
exclusionary discourses around questions of ethnicity; for example, the distinction between Hutu 
and Tutsi was ostensibly grounded on phenotypic differences such as the facial features of the Tutsi, 
which were considered more 'European'. This created a false biological distinction between the 
groups.  
 
 The sexed body is from its conception socially determined, and this process creates a 
stratification of normalised behaviour. Butler (1997) argues 'for feminism to proceed as a critical 
approach...it must ground itself in the sexed specificity of the female body'(Butler 1997, 28). This is 
important for two reasons–it asserts the necessity of the materialized body as the unit of analysis 
and it recognizes the importance of the sexed, material body specifically. She argues that 'gender is 
the cultural significance that the sexed body assumes' (Butler 1988, 524). Through discourse and 
psychoanalytic analysis, sexuality with respect to the feminine appears to occupy a tense, 
paradoxical space. On the one hand, the sexuality of the woman is often denied, her desires as a 
sexual being problematic and in need of control, and her chastity lofted as necessary and good in 
order for her to carry the banner of a moral society. Yet on the other, discussions of femininity and 
even the use of the term 'female' bind women to their animal (and therefore primitively sexual) 
nature (Beauvoir 1976, 3). Feminised sexuality is dangerous, and in need of control and 
subordination.  
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  In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this sexualising dynamic of power worked on the bodies of 
both the Hutu and Tutsi women, where the former were held up as good, true and loyal to 'their' 
men, while the Tutsis were constructed as predatory and perverse, using their sexuality to lure Hutu 
men into a position of slavery (HRW 1996, 17). This use of female sexuality served the Tutsi men 
for their women lured the inferior Hutu into servile positions, demonstrating that even in the use of 
her sexuality, the woman is always at the service of the man. Even the hyper-masculinisation of the 
self is done in relation to and through processes of the feminisation of the other, with the other 
being characterised as weak, and closer to animalism or savagery. The notion of the feminine is 
always present in discussions of sexualisation, because, to reiterate Beauvoir, the only intervention 
that can be made on the other is the process of othering itself. Sexualisation is never a positive thing 
– feminising renders the individual subordinate, savage, subaltern, and tied to delinquency, and we 
can see this in the damning references to Tutsi sexuality. This sexualisation of the Tutsi, and Tutsi 
women in particular, was performed in the considerable sexualised violence of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. 
 
The Delinquent in ‘Us’: Sexualisation and Othering 
 The abjection of the ethnic other occurs in two overlapping, complementary ways, through 
an ascribed embodiment of the other whereby the group is ethnicised and sexualised. The notion of 
‘racial purity’ and the defence of the group against outsiders becomes increasingly more important, 
and the interventions upon the other in order to render it both ethnicised as an other-group, and 
sexualised as deviant and delinquent. This creates a boundary that defines the purity of the group 
identity against the impurity of the other. My argument is that this hyper-vigilance with respect to 
group purity, and the resulting violence that is inflicted on the other in defence of the group's purity, 
is an important part of theorising the particular forms that some radicalisations of ethnic identity can 
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take, but is still only a part. My understanding of this radicalisation is that it creates these types of 
violence as it implicates the performances of the body in specific, sexualised, and abject ways. 
While the conditions under which this occurs will vary across time and space, it will include the 
sexualisation, the dehumanisation, and the abjection of the other. 
 
 Historically, discussions of race demonstrate the classifications of entire peoples as 
inherently inferior to others, which Mamdani (2001, 13) calls 'race branding...whereby it became 
possible not only to set a group apart as an enemy, but also to exterminate it with an easy 
conscience'. Butler (2009, 42) carries this point further, arguing that 'we imagine that our existence 
is bound up with others with whom we can find national affinity...who conform to certain culturally 
specific notions about what the culturally recognizable human is'. Butler's assessment is important 
because it reveals how and why outsiders are excluded to the point of dehumanisation. 
Dehumanisation is an important part of exterminatory discourse (see Lindqvist 1992), wherein the 
other is referred to in terms of their supposed beast-like nature (Lindqvist 1992, 8). The discussion 
of an us/them binary produces an alarming ferocity, where ‘they' can be exterminated as something 
other than the culturally recognisable human. An understanding of the role of dehumanisation in 
identity politics is important for my understanding of overkill, but it does not tell the whole story – 
dehumanisation is part of a process that includes the intersection of ethnicisation and sexualisation 
in abjection.  
 
 There is a strong link between the ethnicisation and the sexualisation of the body, 
particularly in cases of tensions that build along the boundaries between ethnic groups. While these 
connections can seem incidental, I argue them to be critical to understanding violence as overkill. 
Nagel writes '[e]thnicity and sexuality are strained, but not strange, bedfellows' (Nagel 2000, 113). 
She goes on to  argue '[t]he borderlands that lie at the intersections of ethnic boundaries are 
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‘ethnosexual frontiers’ that are surveilled and supervised, patrolled and policed, regulated and 
restricted...' (Nagel 2000, 113). She also references the need for sexual propriety within the 
community that is based on heteronormative conceptions of gender and the stereotyping of both the 
virile-masculine self and the delinquent-feminine other according to these gender hierarchies (Nagel 
2000, 113). This lack of sexual propriety was a common stereotype of Tutsi women prior to the 
1994 genocide, and served as a foil for the propriety and purity of the Hutu. In another example, 
when the women in Armagh Gaol began their own No Wash Protest, which included the use of 
menstrual blood that Aretxaga (2009) credits with bringing forward the sexualised nature of the 
women, and therefore their maturity and agency. This was met with extreme discomfort and 
aversion both by the unionist and republican communities. Both of these demonstrate the abjection 
of the feminine-other in these cases. 
 
 Based on imaginary configurations of the individual (for example, the subordination of 
women as the weaker sex, the subordination of the African as savage), these hierarchical divisions 
can and do have very real effects on the lives of, in particular, the subalterns. This can also be seen 
in discussions of hegemonic masculinities, which argue that certain expressions of masculinity are 
inherently superior to others, subjugating other masculinities, and including the subjugation of all 
femininities. Ashe (2012) discusses this in term of the construction of masculinity in Northern 
Ireland, where in particular Republican paramilitary masculinity was viewed by the Loyalist 
community as aberrant and dangerous, in contrast to the noble Unionist masculinity.  These 
expressions of masculinity are subject to cultural and historical influence, as the ways in which 
someone may 'be a man' differ significantly across time and space. Hegemonic masculinity 'was not 
assumed to be normal...But it was certainly normative' (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 832), and 
it dictates not only the aspiration to this normative manliness on an individual level, but also the use 
of hegemonic masculinities to promote a specific image of the larger self-image (that of the group) 
in contrast to a subordinated other. This leads to the feminisation of other groups in the attempt to 
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establish, protect, or propagandise the masculinity of the in-group, even when the differences 
between groups are being framed as primarily ethnic.  
 
 Through these processes of race-branding and sexualisation, the body of the other truly 
becomes the body of the other, meaning that the body of what was previously simply the body of 
another individual belonging to another group, becomes infused with a new alterity, and embodies 
otherness. The sexualisation and ethnicisation of the body of the other are processes through which 
alterity becomes recognised and ascribed. They occur in tandem and produce the abject body of the 
other. Abjection can be instrumentalised in community building through its demarcation of what is 
acceptable and unacceptable. Miller argues '[d]isgust has...powerful communalizing capacities and 
is especially useful and necessary as a builder of moral and social community' (Miller 1998, 195). 
He goes on to say that 'disgust marks boundaries in the large cultural and moral categories that 
separate pure and impure, good and evil...' (Miller 1998, 220). This boundary is critical, not only 
because it defines who is in or out of the group, but because it demonstrates what is considered to 
be either in or out of the group – what behaviours and/or what individuals will be punished for 
transgressions against the boundary between us and them: '[a]cross this boundary values are 
projected that define the characteristics of the self and the Other; force is then mobilized to ensure 
that the boundary and the differentiated identities remain intact' (Papastergiadis 2006, 432).  
 
 Once outside the boundary of us or the self, the other becomes in some instances much 
easier to dehumanise, and this dehumanisation relative to the self becomes a danger for those 
others. Papastergiadis writes '[o]nce the Other is constructed in the position of debasement, 
abjection and evil, they are excluded from the field of human values....and moral obligations' 
(Papastergiadis 2006, 433). This exclusion from human dignity makes the policing of the border 
between us and them all the more important (Papastergiadis 2006, 433),  '[f]or if the nature of the 
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Other is composed of animalistic appetites and malicious calculations, then ‘they’ will be driven to 
violate the boundary' (Papastergiadis 2006, 433).  This boundary and its guardianship is in place not 
only to keep the other out but to ensure, through the performances of adherence to 'our' accepted 
norms, that the self does not find itself on the wrong side of the border. Once excluded, the other 
must be continuously held in its place outside the sphere of the self. This need for exclusion may 
take the form of a  pathologisation of the other, likening its presence to that of vermin, infection, or 
other contaminant, as I have previously discussed in terms of biopolitics and security in Chapter 
Three (Masey 2008).  This in turn increases the need for the securitisation of the border between the 
self and the other, which can also be viewed as the subject and the abject as the other begins to 
embody perversion, filth, and disease: '[t]he fantasy of the anxious self relies on strong boundaries 
and heightened vigilance against any sign of violation. This boundary becomes invested with the 
need for security against decline and contamination' (Papastergiadis 2006, 433).   
 
 An example of this is the discursive production of the Tutsi as vermin prior to the 1994 
genocide, when the Tutsi were commonly called inyenzi (cockroach). Interviewed survivors 
discussing the Rwanda genocide 'mention the fact that Tutsi were described in ...dehumanizing 
terms such as inyenzi (cockroach) and inzokas (snakes)... – terms that suggested Tutsi were 
dangerous and needed to be dealt with harshly' (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 14). These epithets were 
not only part of the propaganda that spread in the years before the genocide, but were reportedly 
part of the everyday discourses of the Hutu as well (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 14). While declaring 
the inhumanity of the Tutsi, Hutu propagandists also stressed the ethnic boundary between the two 
groups, rejecting the idea of a Rwandan nation as 'a Tutsi trick to divide and weaken the Hutu by 
destroying their sense of ethnic identity' (des Forges 1999, 61). The Hutu were a proud Bantu-
descended ethnic group- the Tutsi, foreign invaders (des Forges 1999, 61), bent on imprisoning the 
Hutu or otherwise destroying the Hutu's sense of self.  
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 Foucault's concept of disciplinary power can add to an understanding of these processes, as 
disciplinary power works (and did so in Northern Ireland during the Troubles) to secure the non-
delinquent population from threat within itself. The cellular organisation that is part of Foucault’s 
disciplinary power model is diffused throughout the entire social body, beginning with prisons and 
production and working through the very fabric of society. The cellularity of the prison transfers its 
'perpetual surveillance of a population' (Foucault 1977, 281) to the 'entire social body' (Foucault 
1977, 298), through a 'production of delinquency' (Foucault 1977, 285), where delinquents are 
'everywhere present and everywhere to be feared' (Foucault 1977, 286). Normalising technologies 
for scrutinising and regulating the body proliferate throughout society. One area of discourse that 
emerged surrounded the 'problem' of sex. That sex would have to be addressed by disciplinary or 
regulatory regimes is hardly surprising, given that, as Foucault points out, the body was placed 
under masterful and productive control rather than being allowed to give itself over to more base or 
primal urges. 'It is in the nature of power,' Foucault writes, 'to be repressive, and to be especially 
careful in repressing useless energies, the intensity of pleasures, and irregular modes of behaviour' 
(Foucault 1976, 9). Sex had to be controlled, and effective control, as demonstrated by the 
reappropriation of the Panopticon, requires surveillance and scrutiny. Sex must be spoken about, but 
who was allowed to speak of it and who was not, and in what contexts, would need to remain 
tightly regimented. Foucault argues:  
The couple imposed itself as model, enforced the norm, safeguarded the truth and reserved 
the right to speak while retaining the principle of secrecy. A single locus of sexuality was 
acknowledged in social space as well as the heart of every household, but it was a utilitarian 
and fertile one: the parents' bedroom. (Foucault 1976, 3).  
 
 The heteronormative matrix creates a norm that serves a utilitarian function necessary for 
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the social body. Only the heteronormal couple was allowed to acknowledge their sexuality, whilst 
other sexed bodies were forced into silence. Silence is, according to Foucault's framework, another 
form of discourse (Foucault 1976, 27), that produces a sexual delinquent that is everywhere present 
and everywhere to be feared. While this silencing does not in and of itself produce or even assume 
the inevitable production of brutalisation against the other, it is another argument for the exclusion 
of other as outside the frame of normalised sexuality, and for 'deviant' sexualities to become treated 
as other.  For Foucault, sex is the pivotal factor in the proliferation of mechanisms of discipline and 
normalisation; it is also at the centre of a system of 'dividing practices that separate off the insane, 
the delinquent, the hysteric, and the homosexual' (Deveaux 1994, 224). Sexualisation and in 
particular the sexual delinquent make up a very important part of the creation of the normative self, 
and sexual delinquency becomes a discursively assigned trait of the other. 
 
 The sexualised and delinquent body poses a particularly nuanced threat to the social body, 
and its being brought to public attention inspires an emotive reaction from the social body. The No 
Wash Protest that took place between 1976 and, roughly, 1981, in both the men's and a women's 
gaol in Northern Ireland provides an illustration of this point. While neither protest was particularly 
enthusiastically supported (unlike, for example, the Blanket Protest that began in Long Kesh in 
1976), the men's protest was framed as a 'step-up' process of resistance against brutality suffered 
within the prison (Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 1994; 2006, 31) and later as a means of re-
clothing the body whilst on the blanket (Feldman 1991, 175), the women's No Wash Protest was 
either viewed with complete horror from both sides of the ethnic battle or was virtually ignored (see 
Weinstein 2006; see also Aretxaga 1995).  Feminist scholars have drawn many parallels to 
Foucault’s description of the Panopticon as the paradigm of disciplinary power, that at the level of 
the social body, women have so wholly internalised the normative structure of idealised 
womanhood that they 'are…fearful of the consequences of ‘noncompliance,’ and ideals of 
femininity are so powerful that to reject their supporting practices is to reject one’s own identity' 
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(Deveaux 1994, 226).  The reception of the Armagh No Wash Protest supports this claim, as the 
women involved disturbed the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for women, even women in 
prison, by ignoring both the pre-eminence of hygiene placed upon women, and the tacitly 
acknowledged taboo that surrounds menstruation, its discussion and even its very 
acknowledgement, in nearly every social context.  
 
 What the previous discussion brings forward is an explanation for the extreme forms of 
ethnicised and sexualised violence, overkill, which can occur in violent ethnic identity politics. I 
have previously demonstrated the need for a new framework for examining violent identity politics, 
the utility of performativity in addressing this gap, the role of the body in an examination of 
violence, and the ways in which the intersection of ethnicised and sexualised identity in abjection 
produces exclusionary discourses that can become radicalised towards overkill. The combination of 
these leads to an understanding of overkill, which I argue provides an understanding of the kind of 
violence with which this thesis is concerned, how it emerges, and what it attempts to accomplish. 
My understanding of overkill is that it is qualitatively different to dehumanisation discourses that 
lead to extermination – overkill accomplishes more than just destroying or attempting to destroy an 
enemy group, but communicates the abjection of the group through the specific types of violence 
that it employs, namely the weaponisation and brutalisation of the body.  
 
‘Exterminate All the Brutes’13: Bodily Inscription, Dominance, and Overkill 
 According to Butler's reading of Irigaray, the only way of seeing 'the philosophical relation 
to the feminine' is by recognizing that feminine as the outsider, as 'the unspeakable condition of 
figuration' (Butler 1997, 37). She says 
                                                 
13 Lindquivist, Sven (1992). Exterminate all the Brutes’. London: Granata Books.  
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 This exclusion of the feminine from the proprietary discourse of metaphysics takes place, 
 Irigaray argues, in and through the formulation of ‘matter’. Inasmuch as a distinction 
 between form and matter is offered within phallogocentrism, it is articulated through a 
 further materiality. In other words, every explicit distinction takes places in an inscriptional 
 space that the distinction itself cannot accommodate...It is this unthematizable materiality 
 that Irigaray claims becomes the site...for the feminine within a phallagocentric economy 
 (Butler 1997, 38). 
To feminise somebody, then, is to render that body uniterable, is to mark it by exclusion – the 
feminisation of the body is tantamount to the exclusion of that body. The female body by this 
understanding does not matter – and since it does not matter, it is more readily subjected to harm. In 
her discussion of gendering as a process through which bodies come to be understood (Butler 1990, 
12),  Butler points out that there is an historical association of the body with the female, in contrast 
to that of the mind with the male (Butler 1990, 16), and argues that this tying down of the 'female' 
to 'her' body is itself a form of control, arguing '[t]he identification of women with ‘sex’... is a 
conflation of the category of women with the ostensibly sexualized features of their bodies and, 
hence, a refusal to grant freedom and autonomy to women as it is purportedly enjoyed by men' 
(Butler 1990, 27).  I suggest that this raises the question of whether or not embodiment, particularly 
the forcible embodiment of an individual by another, inherently feminises the individual in that it 
ties him or her to his or her body.  
 
 We see this in the way that ethnic violence may be written upon the bodies of victims. This 
is evident in the case of the Hunger Strike Protest in Northern Ireland in 1981. Hunger striking has 
strong links to passivity, to typically 'female-dominated' illness (i.e. anorexia – see Ellman 1993), 
but I argue that the 1981 protest should be viewed as an attempt by the strikers to reclaim their 
bodies from a forced embodiment of feminsation and abjection. It can be read as: 'if you hold our 
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bodies captive and force us to mark them in one way, we will refuse any marker and we will deny 
you access to our bodies by rendering them repulsive. If that is not enough, we will refuse to take 
your food and our bodies will waste before you.' The wasting of the body becomes a categorical re-
masculinisation, evoking such masculine characteristics as pro-activeness, militancy, and the 
domination of the rational mind over the body.  In the Rwandan genocide, rape and other sexualised 
violence was used as a mean of locating difference and as a means of communicating dominance.  
 
 This extreme violence that makes up overkill does more than hurt or kill – it acts out 
abjected difference and communicates the dominance, and more fundamentally the distinctive 
identity, of the ingroup over the outgroup.  For Appadurai (1998), extreme brutality literally marks 
difference on the bodies of the other (and while he uses the Rwandan genocide as an example, the 
bodies of the republican prisoner participating in the No Wash Protest and the Blanket Protest 
clearly marked their difference), and is a diagnostic tool for discovering difference. Furthermore, 
there is the concept of sacrificial violence in Girard (1972), who claims that mimetic rivalry (which 
is similar to Butler's (2010) concept of melancholia) leads to violence, a violence that is used to sate 
the desires of the group and helps explain in part the rage of the self against the other. All of these 
bring us closer to an understanding of how such extreme forms of violence may emerge from 
violent identity politics.  
 
 Fujii (2010) argues that violence of this kind is not an aberration of identity, but is itself the 
identity – violence is performative of violent identity, not a feature of another identity. I also 
understand extreme violence to be performative of violent identity, rather than an endpoint for an 
identity group that becomes violent. This understanding of violence leads to my understanding of 
overkill. Overkill is the sexualised weaponisation and/or sexualised brutalisation of the body. It is 
particularly aggressive, and is intended to communicate difference, exclusion, and domination. It 
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sends a message that the other has been stripped of agency and subjectivity. Overkill is itself 
performative, commuting the identity of the self as aggressive, dominant, masculine, and the other 
as abject, subjugated, and feminine. This type of violence does not police norms: it eradicates, 
humiliates, and expels difference.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 So far, I have examined the existing literature on ethnic identity and conflict, and discussed 
the theoretical understandings of performativity, embodiment, and abjection of the other. In 
attempting to address the question of why some instances of violent identity politics produce 
extreme forms of violence that are highly sexualised and focus upon the body in specific ways, I 
have identified a gap in the literature on ethnic identity formation that has left it unable to provide a 
satisfactory account for how identity appears natural while being socially constructed. This gap has 
prevented some traditional theories of ethnic conflict from addressing the extreme nature of some 
conflicts. I have proposed an understanding of ethnic identity as performative, to account for its 
appearing natural and enduring while in reality being constructed. This has also expanded the 
understanding of identity in conflict, as it has allows us to understand how abjection and the 
intersectionality of identity markers such as ethnicisation and sexualisation informs violent identity 
politics. In the remainder of this thesis, I will demonstrate through the use of empirical evidence 
that it is this collision of these abject performances of the embodied other that lead to the 
extraordinary levels of violence that we see in some cases of ethnic violence, where the body is 
either weaponised, brutalised, or in some instances, both. It is my contention that the performativity 
of ethnicity is the bridge between the ontologies of ethnic identity formation and the scholarly 
struggle to understand ethnic conflict, and why it can take such sensational forms. I argue that 
viewing identity as performative exposes the intersectionality of ethnicisation and sexualisation, 
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which when produced through abjection can lead to overkill. 
 
 Overkill produces two types of violence that are not mutually exclusive to one another and 
may occur in tandem, which are the brutalisation and the weaponisation the body. Empirically, I 
will begin by discussing the ways in which the body in Rwanda was brutalised as part of the 1994 
genocide. Beginning on 6 April 1994 and lasting approximately one hundred days, the Rwandan 
genocide represents one of the greatest spectacles of death, for its reliance on what Fujii (2010) 
calls 'extra-lethal' violence. There are a few features of the genocide that are distinct and which I 
will argue contribute to the construction of the abject other. The violence suffered by the victims 
was as intimate as it was fast-paced, as the weapon most associated with the violence is the 
machete. This meant that the genocidaires were in exceptionally close physical proximity to their 
victims, and the manner in which death was dealt out implicated the body in a way that was 
incredibly intimate and direct, and resulted in their dismemberment, evisceration, and vivisection. 
Sexual assault and rape was rampant during the genocide, which itself carried on from a campaign 
of sexualisation of Tutsi women that cast them as deviant and themselves abject. Tutsi women were 
viciously raped, often numerous times and by numerous attackers, and either left for dead or 
immediately killed. Some were kept in sexual slavery as the 'wives' of the genocidaires, and 
continue to live with their captors in exile. Additionally, the corpses of murdered women were 
reportedly raped after their deaths. These incidents illustrate the collision of abject violence and the 
sexualisation of the embodied ethnic other.   
 
 Following my discussion of the brutalisation of the body, and demonstrating one potential 
outcome of brutalisation, the second empirical chapter will focus on the weaponisation of the body 
through the prison protests in Northern Ireland. The notion of the body as a weapon creates some 
tension in political scholarship, particularly as the transformation of the body into a weapon carries 
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with it the underlying assumption on the part of the agent of the possibility if not outright certainty 
of his or her death. Such practices are deemed 'irrational, pathological, suicidal' (Bargu 2009, 634). 
Bargu (2009) refers to the 'metamorphosis of human beings into weapons of war' as ‘unsettling' 
(364), arguing that the actions of weaponised political bodies 'assert that their political cause is 
worth dying...for, that they would prefer to die rather than settle for a life whose terms they cannot 
choose or effectively change according to their political views and collective will' (Bargu 2009, 
364).  
 
 In the conflict in Northern Ireland, the weaponisation of the body was deployed as a means 
of resistance within the prison system. This weaponisation took two distinct forms in the No Wash 
Protest and the Hunger Strike Protest. Each protest relied upon the body, specifically the sexualised 
body, for its impact. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate that this weaponisation of the body 
stems from a melancholic desperation, that the body become the site of exteriorised abjection.  The 
No Wash Protest as a scatological weapon not only made the bodies of the incarcerated objects of 
disgust, it weaponised the sexualised body, particularly as in my discussion of this protest, 
‘scatological’ will refer to the deployment not only of faeces but of menstrual blood, encompassing 
multiple forms of bodily waste.  It internalised and then externalised its relationship to the abject 
other, in this instance the colonising force of the British, in a spectacle of bodily resistance that 
ultimately culminated in the deaths of ten men by hunger strike.  
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Chapter Five 
‘Go and Kill Your Neighbor’14: The Brutalisation of the Body in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
Introduction  
 The first empirical chapter of this thesis will focus one form of the intersection of ethnicised 
and sexualised identity in the body, this time focusing upon the body as primarily a target rather 
than a tool of violence through its brutalisation. So far, I have discussed the existing scholarship on 
ethnic identity formation and violent identity politics in order to identify a gap in the literature, 
which I argue to be the intersection of ethnicised and sexualised identity in the formation of 
radicalised identity that is communicated and produced through overkill. I went on to introduce 
performativity as a conceptual framework for this study, as it accounts for the production of a 
dynamic, intersectional, and exclusionary identity.  
 
 Having identified two dynamics apparent in overkill, the brutalisation and the weaponisation 
of the body, in this chapter I will discuss the first dynamic, the brutalisation of the body, using the 
empirical case study of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The brutalisation of the body is the first 
dynamic to emerge from the abjection of the other that produces and is produced by overkill. Once 
the other has been produced as abject, the subject attempts to destroy it – but not only to destroy it 
by causing death, but to humiliate and dominate it to the extent that the subjectivity of the other is 
removed. Abjection and othering are initially externally-ascribed events, which means that the self, 
the subject, recognises the other as abject and reacts to that abjection first. Weaponisation of the 
body may follow on from this as the other takes on and performs its own abjection to strike back at 
the subject. The 1994 Rwandan genocide clearly illustrates the brutalisation of the sexualised body 
through widespread genocidal practices such as rape, gang rape, and evisceration. As will be 
                                                 
14 Phrase attributed to Gourevitch (1998) 
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discussed in this chapter, much of the discursive production of groups leading up to the genocide 
was intended to sexualise the other, in this case the Tutsi, and much of the violence was, in addition 
to being a particularly gruesome example of brutalisation, highly sexualised.  
 
 It is important to note once more at this stage that the term ‘sexualised’ is used in this 
discussion in a slightly different manner to how it is normally used. In some cases, sexualisation as 
a concept may carry with it an assumption about desire and desirability, which is not directly 
relevant to this discussion. Desire is not necessarily excluded from my application of sexualisation, 
but neither is it the focus; rather, I am more interested in the sexualisation and/or the gendering of 
the individuals within a group as a means of conferring or denying power. Sexualising and 
gendering are separate processes with separate impacts, and it is not my intent to conflate the two. 
Sexualisation here refers to the reduction of the body to its sexuality and/or its sexual 
characteristics, whilst gendering in this context refers to the ascription of gender-coded 
stereotypical characteristics (e.g. feminine passivity versus masculine aggression). Both are displays 
of power that operate in separate spheres, but do often occur in tandem. In the cases presented in 
this thesis, this tandem operation can be seen in the intersection of the body and power through a 
forcible ascription or removal of these gender-coded characteristics through sexually defined 
violence, which is to say violence that targets the sexual body and/or uses the language of 
sexualisation. What is of interest is the focus on the way in which the production of the other 
through sexualised tropes is at the root of abjection.  
 
 The extremity of the violence that occurred during the genocide proved difficult to come to 
terms with, to process, and to remember, particularly in Western popular culture. This reflects the 
sort of cognitive disconnection that the brutalisation of the body in overkill produces – the abject 
violence of overkill touches on the affective receptor that confounds the recognition of the subject 
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or indeed the human. Popular depictions of violence including but not limited to the Rwandan 
genocide have been accused of white-washing the horror, both in the sense of making it more 
palatable for audiences (Dokotum 2012), and in romanticising intervention through heroic-western 
tropes (Scott 2003). There are two Hollywood productions that deal with the brutalisation of the 
body in Rwanda, one directly and one indirectly. Tears of the Sun (2003) is nominally set in 
Nigeria, though the civil war depicted is thought to 'represent a collage of recent real-world African 
atrocities, evoking wars in places like Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan' (Scott 2003). Tears of the Sun is 
the story of a US Navy SEAL team tasked with evacuating U.S. Nationals from Nigeria, a very real 
country that is tearing itself apart in a fictional civil war (Tears of the Sun 2003). The most 
memorable, and indeed gruesome, scene in the film depicts the protagonist US Navy SEAL team 
'clearing' a village where a massacre is taking place, and the film makes a point of noting the 
intimacy of the killings (preformed often with machetes), as well as sexual violence – one of the 
SEALs shoots a man as he is raping one of the villagers (Tears of the Sun 2003).  While this film 
does attempt to confront the horror of genocidal violence, it does so at the expense of the conflicts 
that it portrays by collapsing ethnicised violence into a single trope of tribal warfare that is in some 
fashion dealt with by the (white) West. This resonates with the 'ancient hatreds' theorisation of 
ethnicised conflicts, particularly those on the African continent, but Tears of the Sun does this not 
only through the conflation of at least three different and dynamic events, but through the over-
emphasis of the efficacy and scope of Western (particularly American) aid. 
 
 Focussing exclusively on the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Hotel Rwanda (2004) is based upon 
actual events. This narrative film tells the story Paul Rusesabagina, manager of the Hôtel des Mille 
Collines, who is forced to take in refugees fleeing the violence and becomes their lifeline once the 
United Nations pulls out of the country (Hotel Rwanda 2004). The film was well-received by 
audiences as it 'gripped the imagination of the world and was lauded for publicising the 1994 Tutsi 
Genocide, which was seriously underreported at the time' (Dokotum 2012, 2). However, as 
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Dokotum also points out, the film was criticised for 'trivialising' the violence (Dokotum 2012, 2). It 
is the case that the violence of the genocide is not directly confronted in the film and is instead 
alluded to more than depicted, but the accusation of trivialization is too harsh. Rather, what Hotel 
Rwanda demonstrates is the difficulty of Western audiences in understanding and confronting the 
violence. In his memoir, Reverien Rurangwa says '[t]here is a sort of unfathomable ‘mystery of 
evil’ in such inhumanity committed by humans' (Rurangwa 2009, 31), and the struggle to depict and 
come to terms with the extremity of the violence speaks to this.  
 
 During the 1994 Rwandan genocide an estimated eight hundred thousand to one million 
people were killed in the span of one hundred days. It is not, however, only the scale and speed of 
the violence that is particularly horrifying, but also the kinds of violence that occurred. The 
genocidaires not only killed on a massive scale, but the methods they used to commit genocide 
were intimate in terms of both the relationships between some of the killers and some of the victims 
as well as the methods employed in the genocide. Lee Ann Fujii (2011) highlights this in the title of 
her book, Killing Neighbours, and the fact that the weapon of choice for the majority of the killers 
was the machete, which required both close physical proximity to the victim and a considerable 
amount of physical effort illustrates the intimacy of this violence. There was also widespread sexual 
violence and sexualised mutilation, including rape, gang rape, castration, and the evisceration of 
pregnant women: 
 The killers used all types of torture possible on earth...To traumatize and terrorize their 
 victims, people were picked at random from the group in churches and stadiums and 
 chopped into pieces in front of frightened Tutsis who did not know when their turn would 
 be. These victims were first starved and dying of thirst. There are some whose legs and 
 arms were chopped and left bleeding. In many places like in Butare, Nyanza and countless 
 other areas, people were buried alive. Pregnant women were sliced into pieces, the babies 
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 taken out of the womb, slaughtered and then it would be the mother's turn (Kimenyi 1996, 
 109).    
 
 The silence of traditional approaches to ethnic violence discussed in the second chapter with 
respect to the extreme nature of the violence that comes out of some conflicts is becomes quite 
starkly apparent when examining the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Erin Baines (2003) writes of a 
'lacuna...between the macro-level theoretical scholarship and the 'details of the genocide as a series 
of acts of violence' (Baines 2003, 479). The brutality of the killing in the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
resists explanations such as elite manipulation or economic disparity, for although these were 
contributing factors and certainly played a role, they cannot account for the horror with which the 
genocide was committed. Survivor Marie-Louise Kagoyire said 'I don't believe in the jealousy 
explanation, because envy has never driven anyone to lay children in a row in a courtyard and crush 
them with clubs' (Hatzfield 2000, 130). Territorial competition does not address overkill, or provide 
an explanation for it. Often survivor testimony repeats this idea of the brutality of the genocide 
resisting simplistic instrumental explanations – it was simply too horrifying. Kagoyire's testimony 
goes on to say 'they became obsessed with burning our photo albums during the looting, so that they 
dead would no longer even have a chance to have existed' (Hatzfield 2000, 131). Survivor Innocent 
Rwililia asked '[i]f there was killing to be done, they had only to kill, but why cut off arms and 
legs?' (Hatzfield 2000, 113).  
 
 Rather than put forward a model or rubric for explaining how genocide may come about, or 
suggesting an inherently causal variable that explains genocide, what this project seeks to draw out, 
here through an examination of the brutalisation of the body in ethnic violence, is the existence of 
certain trends – the abjection and sexualisation of the ethnicised other – that make such extreme 
violence possible. Rather than treating ethnic identity as something that is created then 
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disseminated, or that exists a priori, extreme identity violence is better understood as the result of a 
constellation of identities and identity norms both ethnicised and sexualised that intersect with one 
another and are naturalised in order to make extreme violence possible. 
 
 The intimate, extra-lethal violence of the Rwandan genocide brings forward a number of 
interesting problems that highlight the intersection of the sexualised body with the ethnicised body 
in extreme political violence. First, the violence itself is abject- Arjun Appadurai (1998) discusses 
the prevalence of vivisection in the genocide as an attempt by the genocidaires to stage the 
difference separating the self (Hutu) from the other (Tutsi). Vivisection refers to a living-dissection, 
which is to say that it is the cutting open of a living being for exploratory or experimental purposes. 
It is distinct from dissection because the subject is still alive, and so in the case of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide the bodies of the victims of vivisection were opened whilst still living. To 
Appadurai and Fujii, the abjection of the other was quite literally inscribed on the body of the other 
(Tutsi) through a campaign of abject violence – the mutilation of the corpses of the Tutsi serving as 
a grotesque marker of difference. Fujii (2010) argues that extreme violence is itself an identity 
performance, rather than a boiling over of long-standing hatreds. This accounts for two important 
factors in extreme brutality: the extremity of the violence that can occur, and the dissolving of a 
distinction between group identity and group violence. Groups are not necessarily inherently violent 
or hostile to any one particular group, but rather, the violence that emerges in these extreme cases of 
identity politics is the result of a specific kind of radicalisation of identity and creates a new kind of 
violently exclusionary identity.  
 
 What is left out in these previous discussions, however, is this additional radicalisation of 
the violence through the ethnicisation and sexualisation of the other, which in the case of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide was the Tutsi. Prior to the genocide, the anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign made 
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the sexuality of the Tutsi, particularly the Tutsi women, a highly salient feature of a campaign of 
hate speech. The presentation of the Tutsi woman as a succubus was an integral part of the hate 
campaign against the Tutsi (Human Rights Watch 1996, 18). Ethnic difference was revealed and 
disseminated through an alleged difference in sexual norms, and these alleged norms were explicitly 
targeted as degenerate and abject. Tutsi women were called ‘seductress-spies’ (Human Rights 
Watch 1996, 18) whilst Hutu women were the ‘more honest’ (Human Rights Watch 1996, 17). 
During the genocide, there was wide-spread sexual violence that included the rape of victims prior 
to death (with both male and female victims), the rape of corpses, gang rape, sexual slavery, and the 
intentional transmission of HIV to victims through rape. 
 
  In the remainder of this chapter, I will demonstrate how the sexualisation of the Tutsi was 
part of a campaign of dehumanisation and abjection, which made unthinkable acts such as 
vivisection not only thinkable, but actionable. This abjection not only made the brutalisation of the 
Tutsi body possible, but the brutalisation of the Tutsi became performative of their abjection, and 
by contrast, the affirmation of the subjectivity of the Hutu at the expense (and removal) of that of 
the Tutsi. I will begin this chapter by discussing some of the background to the 1994 genocide, 
specifically with a focus on the ethnicisation of both the Hutu and the Tutsi. My intention is to 
demonstrate that the distinction between the two groups was ultimately historically constructed, and 
difference in this case was produced in order to create two groups, one of which had to be 
discursively produced as other in order to allow for its extermination. From there, I will move on to 
a discussion of the propaganda campaigns that attempted to solidify difference through the abject 
sexualisation and dehumanisation of the Tutsi. Finally, this chapter will examine the use of 
vivisection and sexual violence to respectively ascertain and codify difference through performative 
violence. This violence was what I have described as overkill – communicative and productive of 
abject difference in the other through the highly aggressive, sexualised use of violence.  
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Background to the 1994 Genocide 
 On 6 April, 1994, the Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprian Ntayamira of Rwanda 
and Burundi respectively were on board an aircraft that was shot down by a still unknown party, 
killing the two heads of state and members of staff (Melvern 2004, 134). This assassination is said 
to have sparked approximately one hundred days of genocide that killed an estimated 800,000 to 
one million people (Mamdani 2001, 5). While the exact nature of Habyarimana's assassination may 
remain a mystery, it is generally understood to have been the catalyst for the genocide; however, it 
is relatively obvious given the enormous degrees of preparation that the Hutu's genocidal campaign 
against the Tutsi was not a spontaneous response to the assassination. The machinery needed to 
carry out genocide was in place and well prepared before 6 April 1994 – the Hutus already had the 
machetes and the widely disseminated hate radio, and other types of propaganda, at their disposal 
(see Dallaire 2003). The hate radio program had as early as 26 November 1993, two months after its 
broadcasting agreement was signed, been accused to disseminating hate speech (Melvern 2004, 55) 
The propaganda campaign had begun well in advance of the genocide, and its dehumanisation of 
the Tutsi was immensely important.  
 
 The argument that the 1994 Rwandan genocide was a conflict between two competing and 
inherently different African 'tribes', and that I reject, has passed into common parlance quickly 
through journalistic reports. The 'ancient hatred' hypothesis gained a significant foothold in the 
explanations that immediately followed the downing of the presidential plane on 6 April 1994. The 
New York Times reported '[t]he bloodletting in Rwanda and Burundi runs through the history of 
both countries as fluidly as the meandering Akanyaru River that marks their common border' (Gray 
1994). Jerry Gray, explaining the context of the genocide, observed that '[t]ribal problems exist in 
virtually every African country' (Gray 1994). The assumption that conflicts on a continent as 
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diverse as Africa can be singly simplified to 'tribal' in nature, a term which is not defined in 
journalistic reports, is problematic in its framing of violence as reducible to an unquestioned label. 
Gray then goes on to claim that since the populations of Rwanda and Burundi were both largely 
agricultural, 'competition for land is at the root of much of the ethnic animosity' (Gray 1994). The 
New York Times published another article, written by Donatella Lorch, days after the genocide 
ended, in which she writes that the genocide transformed Rwanda into 'a laboratory … a microcosm 
from which to learn what can happen when politicians seek to ride sectarian forces of hate' (Lorch 
1994). Lorch, quoting Alison des Forges, asserted that the genocide was the result of elite 
intervention into existing tribal hatreds, crafted to ensure that the existent Hutu-dominated power 
structure remained in place. These kinds of arguments are effectively primordialist in nature and 
grossly misrepresent the nature of conflict in Africa, foremost because the assumption that all 
conflicts in a given non-Western region will be sufficiently similar to be reduced to a single (and 
infantalising) cause (tribal hatred). This clashes with my argument, laid out in Chapter Two, where I 
demonstrated that elite manipulation and instrumental concerns did not account for the types of 
violence with which this thesis is concerned.  
 
 Initial accounts of the genocide attributed it to either a failure to constrain historical hatreds 
or instrumental approaches driven by contemporary economic or political considerations. Gray 
(1994) reported that the genocide was largely the result of economic competition (Gray 1994), 
whilst shortly thereafter Alison des Forges asserted that the 'genocide resulted from the deliberate 
choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear in order to keep itself in power' (des Forges 1999, 
6). While my intention here is not to claim that either Gray or des Forges were outright or entirely 
wrong, I argue that these initial accounts of the violence did not focus on what I find compelling 
about the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Both these and similar explanations were accepted as adequate 
accounts of the violence – the horror of the violence itself was regarded as incidental, symptomatic 
of the intensity of the hatred. Elite intervention and socioeconomic power hierarchies certainly 
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played a role, but do not account for the extremity of the brutality- likewise, uncertainty over 
difference contributed significantly but does not consider fully how the demonisation of the Tutsi 
made the type of violence that occurred, and particularly its sexualised and brutal nature, possible.  
 
 Two elements of the Rwandan genocide stand out: the speed with which such massive 
destruction of human life was carried out, and the deeply personal, even intimate manner in which 
the mass exterminations were performed.  The victims in Rwanda were in the majority of cases 
hacked apart with machetes, mutilated, or blown apart by grenades. In addition to the intimate, face-
to-face mode of killing that was implemented during the genocide, rape and sexual violence were 
rampant. Human Rights Watch (1996) points out that while the number of sexual assault victims 
will never be known with certainty, thousands of women of have come forward about the assaults 
they experienced, which given the stigmatisation of rape and of being the victim of rape suggests a 
considerable number of silent victims, both among the living and the dead. Largely it was Tutsi 
women who were targeted for rape, although Hutu women too were victimised, particularly those 
who were married to Tutsi men (Human Rights Watch 1996, 65).  The reasons that the perpetrators 
gave for these assaults all resonate strongly with the existing literature on rape in conflict – 't]hey 
would say things like ‘a certain girl was too proud – so we raped her and then killed her’….[t]hey 
would say ‘we wanted to see how Tutsi look’'(Human Rights Watch 1996, 60). Tutsi women were 
raped, the interviews conducted by the Human Rights Watch suggest, to humiliate them for their 
perceived superiority, and because the perpetrators wanted to see how different the Tutsi really 
were to their attackers.  
 
 The use of rape as a weapon of genocide in Rwanda has been well documented, and in fact 
was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the successful conviction of 
Jean-Paul Akayesu. The Akayesu judgement was a landmark decision not only for the successful 
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conviction of genocide, but his conviction of collusion in the rape of Tutsi women and girls and the 
recognition by the court of rape as genocide. There has been considerable work done on the use of 
rape as a war strategy or technology of genocide, and with considerable focus on the ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide in Rwanda. Beverly Allen (1996, xii) said of the 
widespread rape of Croatian and Bosnian women that it was 'clearly the result of a combination of 
social causes...the specter of limitless power of one human over another, where the one with the 
power bears absolutely no responsibility, no accountability, for his actions'. She goes on to say that 
'all rape is related in that it derives from a system of dominance and subjugation' (Allen 1996, 39). 
Rape as a weapon has also been discussed as a means of punishing members of other groups 
(Milillo 2006, 197). The two conceptions of rape and its deployment as a technology of genocide as 
punishment for the transgressions of the group as a whole, and as means of conferring and 
demonstrating power and superiority are the most directly relevant to my argument15 
 
 My argument is that the extreme violence of overkill is not symptomatic or merely 
symbolic, but constitutive of identity, as through the act of violence, violent identity is performed 
and therefore is produced. Bringing in the performance of violent identity as constitutive of political 
subjectivity goes further still in accounting for the extremity of the violence that occurred in 
Rwanda between April and July 1994, but stops short of accounting for the intimate nature of the 
violence and its fascination with the sexualised body. Considering the genocide as overkill ties 
these disconnected explanations for aspects of the killing together by drawing out the performance 
of violent identity as a radicalisation of the perception of self/other, and highlighting a need to 
                                                 
15 This focus on dominance and punishment does leave out interesting and important discussions of rape as a 
perpetuation of patriarchal and sexist social structures (Allen 2006, 39), the question of gender-based crimes as 
being kept separate from overall issues of human rights (MacKinnon 2006, Kelly 2000), and the tension between 
'normalised' violence and anomalous violence in 'societies under stress' (McWilliams 1998). These and other 
arguments have not been directly engaged with in the interest of narrowing the focus of a wide, diverse, and 
compelling body of literature. For the purposes of understanding rape as a technology of overkill, I have focused on 
analysing sexualised violence including rape as it pertains to the domination and abjection of the other.  
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abject and exterminate, not merely to understand or even kill the other. Viewing the ethnic other, in 
this case the Tutsi, as abjected explains both the Hutu's vivsectionist fascination with the body of 
the Tutsi, as well as the rage with which the bodies of Tutsi were mutilated and destroyed. The 
other becomes something whose very subjectivity must be exterminated, not only killed but utterly 
humiliated and annihilated – but only after being visibly demonstrated to be and marked as 
different. This is the importance of vivisection in the Rwandan genocide, and the history of violence 
in Rwanda leading up to the genocide – Beatrice Nikuze, a genocide survivor, in testimony 
collected by the Genocide Archive of Rwanda, said '[e]very time there happened something awful 
in the country the Tutsi were always the scapegoats and were mercilessly killed' (Nikuze n.d.). This 
demonstrates that the othering of the Tutsi was systemic to the Rwandan sociopolitical dynamic, 
wherein the problems of Rwanda were blamed on the outsiders and punishment was given. 
 
 The footholds gained by theories such as the 'ancient hatreds' hypothesis are understandable 
if ultimately unsatisfying as explanations. The ancient hatreds hypothesis in particular takes root in 
the colonial structure of East Africa in general, and specifically colonial rule in Rwanda and 
Burundi. Alison des Forges (1999, 31) writes 'Rwandans take history seriously. Hutu who killed 
Tutsi did so for many reasons, but beneath the individual motivations lay a common fear rooted in 
firmly held but mistaken ideas of the Rwandan past'.  Des Forges begins her history of Rwanda with 
an explanation of its earliest settlement, highlighting that prior to the eighteenth century, people 
generally grouped themselves along family lines or around specific leaders, eventually developing a 
common language and set of cultural practices (Des Forges 1999, 31). Consolidation and the 
increasing sophistication of the Rwandan state led to a more 'clearly defined...governing elite' (Des 
Forges 1999, 32), at which point the division between Hutu – 'meaning originally a subordinate or 
follower of a more powerful person' (Des Forges 1999, 32) – and Tutsi – 'which apparently first 
described the status of an individual...rich in cattle' (Des Forges 1999, 32) – became concurrently 
more defined.  She emphasises however that these delineations were 'not yet completely fixed 
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throughout the country' when the European colonisers entered Rwanda (Des Forges 1999, 32). 
What I wish to emphasise here is that the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was not, at this stage, 
primarily an ethnic one in the sense that it would later come to be understood – a founded on 'tribal' 
difference. Rather, socioeconomic distinctions became codified as ethnic boundaries that could be 
later called upon to fragment Rwandan society into two antithetical and competing ethnic groups. 
Mahmood Mamdani (2001, 60) refers to this as 'the contradictory nature of cultural and political 
developments. The very people who came to be integrated into a common cultural community... 
became polarized into two distinct and even antagonistic political identities'.  While on the one hand 
'Rwandan' meant a set of shared commonalities, it was underscored by the production of two 
distinct types of Rwandans.  
 
 Mamdani (2001, 56) also emphasises the pre-eminence of exploitation in the consolidation 
of the Rwandan state, and its impact on the view towards difference between Hutu and Tutsi. He 
categorises the view of group difference according to the perception of the division lines of the 
groups themselves, saying that 'Tutsi power' tended to claim 'no difference' whilst 'Hutu power' 
claimed 'distinct difference' (Mamdani 2001, 56). Mamdani argues that these two are not in fact 
contradictory positions but rather complementary interpretations of Rwandan social history, each 
speaking to different moments in history (Mamdani 2001, 57). A substantial part of what it meant to 
be Hutu was what it meant to have been previously marginalised, and Hutu identity, especially Hutu 
Power, relied upon memories of exploitation and exclusion. Therefore whilst I agree that there is an 
historical discontinuation between each hypothesis and the state of group separation in 1994, I also 
argue that this is explicable through and indeed demonstrative of the vested interest of the other to 
deny difference. The Tutsi as the other did not recognise themselves as distinctly different from the 
Hutu, but the Hutu relied upon conceptions of this difference particularly in justifying their 
suppression and eventually extermination of the Tutsi. This operated in a slightly different way in 
Northern Ireland – the republican prisoners rejected not the otherness of Irish/republican, but the 
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otherness of the criminal criminals. 
 
 There is an historical precedent for violence between the Hutu and Tutsi that helped in 
establishing a myth of enduring hatred between the two. From the colonial period, the Tutsi were 
the dominant, though numerically the minority, group. The Hutu on the other hand were largely 
excluded from positions of political control. Slowly catching on through the 1950s and gaining 
momentum following the 1959 revolution, the 'political landscape...reversed' (Twagilimana 2003, 
62), which is a somewhat euphemistic reference to the fact that after 1959 it was Hutus killing 
Tutsis, rather than the other way around. It was then the Tutsi who were excluded from a variety of 
roles in Rwandan society, from political positions to education. This exclusionary discourse 'served 
as the ideological basis for an independent Rwanda' (Twagilimana 2003, 62) that followed the 1959 
revolution, which suggests that the Tutsi as the other within Rwandan society formed the initial 
ideological consolidation of post-colonial Rwanda. This polarisation could then be called upon in 
times of crisis. This consolidation based upon exclusion is consistent with both an understanding of 
identity as performative and as relational to the discursive production of the abject. The exclusion of 
the Tutsi became a naturalised part of Rwandan identity, as their exclusion cemented and reified 
their status as other.  
 
 During the 1959 social revolution for independence, the violence against the Tutsi arguably 
approached genocide, constituted as revenge killings for oppression during the colonial period. 
Aimable Twagilimana (2003, 73) writes '[t]hus a racist ideology sealed the end of the Hutu 
revolution, and the years that followed it became the foundation of political policies'. She argues 
that rather than rejecting the racist ideology of colonialism, 'the new regime instead appropriated 
it...to deny the Tutsi their deserved place in Rwanda' (Twagilimana 2003, 73). Specifically, 
Twagilimana refers here to the Hamitic hypothesis, which claimed that the Tutsi were not originally 
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from the geographic area that would become known as Rwanda, unlike the Bantu-descended Hutu. 
Also unlike the Hutu, the Tutsi were considered more closely linked to the Europeans. The Hutu 
revolution took the Hamitic ideology of colonialism and used it against the Tutsi, highlighting their 
status as outsiders, in an interesting demonstration of Feldman's (1991) 'mimesis of alterity' seen in 
the prison protests in Northern Ireland.  
 
 It is important to discuss the prior record of violence between Hutu and Tutsi not because of 
any suggestion of ancient hatreds latent and inevitable in Rwandan society, but rather because it 
illustrates how racist, exclusionary, and exterminatory discourse shaped what it meant to be Hutu, 
Tutsi, and Rwandan. This allows for an understanding of violence as not an aberrant or exceptional 
event, but rather as tied to banal, everyday performances of Rwandan identity. Rothbart and 
Korostelina (2006, 5) write of a 'threat logic [that] recasts Self and Other within a preformed 
dogma, elevating their roles to a timeless universal law'. The threatening nature of the other 
becomes so naturalised as to become in many respects banal, salient in times of crisis and not in 
times of calm. This accounts for fluctuations between intergroup conflict and cooperation – 
'[d]uring periods of crisis, the threatened group denigrates the Other as uncivilised, savage, 
subhuman, or demonic. Negative iconography is retrieved from mythic stories of the past' (Rothbart 
and Korostelina 2006, 1). This is notable in both the case studies of Northern Ireland and the 
subsequent weaponisation of the abject body, and this case study of the brutalisation of the abject 
body. In Rwanda, the Tutsi (and in particular the Tutsi women), were discursively produced as 
cunning, manipulative, and sexually deviant. One journalist quoted by Human Rights Watch said 
'Tutsi women were made for sexuality and beauty...Tutsi women were seen as spies because they 
know how to present themselves to whites and to Hutu men, so they became an arm of the RPF' 
(HRW 1996, 19). Even in this recounting of the propaganda, Tutsi women are still produced as 
sexualised objects, with the use of phrases like 'made for', and becoming 'an arm of the RPF'.  This 
discursive production of the demonic, abject other, reliant upon a mythic past of conflict, 
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contributed the most to the violence in the 1994 genocide.  
 
‘Always yell with the crowd...It's the only way to be safe’16 
 There has been a considerable attempt in the current literature on the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide specifically, and violent identity politics more generally, to understand and rationalise its 
beginnings. The history of exploitation and conflict in Rwanda has left the 1994 genocide ripe for 
instrumentalist explanations. Given the history of exploitation in Rwanda and the assumption of the 
greater relative wealth of the Tutsi, it can be tempting to explain the genocide as a class struggle. 
However, such instrumental explanations fall short of explaining either the nature or purpose of the 
violence. As survivor Berthe Mwanankabandi pointed out, instrumental explanations fall short of 
explaining the reality of the violence that took place during the genocide: '[t]hose who just wanted 
to steal our homesteads, they could have simply chased us off, the way they'd managed to do with 
our parents and grandparents in the North. Why cut us as well?' (Hatzfield 2000, 189)17.  Violence 
was a means of separating the insiders (Hutu) from the outsiders (Tutsi), and violence such as rape 
was used to initiate Hutus as genocidaires (Human Rights Watch 1996, 40). 
 
 The group consciousness of the Hutu, at least in terms of how they saw themselves when 
compared with the Tutsi, was fundamentally altered in such a way that the genocidaires were able 
to see themselves not only superior in the face of an inferior enemy people, but as human in the face 
of a dehumanised enemy. Odette Mupenize, who was shot below her jaw before being hacked with 
machetes and taken to a field hospital, recounted that Interhamwe came to the hospital and told the 
doctors '[w]e are killing Inyenzi and you are healing them! They ordered us to go out; the doctors 
                                                 
16 Phrase attributed to Orwell 1949. 
17 The terms ‘cut’ or ‘hit’ are often used to describe an attack with a machete.  
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told us they had no choice and we had to leave...They had stopped the doctors from treating us 
saying that: ‘you don't have to treat those cockroaches’' (Mupenzi, n.d.). 
 
 Phillip Gourevitch (1998) makes an alarming and astute observation of a major feature of 
the nature of genocide, saying that it, 'after all, is an exercise in community building. A vigorous 
totalitarian order requires that the people be invested in the leaders' scheme, and while genocide 
may be the most perverse and ambitious means to this end, it is also the most comprehensive' 
(Gourevitch 1998, 95). There are certainly elements of truth to this idea of genocide as formative of 
groups at the same time that it destroys one. Genocide does form a distinct self/other separation 
along the direst lines, wherein membership quite literally means the difference between life and 
death. Participation in genocide, whether through killing, mutilating, or orchestrating violent acts 
also ensures that the blame for the genocide is diffused throughout a larger portion of the self – it 
binds the self to the cause of genocide through mutual responsibility for both the destruction of the 
other and its outcome.  
 
 My departure from Gourvevitch's claim is with the emphasis on the investment of the people 
in the charismatic leader, because such a leader does not fully account for the extremity of the 
violence of, in particular, the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Even given pressure to participate in such 
acts as gang rape, which has been well documented as having occurred (see Human Rights Watch 
1996), conformity and coercion do not satisfactorily explain how such violence became the norm of 
group membership in the first instance, which I have discussed in Chapter Two with respect to 
Volkan's (1997) ethnic terrorism thesis. Furthermore, genocide is not always about community 
building but may also be about community splitting – the ethnic cleansing following the collapse of 
Yugoslavia was as much to do with dividing the community that had begun to identify as Yugoslav 
as it was solidifying Serbian or Croat identity (Hayden 1996). The impact of extreme violence on a 
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community is not unidirectional – genocide exterminates one community to solidify another. It 
accomplishes this by producing and naturalising violence as a form of ingroup identity, wherein 
ingroup identity becomes reliant upon the extermination of the sexualised-deviant abjection of the 
outgroup. 
 
 This community-building impact of genocide is connected to Fujii's (2009) concept of extra-
lethal violence as a performance of a new kind of identity. In her analysis of the Rwandan genocide, 
she deals with what she dubs the 'ethnic hatred' and 'ethnic fears' hypotheses by noting that while 
'[b]oth approaches offer intuitively compelling explanations for mass violence...ethnic masses do 
not act as a single unit, but a variety of groups and groupings that do not always follow ethnic lines' 
(Fujii 2009, 5). She also effectively summarises one of the primary flaws of traditional theories of 
ethnic violence, stating '[g]enocides are dynamic, while categories are static. In dynamic settings, 
context and conditions change, sometimes in an instant. These changes...can shift actors' relations, 
perspectives, motives, and identities' (Fujii 2009, 8). As I have argued in Chapter Two, an 
understanding of the dynamic nature of violent identity politics requires an understanding of the 
dynamism of identity formation and identity performance. It is logical to assume that a series of 
events that is characterised by its shifting nature would need to be explained in terms of shifting 
foundations. This view of ethnic conflicts allows for an examination of ethnic identity as 
intersectional with other identities, namely sexualised identities, which reveal different types of 
violent identity performance.  
 
 While I do take issue with some of Fujii's arguments, notably that she focuses exclusively on 
violence that results in the death of the victim (Fujii 2010), she does highlight what I consider to be 
critical elements of the ways in which identity was radicalised during the genocide. Namely she 
argues for the idea of the performance of violent identity, emphasising the need to view violence as 
142 
 
'a type of identity performance, rather than an expression of extant identities' (Fujii 2010, 24).  One 
point on which I depart from Fujii, particularly her interpretation of identity performance is at her 
definition of performance itself, as I have argued in Chapter Three: she refers to ethnicity 'not as an 
external force that acts on people, but as a 'script' for violence that people act out...I use the term 
script not to evoke habitual or everyday practices, but to refer to a play or piece of theater, the 
performance of which constitutes an event....out of the ordinary' (Fujii 2009, 12). She identifies the 
variance of performance in this idea of identity as a script, just as actors in a play will have different 
interpretations of the same role (Fujii 2009, 13).  
 
 In a modification of Fujii's argument, I argue instead that these variations come not from 
varied 'textual' interpretations but rather because people themselves vary – fluctuations in identity 
performance will 'naturally' arise from the numerous and individualistic ways in which people 
perceive their identities and themselves. The script that Fujii identifies does inform performance 
through normative prescriptions of behaviour, but I argue that it does specifically impact the 
habitual and every day. Reflecting back upon Butler's theory of identity as performative (Butler 
1990), we understand identity to be a naturalised process that operates within a compulsory matrix. 
Identity in this way is productive of that which it claims to be produced by (Butler 1990). 
Radicalised identity produces violent subjects, and this violence is naturalised within its compulsory 
matrix (to borrow from Butler's notion of the compulsory heteronormative matrix). Violence as 
identity in this way must be naturalised and treated if not as banal then at least as contextually 
appropriate.  
 
 We can see this in the framing of the violence as 'work' for the Hutu to complete – survivor 
Emmanuel Murangira discussed the use of Caterpillar tractors and bulldozers to clear away the 
dead, evoking images of a construction site (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 87), which speaks to the 
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banality with which the genocide was treated. The subjects who participated in the genocide were 
constituted through their participation, and so actions such as bulldozing bodies into mass graves 
became a naturalised performance of that identity.  It begins with the naturalisation of difference, in 
this case buoyed by a connection between contemporary difference and past domination and 
violence, and leads to violence as the natural/naturalised reaction to the abject other, who has been 
rendered abject through its sexualisation.  
 
 Furthermore, I am suspicious of the use of performance to denote an identity that is 'acted 
out', as this implies that there is something disingenuous about the identity performance for the 
individual, that it is another layer of identity that overlays a 'true' identity in the same way that an 
actor assumes a character that is not her own. Rather than a superficial scripting of identity in times 
of crisis, this violent, radicalised identity that emerges during a crisis such as the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide is the identity of the violent, radicalised individual. Previous non-violent identities are 
obsolete. Hatred of the other takes on an Orwellian ahistoricism: we are at war with the Tutsi. We 
have always been at war with the Tutsi. And yet while there was certainly an extended history of 
violence between the Hutu and Tutsi, there was also a history of shared language, religion, and 
culture (des Forges 1999, 31), in addition to intermarriages and children of mixed background. 
Hatred of the Tutsi had to be if not outright manufactured, at least made salient and radicalised in 
order to make genocide not only a possible act in the minds of the non-radicalised Hutu population, 
but a necessary one. The performance of Hutu identity did indeed need to be scripted, but I argue 
that this script was part of the normative matrix of Hutu identity, and its performance, as with the 
other identities with which this intersected, such as normalised sexual practice, was compulsory. 
Woven into the web of what it meant to identify as Hutu was its antithesis and the required 
response, which is to say that a part of the intersectional constellation of Hutu identity was a sense 
of the Tutsi as the other, the antithesis of the self, and as abject.   
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 So far, this chapter has given the historical context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
highlighting the history of exploitation and conflict from the colonial and post-colonial formation 
and reformation of the modern Rwandan state to the genocide. Two important trends have been 
noted: the first is that the history of colonialism in Rwanda had a tremendous impact on its history 
moving forward after the dissolution of colonial power, particularly through the consolidation of 
ethnic groups that were based upon and solidified around socioeconomic stratification and 
exclusion. The second is that conflict was very much a part of the history of Rwandan, with ebbs 
and flows of coexistence and co-mingling interspersed with periods of fragmentation and conflict. 
These histories of fragmentation made the differences between the groups psychologically salient, 
and were easily called upon to reify group boundaries. These boundaries were then defined along 
normative, sexualised lines.  
 
 The remainder of this chapter will focus directly upon the events that immediately led up to 
the 1994 genocide and the violence that actually took place during the genocide. I will be making 
heavy use of testimony gathered by a variety of living history and research sources, using the words 
of the survivors to speak to the impact of the violence. This reveals a heavy dependence on 
discursive productions of not only the Tutsi but the Hutu as well, as ideas about difference (between 
groups) and indifference (to the humanity of the other, which in this case always refers to the Tutsi) 
resurface repeatedly. The second half of this chapter begins with a discussion of the dehumanisation 
of the Tutsi, before examining the role of vivisection and sexual violence in stripping the already 
dehumanised enemy of its very subjectivity.  
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Sexualisation, Brutalisation, Dehumanisation: The Road to Genocide 
 Violent identity politics begins with radicalised hostility towards the other. This hostility 
towards the other begins with a perceived threat towards the self from the other, and there is a 
causal loop between the identity of the self and the perception of a threatening other. Rothbart and 
Korostelina (2006, 1) note that '[s]tudies have shown that high salience of ingroup identity promotes 
negative opinions of outgroups'. Hatred of the other is intimately connected with the body of the 
other, and this is quite viscerally seen in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Abjection demarcates the 
boundaries of both the individual territory and the social territory, and can be a means by which 
political agency is gained through a disruption of political and social order (see Wilcox 2014), or 
denied as in the case of the Rwandan genocide through processes of abjection and dehumanisation.  
 
 The brutality of the 1994 Rwandan genocide was about far more than consolidating the 
identity of the Hutu (although it did this as well) – the violence of the genocide was intended to 
assert the dominance of the Hutu over the Tutsi, to humiliate and render them abject. As previously 
stated in the definition of overkill in Chapter Four, this violence was communicative of the 
differences between the groups, the exclusion of the Tutsi and the domination of the Hutu. The 
Tutsi were stripped of their subjectivity, and were thus appropriate targets for extreme violence, 
being denied humanity and the right to existence. Beatrice Nikuze recalled ‘the policemen took us 
to Sonatube where we stayed for a short time. A man called Rusatira came and said, 'Take the 
garbage to Nyanza.' (By saying ‘garbage’, he was referring to us)’ (Nikuze n.d.). Francine 
Niyitegeka, a survivor whose child was butchered in her arms, said 'I endure a kind of shame over 
feeling hunted like that...just because of what I am. The moment my eyes close upon that, I weep 
inside, from misery and humiliation' (Hatzfeld 2000, 43). Another survivor, Freddy Mutanguha, 
recalled   
 The one thing I keep remembering is the way they’d get people from their hiding places and 
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 run after them with dogs. I remember a certain man called Canisius, he had many dogs that 
 were used in hunting people from the bushes where they were hiding. Once they caught 
 them, you’d hear screams that meant they had been killed. They run after them as though 
 they were animals, Tutsis were no longer human beings then. I remember how Tutsis were 
 denied their rights as human beings. They had become like animals and they started killing 
 Tutsis as they believed they were not human beings. They believed they were killing 
 something else, not human beings. I remember that thing so well and it hurts me 
 (Mutanguha, n.d.).  
 
 
 Prior to the genocide there was a considerable campaign of dehumanisation through 
abjection against the Tutsi. Tutsi were commonly referred to as inyenzi, meaning cockroach.  A 
survivor who wished to remain anonymous said '[a]fter the genocide I made a joke with a friend; 
‘[t]he reason I didn't die in 1994 is because I had died before, psychologically died before.’ All I 
heard for years in school was ‘You are stupid! You are a cockroach!’' (Totten and Ubaldo 2011 67). 
Another survivor of the genocide said of the insult '[b]eing called an inyenzi also bothered me 
because it's [being] pointed out you are dangerous and you need to die. And everyone hates them in 
Rwanda because they get in our cupboards, and you try to do everything to get rid of them' (Totten 
and Ubaldo 2011, 46). Here the dehumanisation of the Tutsi is apparent to the point of being 
obvious, as the Tutsi are discursively reproduced as insects, and something to be destroyed. This 
survivor's addition that ‘everyone hates’ cockroaches is an interesting and more telling observation 
of the abjection of the Tutsi. It is no accident that the Tutsi were reproduced not only as pests, but as 
something hated to the point that its destruction was universally desired. Cockroaches are associated 
with disease and evoke a reaction of disgust, and it was this association that was the goal of 
abjection of the Tutsi. 
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Figure 1. 
 
‘Propaganda cartoon from the Rwandan Genocide’ by Kangura (1994) 
 Propaganda played a considerable role in rallying the Hutu population against the Tutsi, and 
was a major aid in the dehumanisation of the Tutsi population as a whole. Anti-Tutsi propaganda 
was not limited to the now infamous hate radio the Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM), which broadcasted hate speech as well as orders to kill throughout the genocide, but also 
took place through the publication of political cartoons in magazines and newspapers such as 
Kangura. Figure One, published in Kangura in February 1994, discursively produced as other both 
the Tutsi (through an assumption of the deviant and hypersexual nature of Tutsi women), and the 
United Nations, particularly General Dellaire. This production of the dangerous other/foreigner was 
not limited to this cartoon, or indeed to Kanugra, but was rather rampant throughout – speaking to 
RTLM on 12 April, 1994, Kantano Habimana said, '[t]he whites have just abandoned us and that is 
no surprise! ...If you depend so much on them, you will eat trash. You should not rely on their 
assistance or their lies because they are always after their own interest' (RTLM 1994). Just under a 
month later, on 17 May 1994, Gaspard Gahigi, Editor-in-Chief of RTLM, said '[f]or a long time, the 
white man has harboured the erroneous conception that the Tutsis are the good people. In the white 
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man's view, the Tutsi is more handsome and more intelligent...' (RTLM 1994). This illustrates the 
continuous production of a Tutsi/white alliance that conspired against the Hutu, casting the Tutsi as 
other whilst simultaneously referring to sexualised difference.  In the same address, the Americans 
are produced as corrupt, with references specifically to lobbying the US president to 'kill the Hutus' 
(RTLM 1994). 
 
 As is explicitly demonstrated by Figure One, the sexualisation of the Tutsi women in the 
months leading up to the genocide was particularly visceral, and it was through discursively 
producing Tutsi women as sexually deviant that Hutu Power propagandists highlighted the alleged 
desire of the Tutsi to 'infiltrate' and dominate the Hutu (Human Rights Watch 1996, 16). In an 
address to RTLM on 12 April 1994, Jean Kambanda18, Prime Minister from the start of the 
genocide, said of the Tutsi 'they are already there [Arusha] with their Ibizungerezi [beautiful girls – 
Translator's note] to seduce the people with their malicious smiles' (RTLM 1994). In the same 
statement, he says of the RPF's advance to Kigali '[t]hey will all be exterminated and none will live 
to tell the disastrous story' (RTLM 1994). Also speaking to RTLM, Kantano Habimana compared 
the Tutsi to 'a girl of easy virtue' who cannot hide that she is 'licentious' once she is pregnant 
(RTLM 1994). One Tutsi woman who survived the genocide and was interviewed by Human Rights 
Watch recounted some of the propaganda, which warned Hutu men that '[t]hese [Tutsi] women are 
very sexual, and they sleep with their Tutsi brothers' (Human Rights Watch 1996, 16).  Figure 1 
implies that Tutsi women used their sexuality to 'win over' foreign/Western authorities and to gain 
favour with them at the expense of the Hutu. The outsider status of the Tutsi is highlight as well, 
                                                 
18 Kambadna was the first head of state to be convicted and sentenced for the crime of genocide. As part of the 
Prosecutor’s stated facts of the case, ‘(vii) Jean Kambanda acknowledges that, on or about 21 June 1994, in his 
capacity as Prime Minister, he gave clear support to Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), with the 
knowledge that it was a radio station whose broadcasts incited killing, the commission of serious bodily or mental 
harm to, and persecution of Tutsi and moderate Hutu. On this occasion, speaking on this radio station, Jean 
Kambanda, as Prime Minister, encouraged the RTLM to continue to incite the massacres of the Tutsi civilian 
population, specifically stating that this radio station was ‘an indispensable weapon in the fight against the enemy’. 
(ICTR 1998).   
149 
 
with the unsubtle suggestion of the alignment of the Tutsi with an alien force. The juxtaposition 
ensures a connection between one foreign invader and an other (see Mamdani 2001).   
  
 The accusations of sexual impropriety on the part of the Tutsi were not limited to political 
cartoons. Kangura, which was effectively the print version of the RTLM in terms of the propaganda 
it produced, published numerous articles, essays, and editorials aimed at othering and dehumanising 
the Tutsi. In one editorial, entitled 'A Cockroach (Inyenzi) Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly', the 
author opens by claiming the numerical minority position of the Tutsi was due to incestuous marital 
and reproductive practices.  He goes on to claim '[t]he history of Rwanda tells us that the tutsi [sic] 
has remained the same, and has never changed. His treachery and wickedness are intact in our 
country's history' (Kangura 1994). Tutsi men are thus rendered untrustworthy and devious. He 
continues, saying that the Tutsi's source of power as 'their women and their cows', calling the 
women 'vamp' and the men 'snakes', accusing the men of rape and sexual assault against Hutu 
women and girls. Women are thus relegated to the same social position as cattle, before both men 
and women are accused of sexual impropriety. 
 
 There are many processes at work here, all of which point to a common discursive 
production of both the ethnicity and the sexuality of the other. This particular editorial sexualises 
both female and male Tutsi, turning Tutsi women into tools for the men, and the Tutsi men as 
sexually deviant and violent. Fidelma Ashe (2012), refers to the importance of rendering the 
masculinity of the outgroup abject (239) as a means of demonstrating ingroup superiority. She 
argues that paramilitary masculinities in Northern Ireland are discursively produced as '‘sadistic’, 
‘perverted’, and ‘psychopathic’' (Ashe 2012, 239). Parallels to the production of Tutsi masculinity 
are certainly apparent, as we can see from the Kangura editorial and its use of words such as 
'treachery' and 'wickness' (Kangura 1994). The Kangura editorial frames Tutsi masculinity as 
150 
 
deceptive, manipulative, and violent, while also framing Tutsi femininity as likewise manipulative, 
in the service of Tutsi masculinity, and sexually deviant.  
 
 As I have previously argued, and a central claim of this thesis is that there is an intersection 
between the ethnicisation and the sexualisation of the body, particularly in cases where tensions 
build along ethnic boundary lines. These connections can seem incidental – des Forges says of the 
propaganda that circulated via the national radio that it 'equated the Hutu-Tutsi difference with the 
fundamental difference between male and female' (des Forges 1999, 61). Indeed, Joanne Nagel 
(2000, 113)  argues '[t]he borderlands that lie at the intersections of ethnic boundaries are 
‘ethnosexual frontiers’ that are surveilled and supervised, patrolled and policed, regulated and 
restricted...' The real differences in ethnicised and sexualised practices of either group can be 
extraordinarily difficult to see at the margins between them, and it is all but impossible to locate 
where one group ends and another begins. This boundary is marked by exclusionary criteria that are 
read as deviation from the norm, outside and dangerous. Nagel also references the need for sexual 
propriety within the community that is based on heteronormative conceptions of gender and the 
stereotyping of both the (virile) self (men) and the (effeminate) other according to these gender 
hierarchies (Nagel 2000, 113). This lack of sexual propriety was a common stereotype of Tutsi 
women, and served as a foil for the propriety and purity of the Hutu. This abject deviance as a 
marker of difference fuelled hatred and fear, but the evidence of difference was lacking. Violence 
became a means of finding, of solidifying, and of marking difference.   
 
The Purpose of Vivisection: Extermination and Examination in Extreme Violence 
 Arjun Appadurai (1998) argues that, in studying an event like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 
the most 'striking feature of such violence...is its site and target – the body' (Appadurai 1998, 6). He 
emphasises how frequently the horrifying violence done through and on bodies appears in the 
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literature on ethnic violence (Appadurai 1998, 6), and argues for examining the importance of 
uncertainty in producing the extreme violence seen in some instances of ethnic violence. As 
Appadurai explains, viewing extreme violence in identity politics as the result of uncertainty rather 
than as the result of a 'heightened conviction' (Appadurai 1998, 1) brings us closer to an 
understanding of how extreme violence is produced. Uncertainty and the fear it produces can spread 
like a virus through a population, whereas conviction for a cause may be harder to propel.  
 
 Appadurai focuses his arguments, as I have, on conflict 'associated with appalling physical 
brutality and indignity – involving rape, mutilation, cannibalism, sexual abuse, violence against 
civilian...populations' (Appadurai 1998, 3). His reasoning for narrowing his focus is similar to my 
own: 'f]ocussing on bodily violence between actors with routine...prior knowledge of one another 
is...a way to illuminate ‘threshold’ or ‘tip-over’ conditions, where managed or endemic social 
conflict gives way to runaway violence' (Appadurai 1998, 4). Additionally, I add that given that 
overkill as a concept or predictor of violence attempts to explain this extreme violence, it is logical 
to confine the study to the object of interest. Traditional theories, I argue, aggregate violence in 
such a way that the role of the individual becomes lost. When this occurs, violence runs the risk of 
being treated as systemic within a fully realised political structure, or an outlier that gains notoriety 
without being indicative of the individuals' understanding of the events. What this project is 
concerned with is the manner in which extreme aggression, through the weaponisation of the self or 
the brutalisation of the other, becomes possible through the psychic build up to Appadurai's 
'threshold'. Traditional theories of violence are unable to account for the lack of incremental or 
chronological build up in overkill – extreme violence of this kind can erupt in an instant without 
following a linear trajectory. The goal of this violence is furthermore not a display of superior 
strength but rather the exposure and expulsion of the abject. 
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 Uncertainty in Appadurai's work is connected to Lisa Malkki's work on the ‘relationship of 
purity to identity’ (Malkki 1995 in Appadurai 1998, 7). He focuses on her 'necrographic map' 
(Malkki 1995 in Appadurai 1998, 7), which draws on Feldman (1991) and his understanding of the 
body as part of the spatial formation of violence. Necrographic maps understand bodies as a 
materialisation of difference here realised through not only physical markers but through the 
violence that reveals them or is implied by them. In Malkki (1995, 88), these symbols of difference 
become the means by which bodies are marked for death.  Bodies as necrographic maps become 
signifiers of difference, a means of materialising difference, in both Feldman and Malkki (Pohlman 
2012, 204) Through these maps of 'bodily difference' (Malkki 1995, 88), difference is produced, 
which at the same time highlights Appadurai's theories of uncertainty in extreme violence. The 
juxtaposition of purity to identity is a tense and paradoxical, yet readily recognisable concept – 
nearly if not outright impossible to attain and yet intrinsically in need of preservation.  
 
 The abjection of the other and the exterminatory discourse that arise in the face of the abject 
other coalesces around this idea of preventing the contamination of the self by the other. The idea of 
a 'pure-bred' identity group is nearly absurd – individuals marrying across groups being just one of 
the ways in which the purity of a bloodline can be diluted over generations if indeed bloodlines can 
be said to have existed at any stage in history. Often in cases of extreme violence, such blurring of 
the bloodlines is common (e.g. in the former Yugoslavia, and indeed between Hutu and Tutsi in 
Rwanda), and it is this blurring of the boundary that causes the visceral reaction that leads to a 
radicalisation of identity. The paradox is that abjecting the other is a response to the encroachment 
of the other on the self/us – but this encroachment is ever present, whether the other is perceived as 
a threat or not. The goal of abjection discourse is therefore never fully realised because the abject 
can never be fully eradicated. 
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 This in many ways relates to Appadurai's uncertainty thesis. There are few if any 'real' 
differences between groups – in the case of the Hutu and Tutsi, difference had to be magnified and 
codified under colonial rule (see Mamdani 2001). Intermarriage between the Hutu and Tutsi did 
occur (Des Forges 1999, 8) although it was not as common in Rwanda prior to the genocide (see 
Des Forges 1999, 32) as in other sites of ethnic cleansing such as the former Yugoslavia (Hayden 
1996). Additionally, prior to, during, and following the genocide, the Hutu and Tutsi shared more 
than they did not – a common language, common religious practices, and a common cultural 
history. Difference had to be produced, and was largely accomplished through the dissemination of 
anti-Tutsi propaganda. But even with this propaganda the differences between the groups were built 
upon flimsy foundations. The primary means by which difference was produced was through 
allegations only, and so their reality had to be confirmed. Without the narrative of sexual deviance, 
difference could likewise not be assured. This instability of categories leads to the uncertainty 
Appadurai's thesis relies upon. 
 
 Appadurai refers to his thesis as an understanding of a 'species of uncertainty' that 'drive[s] 
projects of ethnic cleansing that are both vivisectionist and verificationist in their procedures. That 
is, they seek uncertainty by dismembering...the body under suspicion' (Appaduai 2006, 5). His 
argument is that uncertainty is sought out and must to be verified through the vivisection of the 
other. This is important for my understanding of this violence as abject, as it alludes to the 
fascination with the abject that accompanies the repulsion towards it. Furthermore, the repulsion of 
the abject is always a repulsion towards in these instances rather than a repulsion from – the Tutsi 
were actively and aggressively sought out for examination and extermination. This repulsion 
towards the abject is a propulsion to extreme violence. This vivisectionist violence often intersected 
with sexualised brutality, and rape as a means of discovery was common. It was also a common 
practice to cut open pregnant women and to remove the fetus, killing both: 
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  Before the Interahamwe entered the church they began to check on the ground to make sure 
 all of the people [sprawled out, wounded or murdered] had died. One person they found who 
 had not been killed was a woman who was pregnant, and they grabbed her and began to 
 terrorize her. They began to ask her for money, but she didn't have enough [to satisfy them] 
 and they pulled her clothes off and they wanted to see how Tutsi children looked when that 
 are still in the mother. They took the mother and cut her [sliced her open]. She fell down and 
 the baby [fetus] fell outside of her. That mother screamed until she died (Totten and Ubaldo 
 2011, 119).  
This practice of cutting out unborn babies combines both vivsectionist violence with sexualised 
violence as a means of ‘discovering’ biological difference and brutalising a woman’s body through 
the site of her reproductive capability.  
 
 Uncertainty about the real differences between the self and the other may quickly lead to 
fear of the other, and abjection is a response that combines fear and uncertainty. Particularly with 
respect to refugees as the other, this is sometimes referred to as the invasion complex 
(Papastergiadis 2006).  What is important for this study in Papastergiadis's invasion complex is the 
understanding of the other as abject as a rationalisation for inflicting violence upon it. 
Papastergiadis utilises Kristeva's understanding of the stranger to establish the boundary between 
self and other, the projection of values across this boundary, which justifies the use of violence 
against the other and in doing so, 'minimi[ses] the acknowledgement of violence in the self' 
(Papastergiadis 2006, 432) – 'The violence against the other is...seen not only as a necessary form of 
self-defence, but as a justified response towards the faceless....other' (Papastergiadis 2006, 433). We 
can see this defensive language in a radio address given to RLTM on 22 April, 1994 by Kantano 
Habimana, in which he says 'we can be happy about the fact that people have now united; they have 
understood that the democracy [short silence] of thieves whose objective is to steal power as well as 
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robbing people of what they have achieved in a period of thirty years' (RLTM 1994). The Tutsi here 
are produced as outsiders attempting to steal Rwanda from its people. Papastergiadis highlights one 
of the reasons that defending and maintaining this boundary is so vitally important, that because the 
other is produced as abject, they are outside the boundaries of social propriety, for '[o]nce the Other 
is constructed in the position of debasement, abjection and evil, they are excluded from the field of 
human values, civic rights and moral obligation' (Papastergiadis 2006, 433). The difference in 
language, the use of 'constructed' in Papastergiadis and the use of 'produced' in this project is not 
merely semantic, and is a departure in the theoretical framing of otherness- rather than seeing the 
ascription of otherness as a one-off event, viewing this as performative allows us to understand 
othering as a continuous and productive process.  
 
Rape and Sexual Violence 
 Appadurai's uncertainty hypothesis resurfaces in survivors' accounts of the sexual violence 
in Rwanda. It is commonly reported that the genocidaires said things like '[w]e want to see if a 
Tutsi woman is like a Hutu woman' (Weitsman 2008, 575), making reference to sexual difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi women before raping their victim. One woman recounted that her attacker 
called others to 'see how Tutsikazi are on the inside' before cutting out her vagina and displaying it 
on a stick outside (in Weitsman 2008, 576). This is an example of a brutal attempt at discovering 
difference that is again highly sexualised – the difference that the genocidaire was interested in 
discovering was related directly to the Tutsi woman's sexual being, with the expectation that it 
would be so fundamental as to be visible to passers-by. This example also highlights the use of 
sexualised vivsectionist practices that make up the considerable brutality of the genocide.  
 
 A joint Human Rights Watch/ Africa and Human Rights Watch Women's Right Project 
(1996) details the experiences of women raped, gang-raped, raped with objects, and mutilated 
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(Human Rights Watch 1996, 39). According to the report, this often occurred 'after they had 
witnessed the torture and killing of their relatives...Some women were forced to kill their own 
children before or after being raped' (Human Rights Watch 1996, 39). Even in death women were 
not spared violence, as '[s]urvivors report that ...militia even raped the corpses of women they had 
just killed or women who had been left for dead. After killing women, the militia would frequently 
leave their corpses naked and with legs spread apart' (Human Rights Watch 1996, 40). Rape is a 
frequent occurrence in political violence, with justifications ranging from humiliation of the enemy 
to the assumption of rape as the discovery of men's inherent power over women (Brownmiller 1975, 
in Milillo 2006, 198). This is particularly problematic, as it makes assumptions that simultaneously 
strip the sexual agency of both men and women – rendering male sexuality savage and beyond 
control, and women as mere objects of sexual expression (violent or otherwise).  
 
 The Human Rights Watch Report also describes the practice of genocidaires capturing Tutsi 
women and taking them as ‘wives’, which the report considers ‘Individual Sexual Slavery’ (Human 
Rights Watch 1996, 56).  Referring to these arrangements as marriages, the Human Rights Watch 
argues, ‘obfuscate[s] the total lack of consent by the women’ (Human Rights Watch 1996, 56), 
arguing instead to their being the ‘looted possession of the militiamen’ (Human Rights Watch 1996, 
56). The choice for some women and girls became sexual slavery or death. Rosette Sebasoni 
Musabe testified that 'I remember this man called Niyonsenga who came and told me he wanted to 
help me flee so I wouldn’t die...I was still very young but I could understand that he either wanted 
me to become his wife or he had in mind to rape me...I went on and told him, ‘I’d rather be killed 
than becoming your wife or fleeing with you’' (Sebasoni Musabe, n.d.).  
 
 One of the more important and surprising narratives of the sexual violence in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide surfaced as part of the Akayesu judgement. It was the first time that an official 
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stood trial before an international criminal court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), and was convicted of the crime of genocide. Jean-Paul Akayesu, former mayor of Taba, 
was found guilty on nine counts of genocide and crimes against humanity for his role in the 
massacres that took place within his commune. Multiple witnesses were called to testify to 
Akayesu's collusion with the genocide and began to reveal the staggering degree to which rape and 
sexual violence were a part of the genocide: so much so that the indictment was amended by the 
prosecution due to the 'spontaneous testimony of sexual violence' (ICTR 1999). This was in large 
part due to the specific testimony of Witness J, who gave evidence of the common practice of the 
Interahamwe of raping young girls at the bureau communal, including her three-year-old daughter 
(ICTR 1999). The Akayesu judgement is a particularly important event in genocide jurisprudence 
and in genocide scholarship, because it stands as an official, international, and legal recognition of 
rape as genocide.  
 
 The argument that part of the rationale of genocidal rape is the humiliation of the enemy is 
considerably more convincing then rape as sexual expression.  'Ethnic cleansing focuses the 
violence on bloodlines even though it is played out on and through gender...War rape [and 
genocidal rape] is sexualised violence that seeks to terrorize, destroy, and humiliate a people 
through its women' (Eisenstein 1996, 59). Patricia Weitsman (2008) writes 'a woman's identity 
never really stands alone; it is always juxtaposed by her sexual relationships with men, whether 
coercive or consensual' (564). She highlights the gendered dimension of the Rwandan genocide, 
emphasising that '[m]uch of the propaganda leading up to the killing was directed at Tutsi women' 
(Weitsman 2008, 572), in particular 'their supposed promiscuity and their feelings of superiority 
toward Hutu men...As a consequence, much of the violence was directed at women' (Weitsman 
2008, 573). Weitsman points to estimates suggesting that 90% of the survivors of the genocide were 
the victims of some form of sexual assault (Weitsman 2008, 573). Survivor Jean-Baptite 
Munyankone said '[w]e did not mock the women who had been raped, because all the women 
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expected to be raped' (Hatzfield 2000, 71).  Rape was used by the Interahamwe not 'as a mechanism 
to propagate more Hutus … [but rather] as a mechanism to try to take life. Nearly 70 percent of the 
women raped contracted HIV' (Weitsman 2008, 577), and this does not take into account the 
number of women who died as a result of sexual violence and assault and who may also have been 
exposed to the HIV/AIDS virus. 
 
 Rose Marie Mukamwiza, who after the genocide was elected president of her community's 
gacaca, considered herself trusted in her community 'because no amount of money can wash away 
my shame' (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 36). Rose Marie was raped in front of her surviving children 
after having witnessed the deaths of her husband and five of her children – her husband was killed 
by a machete and when the killers tossed a grenade towards his body, five of her children who had 
been hiding by their father were killed in the blast (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 26). Her daughter, who 
also survived and witnessed her mother's rape, asked her repeatedly what the soldiers had been 
doing to her; her mother answered '[t]hat's another problem with the war, like how they killed 
people. That was their way of killing me' (Totten and Ubaldo 2011, 33). Now that her daughter is 
old enough to understand what she saw, Mukamwiza feels shame in front of her (Totten and Ubaldo 
2011, 33). Shame is a common reaction to sexual assault, and often stems from correlating feelings 
of dehumanisation, or being stripped of self-worth and dignity, and this is echoed by republican 
prisoners recounting their experiences, as will be discussed in the next chapter. This is the 
communicative value of rape and sexual violence in violent identity politics and extreme brutality. 
Rape is the aggressive denial of the humanity of the survivor, who in the moment of victimisation is 
made both an object of sexualised power and is rendered abject. The position of the abject is 
conferred upon the victim in the moment of that assault, a means by which the victimised subject is 
constituted.  
 
159 
 
 The use of rape as a tool of genocide, and as a means of brutalising and rendering the body 
of the other abject during the 1994 Rwandan genocide is staggering. The use of rape as a tool of the 
genocide was even mentioned by RTLM presenter Kantano on 28 May 1994, relaying a story not 
only of rape but of men being beaten for allowing their wives to escape before they could be raped. 
The threat of rape was ever present – Josephine Murebwayire survived the genocide after hiding in 
a seminary toilet for fear that if she was discovered alive, she would be raped:  
 So I sat among the corpses and then after a while I asked myself what I was doing then I 
 walked around and then decided to go in the toilet. Let me hide in the toilet, I was thinking 
 to myself that if they return except killing me they were also going to do other bad things, I 
 was really afraid they were going to rape me. So I went in the student’s toilets, I looked for 
 the filthiest and went in it. I said to myself that if they come to use the bathroom they won’t 
 go in the dirtiest, I stood behind the door and that is exactly what happened. They kept 
 coming to use the toilets but they didn’t enter in the one I was in. (Murebwayire, n.d.) 
Murebwayire hid in the toilet for five days before a student of the seminar found her and gave her 
the first drink of water she'd had since the massacre. (Murebwayire, n.d.) 
 
 Survivor Beatrice Nikuze recalled an incident wherein Interhamwe were searching the bush 
for Tutsi who had escaped a massacre:   
 People were screaming in agony, babies being hacked to death, young ladies from Kicukiro 
 being raped and murdered… I remember Oliva; Oliva was… Oliva was murdered so 
 maliciously imaginable. She was raped first and later tortured to death ...I could hear her 
 crying for help from where I was. All I know is that they killed her by inserting strings and 
 pins in her sexual organs. They inserted several things that they came across in her. They 
 first selected pretty girls and killed them as they desired but they first raped them. (Nikuze 
 n.d.)  
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Conclusions 
 Using the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a case study, this chapter has drawn out the role of 
abject sexualisation through the brutalisation of the body in extreme violent identity politics. The 
1994 genocide involved numerous, sometimes competing, processes of identity production to create 
and then sustain the conditions under which such extreme violence becomes imaginable and 
possible. It required the dehumanisation of the Tutsi, accomplished through the spread of 
propaganda, as well as the production of the Tutsi as the abject other.  This production of the Tutsi 
as abject relied upon both the production of Tutsi women as sexually deviant, as well as the 
emphasis upon the deviant masculinity of the Tutsi male, which also made recourse to claims of 
sexual violence by Tutsi men against Hutu women. Furthermore, because real differences between 
the two groups were difficult to prove and in need of production themselves, the level of uncertainty 
over the nature of Tutsi otherness propelled vivisectionist violence as an evolution of exterminatory 
discourse. 
 
 Violence against the other is more than instrumental, and aims to do more than eliminate the 
threat posed by that other. RTLM presenter Kantano speaking on 28 May 1994 called for the Tutsi 
to be exterminated saying '[i]f you are a cockroach then you must be killed, you cannot change 
anything' (RTLM 1994).Violence in this case is expressive and productive, as it reifies the produced 
dehumanisation of the other. The cutting out of foetuses from their still-living mothers to examine 
their difference in utero, the rape and mutilation of corpses, and the arrangement of the corpses of 
rape victims with legs spread are all demonstrative of the rage against the sexualised female other, 
where their sexual deviance was displayed even after the victims' deaths. The violence in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide was intended to humiliate the Tutsi as a whole through the individual 
degradations experienced by the victims, and was itself communicative of their difference and their 
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abjection.   
 
 During the one hundred days of the genocide, violent acts against Tutsi bodies reconstituted 
the Tutsi, and the Hutu, identities, as dehumanised abjects and as killers respectively. Killing 
became an integral part of Hutu identity. Survivor Innocent Rwililiza confronted and threatened a 
group of Hutu, which included an old man who begged not to be killed. When Rwililiza countered 
that the Hutu were slaughtering Tutsi, and that if the man feared for his own life if he refused to kill, 
then he could simply walk past hiding Tutsis, '[h]is reply to me was ‘That is a good idea, I hadn't 
thought of that.’ I started to yell, I was incensed: ‘It never occurred to you that you could simply not 
kill us?’ He answered, ‘No: from killing so much, we forgot to think about you.’' (Hatzfield 2000, 
102-103).  
  
  What the 1994 Rwandan genocide tells us about extreme violent identity politics is that it 
relies upon an assumption of deviant sexuality in the production of otherness, and this emphasis on 
the sexualisation of the other informs, contextualises, and makes possible the actual violence that is 
conducted upon the body of the other. In contrast to the weaponisation of the sexualised body in 
cases such as Northern Ireland, the body becomes sexualised through deviance in order to render it 
a target of violence. As in cases of weaponisation, the sexualisation of the other is an early-warning 
alarm of the tipping point to extreme violence, but in this case, it is the threat of targeting of othered 
groups that needs to be taken into consideration by external observers. This abjection through 
sexualisation makes overkill a performance of group identity not only possible, but normalised to 
the point of its being a characteristic of group membership. 
 
 In the next chapter, I will be exploring another type of overkill which may occur as a 
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reaction to the brutalisation of the body – the weaponisation of the abject, sexualised body. To do 
this, I will be examining the prison protests that occurred in Northern Ireland in HMP Maze at Long 
Kesh (also called the H-Blocks), and Armagh Gaol, between 1976-1981. This examination will 
focus primarily upon the No Wash Protests that occurred in both prisoners, and the Hunger Strike 
Protest that occurred in the H-Blocks. These protests illustrate the weaponisation of the abject, 
sexualised body as a result of its brutalisation, and in the following chapter I will demonstrate this 
brutalisation through the protests as it inspired the weaponisation of the body.  
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Chapter Six 
‘Nor Meekly Serve My Time’: The Weaponisation of the Body in the H-Blocks and Armagh 
Gaol 
Introduction 
 The main research objective of this thesis is to understand why some instances of identity 
politics produce extreme violence. The types of violence with which this project is concerned are 
abject, sexualised, and focused on the body. I have argued that rather than viewing ethnic identity as 
a top-down construction, what is required is a theory of ethnic identity that understands it as 
dynamic, intersectional, and embodied, in order to account for how it is experienced at an individual 
level, produced through common, socially normalised practices, and may become radicalised in 
certain instances of conflict and not in others.  I have framed this type of violence as overkill, by 
which I refer to specific acts of violence that brutalise (and potentially then weaponise) the body in 
explicitly abject and sexualised ways. Overkill communicates the abjection of the other, renders the 
other abject through violence, and is characterised by its extremely aggressive and sexualised 
nature. Overkill constitutes new subjects through the performance of violence while simultaneously 
stripping the other of its subjectivity, so this type of violence is more than just symbolic, but is an 
integral part of the constitution of the other. The violence performs the abjection of the other 
through its sexualisation and ethnicisation of the other, illustrating the intersection of these 
identities.  
 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed the brutalisation of the sexualised, abject body using the 
1994 Rwandan genocide as illustration. In what follows, I will examine the weaponisation of the 
body that can occur once the body has been brutalised in overkill through the protests mounted by 
Northern Irish republican prisoners in HMP Maze at Long Kesh, also called the H-Blocks, and 
Armagh Gaol between 1976-1981. These protests were called the Blanket Protest, the No Wash 
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Protest and the Hunger Strike Protest, respectively. Each protest demonstrates distinct ways of 
viewing the body as being weaponised through abjection, and all rely upon the sexualisation of the 
body. The weaponisation of the body in overkill can evolve from its being brutalised, and this 
chapter will illustrate how the protesters in the prisons took on their own abjection and weaponised 
it, in what Foucault refers to as a mimesis of alterity. While the Rwandan genocide is a good 
illustration of the brutalisation of the body in overkill, it does not demonstrate the evolution of 
overkill to weaponisation. The prison protests in Northern Ireland, however, illustrate how the 
sexualised brutalisation of the body can lead to the weaponisation of its abjection.  
 
  To reiterate, abjection is understood as the horror and repulsion experienced by the self in 
the face of the other – it combines a sense of uncertainty, terror, and a desperate impulse to 
eliminate the abject to preserve the purity of the self. Abjection, particularly where it intersects with 
the sexualised body, marks the boundaries of difference literally upon the body. The prison protests 
demonstrate the use of the abject, sexualised body as a weapon in extreme violent identity politics. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, sexualisation is used to describe the use of menstrual blood in the 
women's No Wash Protest, which brings to the public attention the sexualised bodies of the women 
imprisoned. We can also see the tandem operation of gendered violence and sexualised violence in 
the H-Blocks, with the use of sexual violence against the Blanketmen that I argue was intended to 
render them docile and passive, i.e. feminised. 
 
 In this chapter, I will use empirical evidence drawn from the prison protests in Northern 
Ireland between 1976 and 1981 to demonstrate the ways in which the abject body can become 
weaponised in certain cases of violent identity politics. I will begin by briefly summarising the 
context of the Troubles in Northern Ireland during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.  The history of the 
Troubles has been told many times, and so I will be focusing on the parts of the historical narrative 
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that are most necessary for understanding the prison protests in the H-Blocks at Long Kesh and 
Armagh. Specifically, I will examine the carceral politics surrounding paramilitary actions during 
the Troubles, from the introduction of internment to the policy of criminalisation. Criminalisation 
was seen as a way for the British government to render the conflict and its participants illegitimate. 
Its historical excavation is therefore directly relevant to this case study, since the decision to 
respond to paramilitaries as criminals rather than political prisoners contributed directly to the 
protests in the prisons.  
 
 The No Wash Protest occurred in both Armagh and the H-Blocks, but because the former 
was undertaken by women and the latter by men, they created different constellations of the 
intersection of identity, and demonstrate different ways in which the abject body can be weaponised 
through its abjection. I argue that the No Wash Protest, in rendering the body abject and making its 
corporeal and uncivilisable characteristics salient, feminised it. It exposed the primal body and 
externalised it in order to achieve its emotive effect on the outside community as well as to provoke 
and disturb the prison guards who daily confronted the sights and smells of human bodies and 
human filth. In Armagh Gaol, the protest brought the sexualised bodies of female prisoners to view 
in the republican struggle, and it occupies an interesting position in the history of not only Irish 
political struggle but political violence more broadly. The No Wash Protest in both prisons was an 
extreme form of resistance that was as difficult to understand as it was horrifying, but in Armagh 
Gaol it took on an additional level of abjection because the participants were women, and the 
protest itself therefore included menstrual blood. The No Wash Protest in Armagh is therefore a 
compelling example of the weaponisation of the sexualised body in violent identity politics as it 
relied upon the demonstration of the abject feminised body.  
 
 In the H-Blocks, the prison guards responded to this feminisation of the prisoners' bodies 
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through an increased campaign of distinctly sexualised violence. As this progressed, the prisoners 
moved to a different form of violence, the Hunger Strike Protest, which I argue was a reassertion of 
their masculinity. This protest occupies a tense position in the examination of the body as a weapon, 
because it weaponises the body through a denial of the needs of the body, pitting the two sides of 
the perceived mind/body binary against one another. This assertion of the dominance of the pro-
active, rational, and therefore masculine mind over the reactive, irrational, and therefore feminine 
body, particularly as it coincided with the ending of the No Wash Protest, leads me to argue that the 
Hunger Strike Protest was a reclamation of the masculinity of the protesters – if the Blanket and No 
Wash Protests gave too much access to the prisoners' bodies through the nakedness of the 
Blanketmen in the former and the foregrounding of bodily waste in the latter, the Hunger Strike  
Protest denied that access, literally shrinking the volume of physical space occupied by the body. 
The Hunger Strike Protest was an assertion of the proactiveness of the prisoners and dominance 
over their own bodies that challenged the dominance of the prison regime. The Hunger Strike also 
rendered the body of the striker abject through its wasting, recalling the corpse. Ultimately, the 
Hunger Strike was successful at achieving its aims where the No Wash Protest was not, because of 
the manner in which the Hunger Strike Protest weaponised the abject body. These examples 
demonstrate the weaponisation of the abject, sexualised body as one kind of overkill.  
 
The Road to Armagh and the H-Blocks: Internment and Criminalisation 
 The history of the republican movement and its struggle for recognition is a long one, and 
this paper will focus primarily on the history that led directly to the protests that occurred in the H-
Blocks at Long Kesh and Armagh Gaols between 1976 and 1981: the Blanket Protest, the No Wash 
Protest, and the Hunger Strike Protest. This period represents a dynamic interplay between the 
prisoners, the prison regime, and the British government that was dramatically played out upon the 
bodies of the prisoners themselves. The prisoners' weaponisation of their bodies is particularly 
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distinct in this period, and was the primary strategy of the prisoners for achieving their political 
aims.  
 
 For the purposes of this account, the beginning of the road to the protests began with the re-
introduction of internment. Internment, or the practice of extra-judicial incarceration through 
detention without trial, was deployed at various times throughout Northern Irish history. It was 
reintroduced during Operation Demetrius in August 1971, when hundreds of alleged republican 
paramilitaries were arrested and imprisoned without trial (ECHR 1978). The reintroduction of 
internment was meant as a 'sweeping-up' (ECHR 1978) of the IRA in an effort to stem the tide of 
violence in Northern Ireland. This spectacularly backfired, and the level of violence in Northern 
Ireland, particularly in London/Derry and in Belfast, increased dramatically in response to 
internment. In addition to extrajudicial incarceration, republican prisoners claimed abuse at the 
hands of the authorities charged with their interrogation. This abuse occurred during interrogation, 
through what was known as 'the Five Techniques'19 of the interrogation process, and these were 
largely reliant on sensory deprivation to force confessions. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) agreed in its 1978 hearing of the case Ireland vs. the United Kingdom that the Five 
Techniques constituted 'inhuman and degrading treatment' (ECHR 1978, accessed 2013). This 
ruling was anticipated with a considerable degree of trepidation by the Northern Ireland Office, who 
feared the potential publicity that a decision criticising the government could gain (Marshall 1980, 
1). 
 
                                                 
19 'The Five Techniques' referred to tactics used by interrogators and included 'wall standing' (UNCAT 2008, 3), 
during which the detainee was forced to stand four or five feet from a wall with his fingertips touching the wall 
without moving (ECHR 1978); 'hooding' (UNCAT 2008, 3), which consisted of 'putting a black or navy coloured 
bag over the detainees’ heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation' (ECHR 
1978); 'subjection to noise' (UNCAT 2008, 3), wherein 'pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room 
where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise' (ECHR 1978);  'sleep deprivation' (UNCAT 2008, 3), wherein 
'pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep' (ECHR 1978); and 'deprivation of food or drink' 
(UNCAT 2008, 3), which involved 'subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and 
pending interrogations' (ECHR 1978).  
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 Internment created an increase in the prison population, which led to a change of strategy on 
the part of the British government. All three protests that were mounted in the H-Blocks, and the No 
Wash Protest in Armagh Gaol, occurred as a response to this change in policy towards those 
convicted of violence related to the political and social tensions in Northern Ireland during the 
period known as 'the Troubles'20. Prior to the Gardiner Report of 1975, prisoners incarcerated for 
paramilitary participation were granted Special Category Status, which for the republicans 
amounted to being held as political prisoners (Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 1994, 1)  Special 
Category Status afforded the prisoners held for paramilitary activity privileges associated with 
political prisoners, including the right to refuse prison work, freedom of association with one 
another, the right to their own clothes rather than a prison uniform, and separation from those not 
convicted of political crimes, Ordinary Decent Criminals (ODCs). 
 
 While there were periods of relative calm in Northern Ireland at this time, internment did not 
fully achieve its aim. In 1972, the Diplock Commission recommended a series of changes to the 
judicial process that included doing away with internment in favour of what would come to be 
known as the Diplock Courts, where those accused of paramilitary involvement stood trial, but 
before a judge only (Cairns 1982). Additionally, the burden of proof was shifted from the 
prosecution to the defence, which meant that the accused were responsible for defeating their 
accusers in court without the benefit of a jury of their peers. As a result, the prison population 
dramatically increased, with a number of prisoners being held for political crimes and held under 
Special Category Status, which separated them from the rest of the prison population as political 
prisoners or prisoners of war.  Despite Special Category Status, the Diplock system demonstrates a 
shift away from the acknowledgement of the conflict as a legitimate struggle, as the accused were 
                                                 
20 Three women in Armagh Gaol participated in the hunger strike that was staged in 1980; however, they did not 
participate in the 1981 strike that led to the end of the No Wash Protest and to partial concessions by the British 
government. The Armagh women were, as were all female prisoners, allowed to wear their own clothes, although 
they were routinely searched and punished for fastening paramilitary uniforms. The Armagh women were on a no 
work protest against the removal of Special Category Status.  
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denied the accepted judicial process of, for example, a jury or assumed innocence. 
 
 Following the Gardiner Report of 1975 and the subsequent introduction of the policy of 
criminalisation, which decreed that the prisoners would be treated as ordinary criminals, Special 
Category Status was revoked. Anyone convicted of a crime related to paramilitary activity after 1 
March 1976 would be given a prison uniform, expected to perform prison work, and would be 
treated as an ODC under this new policy of 'Ulsterisation, criminalisation, and normalisation' 
(Weinstein 2006, 17). This policy shift denied the existence of political prisoners within the United 
Kingdom and denied the political legitimacy of the conflict itself. Through the refusal to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the republican struggle, the prisoners were effectively disempowered 
and disenfranchised. In determining that paramilitaries should be treated as criminals and marking 
them as such, the British government took the first steps towards the abjection of the republican 
prisoners in labelling them delinquent and outside social norms by denying the political legitimacy 
of their resistance. 
 
Incarceration and Resistance: Protests in Armagh Gaol and the H-Blocks 
 The prison uniform was a means by which the British government was able to write a 
rejection of the legitimacy of the republican nationalist struggle on the bodies of the republican 
movement. Foucault (1977) mentions this use of the prison uniform as a marker of criminality 
explicitly in Discipline and Punish, and in turn Feldman (1991) restates the importance of wearable 
markers of status and identity, which he calls 'embodied transcripts' (7). He uses the example of the 
sandwichmen of Parisian arcades in the nineteenth century, wherein the wearer of the sandwich 
board was clearly visible and clearly marked in his role (Feldman 1991, 7). The protests that this 
chapter investigates began as resistance by the republican prisoners against this reinsription as 
criminals (see Feldman 1991), beginning immediately upon their arrival in the prison with the 
refusal to wear the prison uniform. The prison uniform became the symbol of the criminalisation 
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policies, and when Kieran Nugent was imprisoned in September 1976 (Weinstein 2006, 17), he 
refused it, wrapping himself in his prison blanket instead, and thus beginning the Blanket Protest. 
The men who participated in the protest became knowns as 'the Blanketmen', creating a new 
performance of republican identity within the H-Blocks. The Blanket Protest was a powerful protest 
in terms of its visuality. However, as illustrated by a memo issued by the Northern Ireland Office on 
4 April 1977, the protest did not appear to have the desired impact on the prison regime – Mr. E 
Barry wrote that the protest had the ‘ironic’ impact of making prison discipline easier ‘because of 
the protesters self imposed cellular confinement’ (Barry 1977, 3).  This same memo, however, 
expresses concern for ‘the danger that it will attract outside support in the form of violent action by 
para-military organisations which may be directed against the prison service or take the form of 
widespread attack’ (Barry 1977, 3).  
 
 Two years after Special Category Status was revoked, the Blanketmen began the No Wash 
Protest, in response to the abuse they suffered when leaving their cells to shower or on their way to 
empty their chamber pots. The fact that the Blanketmen were naked left them both emotionally and 
physically vulnerable to abuse from the guards, and testimony from the prisoners illustrates that the 
guards did not waste the opportunity to humiliate and subjugate (see Feldman 1991; Sands 1981; 
Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 1994). Memos released by the Prison Records Office of Northern 
Ireland (PRONI) discuss medical evaluations for prisoners who alleged abuse by the guards 
(McKechnie 1980, 3).One prisoner interviewed in Feldman (1991) recounts the escalation of the 
harassment, saying that the guards 'were giving you a strip search as you were going up to the toilet 
and as you were coming down' (Feldman 1991, 167).  
 
 These searches included what were known as the 'mirror searches', during which the (usually 
violently resisting) prisoner was forced to squat naked over a mirror in order to fully expose his 
rectum, after which they could then be digitally searched by the guards. Former prisoner Tommy 
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McKearney described the experience to the Prisons Memory Archive, saying  
 You were taken out, at most you had a towel...then you see there was the search. One at a 
 time you had to come walking out...naked except a towel... a linen hand towel, a tea towel... 
 They'd have taken you here and there would have ten screws standing around you know? 
 And they had a mirror... see those mirrors there? [indicates a mirror the size of a hand 
 mirror]. A mirror that size there taken off... and you had to squat over that so they could 
 view your backside. And we simply refused to do it for them so in the end they started 
 beating us. And the beating...they just walloped and battered and beat men anyway. And 
 then you see you were sitting in the cell and it was always a dread, you didn't know what to 
 expect. Sometimes it was worse than others. A vicious, brutal time... It was just gratuitously 
 as you were walking by, they'd just give you a wallop. (McKearney, n.d.) 
 The Blanketmen responded to this abuse by refusing to leave their cells to wash or to go to the 
toilet, beginning the No Wash (sometimes also called the 'Dirty') Protest.  
 
 The No Wash Protest in both the H-Blocks and Armagh was a spectacle of the resistance of 
the abject body. Speaking years later to the Prisons Memory Archive, former prison guard John 
Hetherington said ‘[the No Wash Protest] really crept up on us...We were caught in between 
government policy and a very determined bunch of men. I don't know whether to regard it with 
admiration on the one hand for sheer bloody-minded determination, or horror, really...’ 
(Hetherington, n.d.). The production of the prisoners as abject was already well under away with the 
strip and mirror searches, which communicated the degradation and subordination of the prisoners 
through the control that was exerted over their bodies. Because the Blanketmen were harassed 
whenever they went to the toilet, they began exclusively using their chamber pots to avoid leaving 
their cells. They were met with further harassment when going to dispose of the pots' contents, 
which led them to try tipping them out through the windows or under the cell doors. When the 
guards prevented them from disposing of their chamber pots by boarding the cell windows and 
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obstructing the doors, the Blanketmen began covering the walls of their cells with their excrement 
in a mimesis of the abjection they experienced from the guards.  There was no single event that led 
to the beginning of the No Wash Protest; rather, it was a response to the humiliation and harassment 
they suffered because of the Blanket Protest.  
 
 There is an interplay between humiliation and sexualisation that plays out on the bodies of 
the prisoners during this protest, particularly through the struggles over domination and power. My 
use of the idea of violence as played out upon the prisoners is deliberate – the violence experienced 
by the prisoners was itself performative, was intended to inscribe the prisoners as passive, with no 
control over either their bodies or their environment.  This idea is introduced in Elaine Scarry's 
(1985) work on torture, The Body in Pain, in which she argues that torture is used to unmake the 
victim by stripping him or her of their access to language, and therefore their connection to the 
outside world.  
 
 Similarly, the use of sexualised violence was intended to strip the prisoners, particularly the 
Blanketmen, of their political agency, their legitimacy, and their masculinity. In the case of 'male-
directed sexual violence' (Onyango and Hampanda 2011, 237), it is most often 'used to enhance 
political or military aims through humiliation [or] intimidation' (Onyango and Hampanda 2011, 
237). As I have argued in Chapter Four of this thesis, there is an inherent hierarchy in the 
distribution of bodies as units of power, and drawing from Butler (1990), men are granted identity 
while women are viewed as a negation of that identity (Butler 1990, 53; see also Irigaray 1974). 
Expanding upon Beauvoir's (1976) argument that feminsiation is a becoming rather than something 
granted a priori, the 'othering' of the individual is a distinctly feminine and/or feminising 
experience, for if the feminine is constructed as that which is lacking, by extension the other will be 
understood as feminine. Sexualising the other, and the subsequent feminising of the other, also 
renders the other inferior and most important for issues of power relations in general and in political 
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violence specifically, subject to domination. I argue that the Blanketmen were feminised through a 
process of abjection, which renamed them as an other that was lacking such masculine 
characteristics as dominance and agency. 
 
 With the escalation of the Blanket Protest to the No Wash Protest and the concurrent 
escalation of the mirror searches by the guards, the violence that the prisoners experienced 
increased alongside the ways in which their bodies were weaponised. Tom McKearney, speaking to 
the Prisons Memory Archive, recalled the violence he experienced in refusing to submit to a mirror 
search during a wing move. 
 ‘I come to the circle and PO [principle officer] was here and the PO said to me ‘Right get 
 down over the mirror’ and I said ‘I'm not doing that’ and he said ‘right take him back’ and 
 what they done was they grabbed me by the ankles and the arms and they turned me upside 
 down and they run me back like a squeegee back to my cell right down the landing.’ 
 (McKearney, n.d.) 
 
 In describing the mirror searches in interviews (see Feldman 1991), and living history 
narratives (see Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 1994), ex-prisoners frame the events in much the 
same way that victims of rape recount their attacks. If the prisoners were unlucky enough to be 
found with contraband, the abuse they suffered escalated. One ex-prisoner, who was dragged 'to the 
boards', meaning brought to a room for a further search and interrogation, when a mirror search 
revealed a pen and paper he had tried to smuggle in by hiding it in his rectum, said of the 
experience 
 When they left and the door closed, I sat down on the small stool [the guards had forced him 
 to bend at the waist over a stool]. Once I knew they weren't coming back, I cried. I had no 
 clothes on...I remember feeling dirty, I wanted to ask for a bath...The only thing I thought to 
 myself was that they couldn't hurt me any more than this (Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 
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 1994, 91). 
 Feldman writes '[t]he rectal mirror examination was a ceremony of defilement' and argues that the 
mirror searchers were themselves a kind of colonisation (Feldman 1991, 174). Feldman's 
connection between the searches and colonisation is an interesting one. The mirror and cavity 
searches the prisoners endured undoubtedly extended the control of prisoners' bodies from the 
external to the internal. His use of colonisation is also interesting because of its inherent patriarchal 
hierarchy – colonisation involves the control of a native population achieved in many respects 
through a process of othering and feminising the native (see Said 1978). Furthermore, there is a 
recognised link between colonisation and surveillance (Mitchell 1988), implying that surveillance is 
important for the control of the population. The mirror searches forcibly expanded the surface area 
of the surveyed body. 
 
 These extreme methods of control intended to break the prisoners would have, if successful, 
left the prisoner in a state of submission and passivity, ultimately leaving him feminised. The 
overtly sexualised and excessive violence of these searches (it is also worth noting that the prisoners 
in question generally agreed to surrender their parcels prior to these examinations in order to avoid 
them) were intended to be displays of superior strength, which was accomplished through this 
sexualised assault. The search was a means by which the guards attempted to occupy and control 
the body of the prisoner, which is an alternative deployment of the language of colonisation to 
describe the process of bodily control upon which colonisation relies (see Mitchell 1988, 95-127).  
 
 The No Wash Protest was inherently feminising as it drew direct and considerable attention 
to the more primal, uncontrolled aspects to the bodies of the Blanketmen, referential to Kristeva's 
(1982) uncontained, abject female body. Part of the feminising discourse of colonialism involves 
the discursive production of the native as primal or savage, and there is a considerable focus on the 
abjection of the feminine because of the feminine's resistance to being contained (see Kristeva 
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1982, Wilcox 2014).  Two ways in which the prisoners were feminised were through forced washes 
and through mirror searches. Forced washes were mandated in a memo to the Governor of HMP 
Maze on 28 September 1978 by the Northern Ireland Office in order to protect both prison staff 
(particularly medical staff) as well as to nominally to protect the health of the other prisoners (Barry 
1978, 1). The forced washes were horrible, traumatising experiences for the prisoners, and for their 
families – the mother of two prisoners on the No Wash Protest who was brought to the H-Blocks 
for the Prison Memories Archive became distressed at the sight of the visiting room because of the 
memory of the forced washes, saying ‘When I look at this place now and know what happened to 
him in those days it is dreadful … It does bring very clearly, there is no doubt, even after all these 
years … it is very vivid!’ (in Aguiar 2014, 10).  
 
 The trauma of the forced washes is depicted in the film Hunger (2008), in which we see 
Bobby Sands (Michael Fassbender) hauled into the toilets to be shaved and bathed while resisting 
violently. What is striking about this scene is not only the experience of Sands, whose body we see 
quite literally tossed and manhandled, but the emphasis on the body, particularly the hands, of the 
prison guard. This particular guard, Raymond Lohan (Stuart Graham), is viewers' first encounter 
with the narrative of the film, as we see him gingerly washing his hands at home before he goes to 
work at HMP Maze, first checking under his car for bombs (Hunger 2008). These opening scenes of 
the film are arguably the most powerful not only in the piece itself but in preceding depictions of 
the Troubles for creating a sense of tension so palatable that the viewer is immediately on edge – 
this is accomplished largely through the stripped saturation of the shots and the lack of dialogue. 
Lohan arrives at the prison and we witness Sand's forced wash – he is hauled into the toilet, his hair 
shorn and his face shaved. When his head is forced up, he spits in Lohan's face, who then punches 
him once, and misses his second attempt, hitting the wall behind him instead. Sands is dragged 
unconscious from the toilet and thrown back into his cell, and Lohan again washes his now bloody 
hands, and the reason for his earlier tenderness becomes clear (Hunger 2008). It is a striking parallel 
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of the brutalisation of the body of the prisoner and the consequence of accidental brutalisation of the 
guard, and the juxtaposition between the care and the lack of care of injuries received. It also 
reflects the brutalising manner in which the prisoners were 'cared for', as the forced washes, which 
were nominally intended to improve the hygiene and therefore health of the prisoners inflicted a 
considerable amount of damage, and reflect the struggle between feminisation through brutalisation, 
and the reclamation of masculinity through weaponised abjection. 
 
 Hunger also deals with the mirror searches that were put in place to stop prisoners from 
bring contraband into the prison. The scene depicting the mirror searches is one of the most brutal 
in the film, and the impact is evident not only in the suffering of the prisoners, but in the suffering 
of the guards as well – one of the riot police is visibly frightened by the spectacle of these abused 
and naked bodies, and the end of the scene shows him huddled behind the riot shields, weeping 
(Hunger 2008). The mirror searches were clearly sexualised due to their visual and physical 
invasion of the Blanketmen's bodies. The aggression with which these searches were carried out 
strongly suggests an attempt to quite literally beat (and shame) the Blanketmen into submission, and 
the use of this sexualised violence was engineered towards rendering the Blanketmen passive. This 
was an attempt by the prison guards to feminise the Blanketmen, and the Hunger Strike Protest, as a 
reaction to and resistance against this feminisation, was an attempt by the strikers to reclaim the 
masculinity of the Blanketmen as a whole. Similarly, the No Wash Protest in Armagh was a 
response to the domination of the Armagh women by the prison regime, the political system, and 
the gender domination that pervaded society (Aretxaga 1997).  
 
Deploying the Abject: Scatology and Decomposition as Weapons of the Body   
To reiterate a central point made in the previous conceptual chapters, I understand the body 
to be the site of multiple identities, and wherein multiple forces intersect to make up its inscription, 
and its subjectivity. I have previously outlined the intimate relationship between the body and 
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identity, the body and violence, and the body and power, arguing that for these three (identity, 
power, violence) to exist, there must be a body through which they are understood, and are 
therefore able to exist. The body becomes a 'point of transaction' (Feldman 1991, 177) for opposing 
forces that 'fetishise' it as either given to one fixed set of meanings or another. I understand 
Feldman's use of fetishisation in this context as a mixing of a Marxist/Hegelian understanding of 
fetishism to be the foundation of religious superstition, and the Freudian understanding of the fetish 
as a substitute for an object of sexualised desire or disgust (Freud 1927). The fetish works to infuse 
the material with a desired set of meanings, and the fetishised body becomes the living symbol of a 
particular politics. Taken together, the fetished political body becomes the idol of political ideology, 
an object infused with meaning and coveted or abjected for its embodied transcription. In 
embodying these forces, according to Foucault, the individual is 'bifurcated….He internalizes the 
application of alien force onto his body; the action of the Other is metaphorized as his own activity' 
(Feldman 1991, 178; Foucault 1979, 202-203).  
 
 I understand Focault's argument to be that when the individual, the self, is confronted with 
the expectation of its alterity, or the assumption of othering within the self and the subsequent 
performance of otherness and abjection, the individual will respond in such a way that s/he 
embodies both his/her own perception of self, and the opposing force's perception of him/herself as 
other. Where Feldman takes issue with Foucault’s analysis is the lack of acknowledgement that this 
process is not externalised, but internalised; that is, the prisoner (in both Foucault's example and in 
the case of the Northern Irish prison protests) is self-bifurcated, in a process Feldman calls 'the 
mimesis of alterity', and which he argues is the foundation upon which all prison resistance is 
mounted (Feldman 1991, 178). This self-bifrucating process performed by the prisoner is the means 
by which he or she effectively transforms from individual to symbol where the individual body 
became the means through which large-group differences were established. I take this a step further, 
arguing that the mimetic alterity is not only internalised but normalised, and through its 
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performance becomes the identity of the prisoners.  
 
 Prisoners recount the need to participate particularly in the Blanket Protests in order to 
appear fully committed to the cause (Feldman 1991, 158). Protests in the prison became the way in 
which the identity of republican prisoners was produced. In turn, 'this established the body as the 
invariant for all political valuation and exchange in the prison' (Feldman 1991, 179), whereby the 
bodies of the prisoners, through their interactions within and with the prison, became the producers 
of the political in the H-Blocks and Armagh. Letters that were confiscated from the prisoners to 
revolutionary regimes such as Angola and Catalonia illustrate the discursive production of the 
Blanketmen and Armagh women as repressed resistance against British tyranny, referring to 'a 
concerted campaign of torture and barbarity has been waged against naked and defenseless [sic] 
Republican socialist prisoners who simply refuse to yield to Britain's policy of criminalisation' 
(Dalzell et al, 1981, 2).  
 
 The protests also served to consolidate identity outside the prison – in a letter dated 17 
August 1981, David Blatherwick talks about the importance of supporting the protests in the 
Catholic community, saying that '[t]hey [the Catholics] find themselves under increasing tribal 
pressure at least to acquiesce in a cause they know is wrong' (Blatherwick 1981, 1). Then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, in a letter to Cardinal o Fiaich, said that the motives of 'the shadowy 
and evil men behind them [the hunger strikers]' amounted to 'a propaganda victory. They want to 
turn Catholic against Protestant and Nationalist against Unionist, and to stir up the feelings of the 
minority community against Government and the forces of law and order' (Thatcher 1981).  
Whether or not the community did disagree with the actions of the Provos, this demonstrates that 
the protests (in this case the Hunger Strike Protest), was recognised as a community-building 
exercise. This again highlights the relationship between overkill and identity formation – as 
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discussed in the previous chapter, the brutalisation of the abject body produced both group 
identities, and here it is the weaponisation of the abject body that accomplishes this consolidation.  
 
This mimesis of alterity in Northern Ireland through the No Wash and Hunger Strike 
Protests is a particularly compelling materialisation of the relationship between the other, the self, 
and abjection versus subjectivity. This is connected to the precarity of the self in relation to the 
other. Precarity I have discussed previously in terms of Butler's discussion of the precarious life and 
of grievability, particularly as it related to the relationship between melancholia, identity, and rage 
(Butler 1993, 234-236). Because of the inability of the self to release the other, and conversely the 
other's threat to the self's existence particularly when the other is perceived as abject, the other 
occupies a singularly tense and frightening position. The other cannot be destroyed as the self 
requires it to understand itself, but the other must be destroyed in order to protect the self from 
contamination or eradication (see Kristeva 1982). The Blanketmen occupied an obviously 
precarious space, both for themselves through their nakedness and potential exposure to abuse, and 
for the British government as reminders that the legitimacy of the Northern Irish struggle could not 
be easily dismissed. They were constantly reminded of this through the abuse that they suffered 
which led them to their protests.  
 
The Blanketmen also found themselves in the centre of a constellation of competing 
transcriptions, which Feldman (1991) calls a central feature of political violence – in this case, to 
identify as the Blanketmen, the men of the H-Blocks merged their identity as the self (republicans) 
with an identification as the abject-other to the prison system (protesting prisoners). The 
Blanketmen internalised their ascribed identity as the abject-other inscribed upon them through the 
brutalisation they received at the hands of the prison guards, then externalised through the 
performances of their identity, i.e., through their protests. In doing so, they normalised abjection as 
part of the identity of the republican prisoner.  
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 Mary Corcoran (2006) writes '[a]s the disputes over criminalization hardened into overt 
conflict in the prisoners, their bodies assumed a central place in the prison struggle' (Corcoran 2006, 
171). Focussing on her discussion of the women's protest and the Foucauldian analysis of the body 
as a 'two-way conduit for forces of domination' (Corcoran 2006, 171), she mentions, and the 
selections from her interviews support, that the women in her study recognised their bodies 'as both 
objects of retribution and as instruments of war' (Corcoran 2006, 171).   She considers this 
conception of the body as a weapon to be a 'dual meaning of the self' (Corcoran 2006, 171), wherein 
'the body is a two-way conduit for force of domination in that ‘after investing itself on the body, 
[power] finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in that same body’' (Foucault 1980, 56 in Corocoran 
2006, 171). While she ultimately concludes that this form of protest is essentially passive, she 
draws out in the above quotations the fact that the prisoners viewed their bodies as weapons. 
 
 In addition to interpreting the protests as a form of warfare, Feldman (1991) reads the No 
Wash Protest as an attempt by the Blanketmen to re-clothe themselves in something other than the 
prison uniform, thereby escaping the materiality of criminalisation whilst simultaneously denying 
the wardens complete access to their bodies. Because the Blanketmen's refusal to wear the prison 
uniform was met with widespread cavity searches of the inmates, the ‘prison regime....extended the 
logic of compulsory visibility from the surface to the interior of the prisoner's body’ (Feldman 
1991, 173).  He then argues  ‘[t]he No Wash Protest by the prisoners reclothed their naked bodies 
with a new and repellent surface of resistance...in its soiled condition the cell was no longer a 
unidimensional and totally transparent optical space' (Feldman 1991, 175). After years of complete 
visual exposure and the attendant vulnerability from this unending visibility, it follows that the 
protesters would attempt to cover themselves in another way, and evidence from within the prison 
regime suggests that their weaponisation had a considerable impact on the prison regime. In the 
notes from a meeting that took place on 12 February 1980, to discuss the No Wash Protest in the H-
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Blocks, Mr. E. Barry, Assistant Secretary in the Northern Ireland Office, acknowledged the distress 
of the prison guards and advised caution in disseminating information about potential medical risks 
for fear of industrial action: he cautioned that raising concerns over protective clothing would alarm 
the guards, 'giving them a reason to ask for more money' (McKechnie 1980, 2). The nakedness of 
the Blanketmen resulted in a new level of vulnerability, which the No Wash Protest counteracted by 
shrouding their bodies in dirt and waste.   
 
 While I agree that the consequences of the No Wash included this visual obscuring of the 
prisoners' bodies, I argue that there was much more to the No Wash Protest than a desire for a 
refusal of surveillance. The creation of a repellent surface that was meant to render the bodies of the 
prisoners as weapons with which to resist the prison regime was the more important consequence. 
Namely, the No Wash protest was an attempt to weaponise the bodies of the prisoners through the 
process of rendering them abject.  The prisoners in the No Wash Protest through their actions 
embodied the abjection they faced as the other, and their use of their own bodily waste to cover 
their cells and their bodies manifested the dehumanisation that they had experienced through the 
prison regime and at the hands of the prison guards.    
 
 The case study of the Northern Ireland prison protests has been selected because it is a clear 
example of the weaponisation of the abject body that evolved from its brutalisation. The use of the 
body as a weapon creates considerable conceptual tension, since it is the body of the agent that is 
ultimately harmed. Even in the case of suicide bombers, in which other people are harmed, the body 
of the bomber is specifically and horrifically damaged. Banu Bargu (2010) presents '[t]he human 
weapon’ to be ‘the subject-object of violence' (Bargu 2010), whereby the body of the antagonist is 
simultaneously that which commits violence and that which is harmed by the violence. This 
violence, in the case of the prison resistance in Northern Ireland, is intimately connected with not 
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only the ethnic identity of the republican prisoners as Irish, but also their sexualised identity as 
Blanketmen or Armagh women, as the protests in both prisons weaponised the body in ways 
specific to their sex. Understanding this intersection and recognizing it in the ways in which the 
body is implicated in ethnic violence adds to the understanding of how identity performance 
produces such extreme forms of violence that are often highly sexualised.  
 
 There are a number of assumptions in the literature on the weaponisation of the body as to 
the intended target of the human weapon. Human weapons challenge normalised notions of 
sovereignty (Bargu 2010, Linos 2010, Uzzell 2012), but the real symbolic target of the violence can 
be understood as the human weapon's own community (Dingley and Mollica 2007, 9). The question 
of the destabilisation of sovereignty as a goal of human weapons is an interesting one, and appears 
to be a major theme connecting individual instances of bodily weaponisation across different 
contexts and different modes of weaponisation. This destabilisation of sovereignty stems from the 
evolutionary shift of power from sovereign power, in which power means to 'let live and make die' 
to the regulatory power of bio-politics, in which power is to 'make live and let die' (see Foucault 
1977). That the human weapon would bring about his or her own death in direct challenge to the 
sovereign is destabilising in its own right. The human weapon goes a step further than this, for 
'[w]hen life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge sovereignty, the power of life and death that 
the sovereign exercises becomes useless' (Uzzell 2012). This challenge empowers the body-weapon 
as it disturbs what is accepted as normal: the assumption of self-preservation, and of the ability of 
the sovereign to control and regulate the population. Destabilising the notion of 'normal' behaviour 
through the denial of the instinct of self-preservation, the body-weapon becomes abject to the 
biopolitical system by choosing death over life. 
 
 The community's role in the success of a body-weapon is also, perhaps equally, important. 
While the community additionally provides some of the context of the weaponisation of the body, I 
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argue that its importance is mainly in giving an audience to the performance of the body-weapon. 
Dingley and Mollica (2007) place a very heavy emphasis on the role of religion in creating the 
possibility of human weapons, which risks burying those examples of body weaponisation that 
occur in secular contexts, but in doing so they highlight the importance of the readability of bodily 
weaponisation as a performative protest. By making the argument for the significance of 
community response in bodily weaponisation, it is also important to note that the protest must use 
the language of the community that relates to what the protester is attempting to achieve. Religious 
iconography can create a juxtaposition between divinity and the actors themselves, and this is one 
way in which the suicide protest may be legible. This legibility is problematic for the No Wash 
Protest, which was too horrifying and outside a socially acceptable vocabulary for either resistance 
or martyrdom. Conversely, the Hunger Strike Protest, in weaponising the abject masculinised body, 
was able to rally the republican community outside the prison. The Hunger Strike Protest ended the 
No Wash Protest, as demonstrated in the notes of a meeting that took place 2 March 1981, the day 
after Bobby Sands began his fast, in which it is noted that all protesting prisoners requested clean 
cells (which sparked industrial action from the prison guards) (MacKay 1981). All of the emotive 
impact of the protests in both prisoners was channelled into the one operation of the hunger strikes.  
 
  In the republican prison protests, abjection is the medium through which the body of the 
prisoner becomes weaponised. The extreme nature of the No Wash Protest, for even in the context 
of abject protest it seems to stand apart, and its reliance on the weaponisation of the feminine rather 
than the masculine, made it too difficult for the community to grasp. Aretxaga (1997, 137) cites the 
reactions of male visitors (notably Tim Coogan) to Armagh Gaol as being far more repulsed by the 
women's protest than the men's, asking '[w]hat can make thirty dirty women more revolting than 
four hundred dirty men if not the exposure of menstrual blood?'. While there is power in the abject's 
incomprehensibility, it must walk a fine line wherein that incomprehensibility that is still 
recognisable and legible, and the No Wash Protest was beyond the comprehension of its targeted 
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political movement. The No Wash Protest in Armagh demonstrates the contextually-specific nature 
of the weaponisation of the body, as the manner in which the body may be weaponised will depend 
upon the community that it addresses as well as the tools (discursive and corporeal) at its disposal. 
There must be at least some level of understanding on the part of the community, otherwise there 
can be no galvanisation towards effective change, which is one reason that the No Wash Protest 
may have failed where the Hunger Strike Protest succeeded.  
 
 Evidence suggests that the Hunger Strike was so successful at rallying public support that it 
reached Irish-descended populations in the United States, and rattled the British government to the  
point of calling for an American public relations firm to advise on how best to keep negative public 
opinion from mounting in the Irish-American population (Elton 1981).  There were also protests in 
Britain and in Europe, with a weekly bulletin covering 23-30 July 1981 from the Northern Ireland 
Office noting protest demonstrations in Leeds, as well as an instance of red paint being splashed on 
the British Library in Paris, France (MacKay 1981). The backlash of the hunger strike, specifically 
the deaths of any of the strikers, was threatening enough that the Taoiseach, in a recorded phone 
call to 10 Downing Street on 12 May 1981, a week after the death of Bobby Sands, pleaded with the 
strikers to complain to the ECHR, and failing that, pleaded with the Government to do the same, in 
order to halt the strike before the death of Francis Hughes (Harrington 1981). Hughes was declared 
on strike by the Medical Officer at HMP Maze on 15 March (Emerson 1981), and died shortly after 
the Taoiseach's call. Bodily weaponisation is dependent upon the response of the self and other 
communities, a point on which even scholars in disagreement can agree (Pape 2005, Linos 2010). 
The critical differences between the two protests were the genders of the bodies utilised, and the 
abjection weaponised. This is supported by other examinations into the protests, who argue '[t]he 
spectacle of prisoners willing to starve themselves to death... was considerably more communicable 
than prisoners living in their own excrement and urine' (McEvoy 2001, 107). 
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 More recently, there has been some compelling discussion of the use of the body-weapon in 
reclaiming the identity of the self (Linos 2010, 8). The assumption here is that 'suicide violence may 
be considered an extreme form of reclaiming the violated body – a force that ultimately rejects 
oppression' (Linos 2010, 8). When the large-group identity of the self is severely threatened, Linos 
argues the body-weapon serves to retrench that identity by 'reject[ing] oppression and allow[ing] the 
indivdual to reclaim the body through self-directed violence' (Linos 2010, 8). I find this to be a 
compelling and valuable insight that is concurrent with the needs of the body-weapon to galvanise 
the community as well as the argument that violent identity is performative. It connects the body-
weapon intimately to the larger struggle they aim to serve, and draws a parallel to Fujii's (2010) 
arguments on violent identity performance and Appadurai's (1998) discussion of vivisection in 
extreme violence as a means of discovering difference in the other – here, however, rather than 
etching the difference of the other on the body of the other, the body-weapon instead uses the body 
of the self to reclaim its ingroup identity.  The more poignant the threat, the more viscerally the 
encroachment of the other is felt, and consequently the more radicalised the identity of the self 
becomes and the more violent the extraction of the other.  
 
‘The Colour of Shame’: Menstruation and Abject Womanhood in the No Wash Protest 
 One of the critical contributions of this thesis are the insights gained from examining the 
deployment of the abject through the weaponisation of the body is an understanding of the high 
degree of intersectionality in the production of embodied identity, particularly sexualised and 
ethnicised identity. The performances of identities meld into and reinforce one another. Ethnic 
domination may be expressed through gendered and sexualised domination both within the group 
and without, and this line of causality can run in either direction. Here we find that the abject has 
another role to play in political violence, particularly in extreme forms of violent identity politics, 
which is that the abject often characterises the nature of the violence itself. Because identity in these 
cases is exclusionary, with outsiders viewed as dangerous and a threat to the security of the self, the 
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other is violently rejected, as the object violently rejects the abject. The violence itself that occurs 
materialises this sense of abjection, for as identities are written upon the body, so too are abjections. 
The abject is written upon the body both through its weaponisation, in the case of this chapter, or 
through its brutalisation, as will be discussed in the context of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In 
the two sections that follow, I will examine the No Wash and Hunger Strike Protests individually as 
examples of the weaponised abject body. Ultimately I will conclude that the Hunger Strike 
succeeded where the No Wash failed because of its deployment of the masculinised, rather than the 
feminised, body. In this section, I will discuss the No Wash Protest at Armagh Gaol in order to 
illustrate the weaponisation of the abject, feminised body, which I conclude led to its ultimate 
failure.  
 
 'There is menstrual blood on the walls of Armagh Prison in Northern Ireland' opens the 
editorial by Nell McCafferty printed in the Irish Times (McCafferrty 1980). It is a compelling 
opening statement not only because of its content but the directness with which it is delivered. 
Menstrual blood, now as then, is not generally a comfortable or acceptable conversation. As 
disturbing as the No Wash Protest in the H-Blocks was, the 'protest of dirt' in Armagh was met with 
much more horror, and a great deal of confusion. Aretxaga (1997), one of the most prolific, and in 
fact one of the very few, writers on the women's No Wash Protest, comments that '[i]f the men's 
Dirty Protest was incomprehensible, the women's was unthinkable, generating in many men, even 
among the ranks of supporting Republicans, reactions of denial' (Aretxaga 1997, 129). She argues 
that the No Wash Protest in Armagh infused a gender dynamic into the general 'rejection of the 
civilising mission of British colonialism' (Artexaga 1997, 140) that founded the protest as a whole. I 
understand her argument to be based upon Kristeva's (1982, 4) understanding of the abject as 
defiant towards, and rejecting of, civilisation, as it is disruptive of 'identity, system, order'. I argue 
that this dramatic spotlighting of sexual difference through the Armagh No Wash Protest highlights 
the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity in the body of the individual. Through this 
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intersectionality, the Armagh women were able to weaponise their bodies against the political 
domination they experienced both as republicans and as women.  
 
  The abjection of menstrual blood is well analysed in much of the literature surrounding 
disgust and the body horror.  Kristeva (1982) discusses the abject woman in the context of abject 
motherhood, with the mother being a major site of abjection in her understanding. Like other forms 
of abject that Kristeva discusses (that is, having to do with the functions of the body primal), 
menstrual blood 'collapse[s]...the border between inside and outside [of the body]' (Kristeva 1982, 
53). Menstrual blood demonstrates the ambiguity of the border, and particularly the borders of the 
body. Kristeva (1982) also argues that because menstrual blood is connected to motherhood, and 
therefore womanhood, the rejection of menstrual blood is tied to the rejection of corporeality 
(Kristeva 1982, 53). Barbara Creed (1986, 52), in her examination of abject womanhood through 
horror films, argues that there is a psychological connection between evil, sin, and female 
sexuality21. Creed connects this not only to the evils of female sexuality but to Freudian fears of 
castration as well (Creed 1986, 52). In the body-weaponisation literature, Wilcox (2014, 70) 
discusses the anxiety surrounding the 'leaky' female body. Menstruation, then, occupies a space of 
considerable cultural significance in terms of its status as taboo.  
 
 It is difficult to pinpoint precisely where the No Wash Protest at Armagh fits into Northern 
Irish historiography – the women imprisoned at Armagh were convicted as republican 
                                                 
21 In Creed's analysis, there are significant parallels drawn between sin and evil – she notes the use of religious 
iconography in films such as Carrie and their more overt use in The Exorcist as demonstrative of the juxtaposition 
between menstruation, blood, shame, and sin. The understanding of female sexuality as sinful from a religious 
reading is founded in certain interpretations of Genesis 3:6, specifically the story of the Temptation and Fall of Man, 
wherein Eve, the first woman, is lured to commit the first sin and tempts or persuades her husband to commit sin, 
which ultimately leads to them both exiled from Paradise. However, alternate readings of Genesis 3 in which the 
verse is translated more closely reveal that the authors of Bible appear only to suggest that Eve gave Adam the 
forbidden apple, suggesting that the idea of woman as temptress is the result of theological interpretations of the 
Bible, rather than a reaction to what actually appears in the Bible (Higgins 1976, 640).   
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paramilitaries, and their protest was certainly grounded in republican ideology as the result of its 
own cycle of violence that began with the removal of political status and the refusal to do prison 
work under the new criminalisation regime. But there was also the issue of resisting the sorts of 
patriarchal violence that defined life in Armagh Gaol, as in other carceral regimes, and with the 
attendant abjection and pathologisation of women who disturb gendered expectations of women by 
committing crimes (see Corcoran 2006). This raises problematic questions about the motives behind 
the protest: were the prisoners protesting the patriarchal prison regime, and therefore the State, or 
the patriarchal structures of their own community. The answer, in short, is both – in a single protest, 
the women of Armagh resisted both the normalisation as criminals and the normalisation as women. 
One of the problems consistently raised in the examination of the women's No Wash Protest was 
that it 'could not at once be both a feminist issue and the same as the men’s protest in Long Kesh' 
(Weinstein 2006, 26) as each appealed to a different and competing audience, although of course it 
was precisely that – a republican and a feminist issue. This tension left many of the protesters' 
contemporaries unsure of whether or not to support the protest and raised the question of its efficacy 
as a demonstration of Irish identity.  
 
 While it is not my intention to discuss in detail the implications of feminist support, or lack 
thereof, for the Armagh No Wash Protest, this ambiguity highlights the considerable issue of the 
illegibility of the protest – that is, what precisely the target of the protest was to be. It raises the 
following question: could the Armagh women through a single protest resist the domination of both 
the self and the other. While it certainly attempted to do this, ultimately the No Wash Protest in 
Armagh failed, coming to an end not through an escalation to hunger striking (for the Armagh 
women were excluded from the 1981 Hunger Strike Protest), but through a removal from the protest 
strategy entirely in the shift from the No Wash to Hunger Strike Protest by the male-dominated IRA 
command (Beresford 1987). While the women continued to resist through a refusal to undertake 
prison work, their own protest did not advance even as they were increasingly subjected to strip 
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searches. There is an additional layer of illegibility to the No Wash Protest  (both in Armagh and 
the H-Blocks) given the extreme form of protest, which confused the message sent to the 
community – the protesters were abject not only to the regime they resisted but to their own 
community as well.  
 
Legibility in the Weaponisation of the Feminised Body 
 The issue of legibility for the Armagh women arose before the protest began – by virtue of 
being female and in prison, they had already transgressed gender paradigms. This is indicated not 
only by the prisoners but female guards as well. Margaret Skelly told the Prisons Memory Archive 
‘[i]t wasn't about danger or a threat. It was about being conspicuous, I think...If you're a woman in a 
prison, everybody knows you.’ (Skelly, n.d.). The women in both prisoners were hyper-visible. The 
feeling of abjection, the insecurity and horror that the subject feels when confronted with the abject, 
is in large part due to the subject's inability to understand it. This illegibility of the abject is similar 
to Freud's understanding of the uncanny, where the abject (like the uncanny) is simultaneously 
'repulsive and fascinating' (Tyler 2009, 80; see also Freud 1919).  
 
 This potential for illegibility and the anxiety that this produced was also felt in the men's 
prison; Peader Whelan, one of the Blanketman, said of the protest '[w]hile we were worried about 
our health, we worried too about how people would see our going against everything we had been 
taught and if they'd understand it' (Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 2006, 41). The legibility of the 
protest – that is, the ability of those outside the prison to understand it – appears to have been quite 
lost in translation, as visitors to the prison such as Archbishop Tomás Ó Fiaich commented largely 
on the horror of the situation (Ross 2012), rather than upon what the protest was attempting to 
accomplish. Visitors from the International Red Cross, who came to view the living conditions of 
the prisoners under strict mandate of political neutrality, noted that the prisoners decried their living 
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conditions to be ‘irrelevant compared to their political demands’ (Hayes 1981, 2).  Discussions of 
the protest also framed it in such a way to ensure that the responsibility for the conditions of the 
protest were the protesters and not the government: in a memo dated 24 October 1980 the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland said ‘[i]t is by their own decision that the protesting prisoners go on 
living in conditions which must be offensive to all civilised people’ (Atkins 1980, 2) which made its 
reception even more difficult.   
 
 In addition to its use of the language of the abject, the women's protest posed a considerable 
problem for contemporaries trying to frame a reaction to the events in the prison. It was rooted in 
the same principles as the Blanketmen's, and a desire for solidarity among and continuity between 
the male and female paramilitaries can certainly be read into both the protest and the fact the 
prisoners demonstrated a degree of camaraderie amongst themselves: Bobby Sand's diary makes 
frequent references to the Armagh women – on the first day of his hunger strike, he wrote in his 
diary of 'the girls in Armagh...[t]here is so much I would like to say to them, about their courage, 
determination, and unquenchable spirit of resistance' (Sands 1981, 5). However, the women's 
protest was ultimately set in motion by an event that excluded the men in the H-Blocks because it 
involved the domination of women by men at the behest of women.  
 
  The No Wash Protest in Armagh differed slightly to the protest in the H-Blocks, in that  the 
men's protest was a response to a sustained period of abuse, in contrast to the women's which began 
as a result of a search for ‘paramilitary style’ clothing (Barry 1980, 1). Accounts of the strip 
search(es) that led  to the women's protest implicate men as the main aggressors, with female guards 
encouraging their actions (Aretxaga 1995, Aretxaga 1997, Weinstein 2007). Ex-prisoners also 
discuss the attempted regimentation of menstruation through the rationing of sanitary towels 
(Fairweather 1984, 222). More importantly, the protest itself impacted women in a way that it did 
191 
 
not impact men, for while both groups suffered surrounded by their own waste, women dealt with 
addition of menstrual blood. This added more than just another factor with which to contend, but 
rather surrounded the women with the physical expression of their outsider status within their own 
group – the menstrual blood marked them as abject within an abject as sexualised women within an 
othered group.  
 
 I have argued that the protest resisted two forms of domination – the political domination of 
the Northern/Irish by the British, as well as the patriarchal domination of women within the prison 
system. I use 'patriarchal' domination to suggest that this was institutionalised oppression, and it 
was in some instances perpetrated by women (that is, by female prison guards). This domination 
was in some ways similar to what the men experienced in the H-Blocks, particularly when strip-
searching was introduced; but it also took on women-specific forms. One of the Armagh women 
pointed out that in the gaol, women were required 'to state when their period was due...if it started 
earlier that anticipated or came more often then expected, then too bad. The women still had to 
make due with the quota of sanitary towels allotted to them' (Fairweather, McDonough, and 
McFadyean 1984, 222). The authors comment that this was a 'particularly humiliating form of 
punishment...[designed] to break the prisoners in an exclusively female way' (Fairweather, 
McDonough, and McFadyean 1984, 222). I agree with this assessment, particularly given that it was 
punishing without cause – menstruation is rarely a process of clockwork consistency, and the idea 
that a woman should be punished for menstruating out of turn is absurd. It demonstrates a likewise 
absurd attempt at disciplining and controlling the uncontrollable female body. The rationing of 
sanitary towels and the refusal to supply them was domination for domination's sake.  It suggests a 
precursor to the women's No Wash Protest, as having experienced domination through their 
menstrual cycle, the menstrual cycle became a weapon of resistance.  
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 The weaponisation of menstrual blood did not begin with the women of Armagh, but with 
the guards themselves, and it was used as a weapon against the men before it was used as a weapon 
against women. Feldman (1991) publishes an interview with a prisoner about the process of 
interrogation who recounts the story of a fellow inmate whose girlfriend was brought in for 
questioning as well: 
 They took ----'s girlfriend, dragged her into Castlereagh while he was under interrogation. 
 Stormed into his cell with a soiled sanitary towel they took off of her and said 'Do you 
 know what you're putting this woman through here?' It was meant to degrade her and to 
 degrade him. She broke and made statements. (Feldman 1991, 135)  
While the factual status of this example is uncertain, the power of the violence implied is clear for 
those recounting the event: the interrogators sought to degrade the man in their custody, and did so 
effectively by bringing his girlfriend's menstruation into view. Stripping a woman of her sanitary 
towel is itself sexual assault. Menstruation is something that women keep private, and this 
unidentified man's girlfriend would have been forced to either hand it over or would have had it 
taken off of her, in either case violating the privacy of her body. It also suggests that women are in 
some way disadvantaged by their menstruation, that women who are menstruating have something 
to hide and are weakened by it – that her boyfriend was being held and interrogated was struggle 
enough, but that she was also menstruating at the time made it somehow worse. Menstruation is a 
natural biological process, but despite this, it is clearly viewed as something that about which a 
woman should be ashamed, and should therefore be concealed. Menstrual blood occupies a space of 
considerable horror and revulsion, 'more' abject even than urine or faeces. It is, in point of fact, just 
another form of bodily waste, but it also demonstrates the sexualised, uncontained (Kristeva 1982) 
female body.  
 
 Menstruation was weaponised by the prison regime not only to degrade men, but women 
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who were held for interrogation as well. Artexaga (1995) refers to the menstruation of the prisoner 
as ‘a sabotage of the body' (Aretxaga 1995, 139), and recounts the story of Brenda Murphy, a 
republican writer who participated in the Dirty Protest and who told of her experience in her short 
story 'A Curse,' in which a woman held for interrogation discovers her period and must discuss it 
with her male interrogator: 
 ‘I've taken my period’ she said simply. ‘I need some sanitary napkins and a wash.’ He 
 looked at her with disgust. ‘Have you no shame? I've been married twenty years and my 
 wife wouldn't mention things like that.’ But I don’t this would be an atypical response for 
 many men of that generation, whatever their ethnic background.  What is the colour of 
 shame? All she could see was red as it trickled down her legs (Murphy 1989, 226-227 in 
 Aretxaga 1995, 139) 
Here menstruation is an act of betrayal by the woman's body, forcing her to discuss her weakness, 
and her shame. Menstruating women are not viewed as strong, which further illustrates the link 
between feminisation and disempowerment. Women are at their weakest and most subjugated when 
their female-ness is most difficult to deny or avoid. This juxtaposition is itself simple, but it 
becomes more complex where feminisation/disempowerment intersects with identity – the case of 
Murphy, her lack of agency was communicated through her captivity as a republican prisoners and 
her 'ill-timed' period.  
 
 Aretxanga writes, '[t]he prisoners’ excreta and menstrual blood tap into the interconnected 
domains of prison violence, colonial history, unconscious motivation, and gender discourses' 
(Aretxanga 1995, 126).  These women, by virtue of their first being in prison, then by forcing their 
menstruation into public discourse, put themselves at odds with conservative views about the roles 
and proper behaviour of women. Menstrual blood carries with it its own set of taboos, and while 
other elimination processes are thought to be unclean, menstruation carries the additional weight of 
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not only being an unclean process but a process through which the entire body of the woman is 
considered unclean (see Leviticus 15:19). Excrement itself may be dirty, but menstruation renders 
the whole person unclean, undesirable, and untouchable.  
 
 The Armagh protest brought into focus the presence of women as political prisoners and 
protesters in way that made them distinct from the men, and it did this through the use of menstrual 
blood as a weapon of resistance. Outside the prison, the weapons of womanhood had been those of 
'the invisibility of women's bodies' (Aretxaga 1997, 38), and she cites a story of a young woman 
and her mother-in-law who carried guns and ammunition past a group of British guards without 
being questioned or even stopped (Aretxaga 1997, 38). '[A]s subjects of history women have also 
been erased from the public arenas of politics and war' (Aretxaga 1997, 38), and this erasure 
ensures that when a soldier meets a woman, even in a war zone, his suspicions are not raised as they 
would be had he met a man. There was no such invisibility in Armagh prison, however – those 
women were understood to be political agents through the actions that led to their conviction. In the 
absence of their invisibility within political space, the women of Armagh's protest instead made 
hypervisibility of their womanhood a method of resistance. If menstruation is kept invisible, 
weaponising the woman's body through abjection will instead make it extremely visible.  
 
 The Armagh No Wash Protest gained a great deal of attention, and while it did not succeed 
in regaining Special Category Status for the prisoners, it did have some impact. In response to the 
protest, the Government was extremely sensitive to the type of information that got out about the 
protest–   which is called 'lying propaganda' on the part of Father Dennis Faul (n.a. 1980c, 1) – and 
its reception, wherein the Government stresses the need to avoid 'steps likely to harden or 
consolidate the women's protest, or to give the propagandists any legitimate openings to complain 
of harsh treatment by the authorities' (n.a., 1980c, 2). Weinstein (2007) mentions three large groups 
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outside the prison who weighed in upon the Protest: the republican movement, who attempted to 
use (or exploit) the sex of the Armagh women to garner support; the feminist movement, who were 
divided over whether or not support the women; and the Catholic Church, who framed the protest as 
largely a humanitarian concern (Weinstein 2007, 19). Ultimately, however, the Armagh No Wash 
Protest was, as it was with the men's, unsuccessful in achieving its stated aims.  My argument is that 
in order to effectively weaponise the body, what the body-weapon perceives as its target community 
must be able to rally around the actions of the body-weapon, but the No Wash Protests strayed too 
far into the abject to be accessible to the community. The weaponisation of the bodies of the 
Armagh women certainly produced an emotive effect, but one that was too horrified to inspire the 
necessary sympathy.  
 
 
‘The Savage Reduction of the Flesh’22: Abject Masculinity in the Hunger Strike Protest 
 In the previous section, I discussed the No Wash Protest in Armagh Gaol as an illustration of 
the weaponisation of the ethnicised and sexualised body through abjection. I have argued that the 
women's protest was ultimately unsuccessful as it weaponised abject femininity, and was outside 
the scope of legibility. The protest proved too horrifying and too divisive to rally support to the 
republican cause, and a change of tactic was initiated when, on 1 March 1981, Bobby Sands began 
the Hunger Strike Protest that would result in his death and the deaths of nine other Blanketmen. I 
read the 1981 Irish Republican Hunger Strike Protest as a redirection in the weaponisation of the 
abject body, this time deploying the abject masculine body. The Hunger Strike Protest was more 
easily readable and was more effective in rallying support outside the prison, and it ultimately 
succeeded where the No Wash Protest failed. It was also the second hunger strike undertaken in the 
prison; a previous strike in 1980 had failed when the strikers were close to death. The 1980 Hunger 
                                                 
22 This phrase attributed to Maud Ellman (1988). It is also the title of a previously published piece, ‘The savage 
reduction of the flesh’: violence, gender and bodily weaponisation in the 1981 Irish Republican hunger strike 
protest’ (O'Branski 2014). 
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Strike was treated as a nominal victory for the republicans in the first instance, who attempted to 
scratch some gains which the Government said amounted to a failed 'face-saving exercise' (n.a. 
1980a, 22) saying that the demands of the strikers 'would go far to give, and are intended to give, 
the protesting prisoners control over their lives in prison, and could not be agreed to by the 
Government, since to do so would be to legitimise and encourage terrorist activity' (n.a. 1980b, 2). 
This illustrates that the Hunger Strike Protest was consistently a struggle for legitimacy.   
 
 Allen Feldman (1991) says of the H-Block protests that '[s]ymbolization in the H-Blocks 
was forged in violence, it was often violent in itself, and it never failed to engaged life-and-death 
issues' (Feldman 1991, 163). He goes on to argue '[t]he H-Blocks teach us that within the ecologies 
of violence, knowledge, representation, and cultural genesis begin and end in the body' (Feldman 
1991, 166). Each of the three protests that occurred in the H-Blocks represent a different mode of 
bodily weaponisation in which the intended target of violence is out of reach, and the body of the 
prisoner is effectively the best or only weapon available to them. While the prisoners were in close 
physical proximity to the prison guards, and most of their interactions would have been with the 
guards, the prison guards as individuals were not, in the case of the protests, the direct targets. 
Violence that directly targeted the prison guards occurred when IRA and INLA members outside 
the H-Blocks orchestrated their assassinations.  Rather, the intended victim of the protest was, 
broadly, the British government, via public opinion. Westminster was seen as an illegitimate 
occupying force, and perhaps more specifically Margaret Thatcher and her policies. In this regard 
the protest was largely successful. David Blatherwick of the Political Affairs Division said in a 
confidential letter dated 17 August, 1981 '[t]he effects of the strike so far are bad enough. The 
Provos and INLA have gained a new batch of recruits. The feeling of alienation, bitterness and 
frustration we detected in Catholic areas in May has grown steadily stronger. People are becoming 
anti-British and less ready to give the system their support' (Blatherwick 1981, 2). By undertaking 
their hunger strike, the strikers intended to force the government's hand in acquiescing to their 'Five 
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Demands': the right not to wear a prison uniform; the right not to do prison work; of free association 
with other prisoners; one visit, letter, and package a week; and the restoration of remission. These 
amounted to recognition of political status, or the return of Special Category Status. 
 
 The Hunger Strike Protest was orchestrated to mean the end of the No Wash Protest. My 
reading of the Hunger Strike Protest is that through the bodies and actions of the strikers, the 
prisoners as a unit reclaimed their collective masculinity, where masculinity implies agency, power, 
and dignity. They were no longer subjected to the passifying/paternalisitc measures of the prison 
regime, such as forced washes. Most importantly, they were no longer engaged in a protest that was 
so heavily reliant on the more primal features and functions of their bodies as the No Wash Protest 
because the Hunger Strike Protest did not rely on the wastes of the body. Dating back to Aristotle, 
there is an epistemological connection between the masculinity and the mind, femininity and the 
body.  Through the more ascetic Hunger Strike Protest, the strikers crossed over that binary claim 
the superiority of their minds over their subjugated and beaten bodies in a classic subordination of 
the feminine by the masculine. 
 
 There is a discursive echo of the hunger strike to an historic/mythic past that is specifically 
Irish, as there is some suggestion that hunger striking was included in the pre-Christian Celtic legal 
system as a means by which the less powerful could protest the actions of the more powerful. This 
became better known though WB Yeats's 'The King's Threshold'. But as O'Malley (1990) points 
out, 'there is nothing especially Irish' about hunger-striking (O'Malley 1990, 25). 'The myth of 
hunger-striking,' he argues, 'is more powerful than the history of hunger-striking itself' (O'Malley 
1990, 25), and that it 'fuses...the legal code of ancient Ireland, [the] self-denial that is the central 
characteristic of Irish Catholicism, and...the propensity for endurance and sacrifice that is the 
hallmark of militant Irish nationalism' (O'Malley 1990, 25). Whatever the real history of hunger-
striking in pre-Christian Ireland, the 1981 Hunger Strike Protest did establish a mythic genealogy 
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between the rebels of the 1916 Easter Rising, in particular the hunger striker Thomas Ashe, and the 
prisoners of 1981. In addition to establishing their protest as part of a tradition in Irish resistance 
politics, this connection helped in legitimizing the protest in the minds of the people as freedom-
fighters participating in an Irish traditional of resistance rather than terrorists. It also echoed their 
ethnicisation as Irish or Irish-republican by producing their belonging to a group that was other to 
the British self.  
 
 Hunger striking occupies an uncomfortable position in the discussion of political violence. It 
does have a history of being a form of peaceful, nonviolent protest, and one of the major criticisms 
of hunger-striking as a form of political violence is the idea that if a hunger striker is granted his or 
her demands, s/he will end the fast, meaning that the death of the hunger striker is not an assured 
outcome (Biggs 2008), as in other instances of bodily weaponisation such as suicide bombing. 
While this is the case in some hunger strikes, it is not applicable to all, and the testimony of the 
1981 Irish hunger strikers demonstrates that it was not the case in this particular protest.  Bobby 
Sand's diary frequently and with surprising clarity discusses his resignation to death (Sands 1981), 
and O'Malley (1990) describes the words of Kieran Doherty nine days before his death on hunger 
strike as spoken with 'the lucidity of one for whom the certainty of his own death has become a 
matter of comfort rather than regret' (O'Malley 1990, 7). He later uses words like 'nonchalant' and 
'cavalier' (O'Malley 1990, 115) to describe the strikers. A twenty-two page report on the 1980 
Hunger Strike released by the Prison Records Office of Northern Ireland says 'the single most 
important factor was that the seven bunger [sic] strikers just did not have the will to die. They may 
have been misled into thinking that their protest would succeed easily, and as it became increasingly 
clear that their deaths were going to be in vain, the fear of death probably became an increasingly 
significant factor' (n.a. 1980, 19). This was not the case in the 1981 strike.  
 
 What is crucial to an understanding of the 1981 Hunger Strike Protest is that the strikers 
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went in with the acceptance of the certainty or likelihood of their own deaths, and they fasted 
anyway. Feldman (1991) writes '[t]he Blanketmen viewed the 1981 Hunger Strike as a military 
campaign.... it was a modality of insurrectionary violence in which they deployed their bodies as 
weapons' (Feldman 1991, 220). A letter to Cardinal o Fiaich from then-Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Humphrey Atkins emphasises that the Hunger Strike Protest was built entirely 
around the demands of the prisoners themselves- Atkins writes 'I had to pay attention also to what 
the protesters themselves said. They had made it only too clear what kind of status, and what kind 
of prison regime they wanted' (Atkins 1981, 2). In this same letter he makes it clear that the protest 
is viewed as violent: 'the Government [will] maintain its stance not to yield wound principles in the 
face of violence, whatever form that violence may take' (Atkins 1981, 3). The strikers themselves 
appear to have viewed the protest not only as a military operation for a political gain, but as a 
defensive operation to hold back the abuse the other prisoners were experiencing. Father Oliver 
Crilly recalled Tom McElwee, one of the strikers, describing this defensive motivation behind the 
Hunger Strike Protest:  
 There was a high level of hostility and brutality in the relationships within the prison all the 
 time. Tom also said to me that while he was on hunger strike, it was as if he was interposing 
 his body like a block of wood to take the pressure, to hold the pressure from coming down 
 on his comrades in the prison....While Tom was on hunger strike, he felt that he wasn't just 
 working for the Five Demands but that he was actually preventing the kind of brutality that 
 they had experienced in the prison (Crilly, n.d.).  
This militarised framing of the hunger strike by the strikers themselves demonstrates that theirs was 
not a passive protest but was intended to force the hand of Thatcher's government in recognizing the 
Irish republican cause as a legitimate political one.  
 
  Reading the Hunger Strike Protest in this way offers a better understanding of one role of 
the body in ethnic violence, and how it produces extreme expressions of violence. The prisoners 
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chose the most virulent form of resistance available to them in order to create the maximum 
emotive effect. This is what separates the hunger strike of the Irish republicans from those which 
could be labelled passive or nonviolent resistance – their strike was intended as a violent act, and it 
was intended to inspire violence outside the prison, which it managed successfully (O'Malley 1990). 
The Hunger Strike Protest weaponised the subjugated and feminised bodies of the strikers by re-
writing them as simultaneously and paradoxically masculine and abject. It was both an oppositional 
protest in that it resisted the feminisation of the prisoners through the abuse they suffered from the 
guards, and a strategic deployment of the abjected male body against an opponent. One of the more 
salient abjections is the corpse – it is a human body, but it is without life. I may look at a corpse and 
recognize it to be a person that I know, but that person is gone. The corpse is a confrontation of 
mortality, of impermanence, and the ultimate confrontation with corporeality, which the horror of 
the abject helps the self to avoid. It is this abjection, the corpse, which the hunger strikers used as a 
weapon against what they viewed as colonialist domination.  
 
 The Hunger Strike Protest involved two contingent processes – the reclamation of the 
strikers' masculinity, and the reduction of the bodies of young men to corpses. The emotive power 
of the protest came from this wasting of youthful male virility. The violence that the prisoners 
experienced through the Blanket and No Wash Protests were intended by the prison guards to 
pacify them, to quite literally beat them into submission, and it was strikingly sexualised. 
Testimonials from the prisoners graphically recount the ways in which their bodies, and in 
particular their genitalia, were brutalised when they left or more typically were dragged from their 
cells (Campbell, McKeown, O'Hagan 1994). Given that the prisoners were naked when they were 
not in their cells and therefore were entirely exposed to visual and physical assault, the fact that this 
vulnerability was capitalised upon in such a way that targeted their sexual organs directly 
corresponds to sexual assault, which here means violence done to a vulnerable body that 
specifically implicates the sexual characteristics of that body. While the brutalisation of the 
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prisoners in this manner was done to inflict a maximum level of pain, it did so by exploiting the 
vulnerability of the prisoner's bodies. It sent a clear message that the most vulnerable parts of the 
Blanketmen's bodies were within the grasp of the prison regime, and this vulnerability could be 
exploited to ensure the domination of the prisoners by the guards.  
 
 Mary Corocoran (2006) says that all prison protests are inherently passive, and are 
embedded in the power regimes against which prisoners resist, and therefore '[b]odily practices of 
resistance, then, cannot aspire to... autonomy' (Corcoran 2006, 99). In contrast, the hunger strike 
should be read as a process of bodily resistance and weaponisation, but as Foucault indicates, one 
that is inherently founded in the dynamics of power against which it resists.  The nature of the 
prison protest demands that it operates within the discourse of power – that is to say, it is reliant on 
the prison for its legibility, its structure, its impact. The agency of the imprisoned body is, like any 
body, already inscribed by its relationship to power – the prisoners only have so many tools with 
which to mount their protest, and only so many options in terms of what kind of protest they can 
mount.  
 
 The Hunger Strike Protest was a means by which the prisoners crossed from the savage 
captivity defiled by their own bodies in the No Wash Protest to the more ascetic Hunger Strike 
Protest. In this movement, the prisoners moved across the Aristotelian feminine body/masculine 
mind  binary and in doing so they moved away from the symbolic feminisation to a reclamation of 
their masculinity. Feldman (1991) says of the Hunger Strike Protest that it represented a sort of 
catharsis for the prisoners, that '[t]he ending of the No Wash Protest furthered the imagery of ritual 
purification associated with the Hunger Strike' (Feldman 1991, 247). The purification that Feldman 
discusses was the transition between the corporeal protest of the No Wash, which focused 
exclusively on the body, to the more aesthetic hunger strike. One of the things that it symbolized 
was separation of body and mind, a dominance of the masculine mind. In the last entry of his diary, 
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Bobby Sands wrote '[t]he body fights back sure enough, but at the end of the day everything returns 
to the primary consideration, that is, the mind. The mind is most important' (Sands 1981, 60). 
Through the bodies and actions of the strikers, the prisoners as a unit reclaimed their collective 
masculinity. They were no longer subjected to the passifying/paternalisitc measures of the prison 
regime, such as the forced washes. Most importantly, they were no longer engaged in a protest that 
was so heavily reliant on the more primal features and functions of their bodies as the No Wash 
Protest. This reclamation of masculinity is important for the concept of overkill because it illustrates 
the tandem sexualisation and weaponisation of the body in extreme cases of violence, wherein the 
sexualised body is deployed in order to reclaim sexualised dominance.  
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter has focused upon the body as a weapon through its transformation into the 
abject, as one of two empirical studies of the performance of the ethnic body in certain types of 
ethnic violence. This second empirical study was used to illustrate the second stage of overkill, 
wherein in some instances the body that has been brutalised can become weaponised, and its 
sexualised abjection used to strike back at its attacker. This performance of the ethnic body is 
informed by the intersection of the ethnicised body with sexualised body of the other. In this 
chapter, the weaponisation of the body demonstrates this intersection: the No Wash Protest in 
Armagh relied upon the abject and sexualised body of the ethnicised Irish and republican woman, 
and the Hunger Strike Protest relied upon the refusal of a particular mode of sexualisation, the use 
of brutalising violence to feminise the prisoners of Long Kesh. In their refusal to submit to violence, 
and their refusal to be remarked as criminals, the men of the H-Blocks weaponised another abject, 
that of the corpse.  
 
 To arrive at this conclusion, I have examined the nature of the protests themselves. The two 
protests upon which this chapter focused were directly protesting the shift from political recognition 
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of the prisoners to a policy of criminalisation. This shift meant the struggle of the Irish republicans 
inside and outside the prison would be viewed as criminal, or at best terrorist, activity, rather than a 
legitimate struggle of a native population against colonizers. The recognition of Irish republicanism 
as a political cause, and by extension the recognition of the conflict itself as legitimate was what lay 
at stake in these protests, and so the actions of the protest had to be themselves readable as 
legitimate. This meant that the prisoners could not fashion weapons etc., to fight back against the 
regime, but had to weaponise themselves. More importantly, the use of the bodies of the prisoners 
galvanised the emotional response of the community outside the prison walls, and inside proved a 
powerful tool of resistance.  
 
 Through the No Wash Protest, the Armagh women weaponised their bodies in a way that 
was quite specific, in that one of the tools of their resistance was menstrual blood. Although the 
men of the H-Blocks participated in a similar action, the women’s protest through its use of such a 
tabooed function communicated the abjection of the prisoners’ bodies with greater force. The power 
of this protest came from its illegibility, the fact that the protest not only used the language of the 
abject but because of its inaccessibility was itself abject. The horror and confusion, the pre-verbal 
sensation of disgust at the protest was the emotional weight that carried the prisoners’ demands to 
the public outside. The No Wash Protest speaks to the abjection of the colonised other, and 
weaponises the idea of the feminised savage common to colonialist, and especially exterminatory, 
discourses (see Lindqvist 1992). It also disrupts the gendered assumptions of proper expressions of 
femininity, in particular that women should be clean, and that the mystification and taboo of 
menstruation is not to be challenged. 
 
 The Hunger Strike Protest of 1981 represented a tactical shift in the prisoners’ strategy of 
resistance. The No Wash Protest had proved feminising, in its use of the women’s sexualised bodies 
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in Armagh, its opening up of the male body to extreme aggression in the prison, and its focus on the 
body which is typically associated with femininity. The Hunger Strike Protest changed the dynamic 
of the struggle as it shifted to a more ascetic, and therefore masculine, approach. It did not, 
however, complete this transition, as protests of the body will always remain rooted in the body, 
despite claims to an ascetic mythic tradition and its remaining a bodily resistance is what led to its 
success – the protest’s weight rested on the fact that the bodies of young men were wasting away to 
corpses. Unlike the No Wash protest, the Hunger Strike was ultimately successful in that the 
prisoners were awarded a de facto recognition of political status without being officially recognised 
as such. Taken together, these protests demonstrate one way in which the intersection of the 
sexualised and ethnicised body can produce the types of abject violence we see in some cases of 
ethnic violence. The prison protests in Northern Ireland were performative of a new type of identity, 
the identity of republican prisoner, of Blanketmen and Armagh women, and their ethnicisation and 
sexualisation were played out through the weaponisation of their bodies. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Contributions 
 
Thesis Summary 
 This thesis began with questions about the nature of violent identity politics, namely how 
some instances of identity politics have produced extreme forms of abject violence that uses or 
targets specific bodies in ways that appeared highly sexualised. Two examples of this violence used 
in this thesis were the genocidal rape in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the use of menstrual 
blood in the No Wash Protest in Northern Ireland as this violence tended to occur in identity-based 
political conflicts that were often labelled in the existing literature as ethnic conflicts. My initial 
research question was to what extent the intersection of embodied ethnicity and sexualisation 
contributes to extreme forms of violence.  
 
 I began this thesis by introducing the existing literature on the formation of ethnic identity, 
because of the tendency for these conflicts, which are characterised by abject, sexualised violence, 
to be labelled as ethnic. In examining the literature on ethnic identity, it became clear that there 
were considerable issues throughout the literature, and there was a notable lack of cohesion in terms 
of both the definition and the deployment of ethnicity.  Furthermore, my reading of the ethnic 
identity literature revealed inconsistencies in the ways in which ethnicity was framed, discussed, 
and utilised, but some scholars agreed that a group was considered ethnic if they shared some 
number of cultural characteristics, and if they were recognised as a group by those outside (Smith 
1986, Barth 1969).  While it did clearly emerge that ethnicity is a category of  group identification, 
as it is felt as a very real marker of difference, it is one that appears as an overarching description of 
membership loosely defined in terms of language, culture, endogamy, territory, and most critically, 
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social normative practices. I therefore understand ethnicity to be a matrix of intersectional markers 
of difference that are often sexualised and are policed by abjection. 
 
 The lack of a clear definition of ethnic groups poses considerable difficulty when it came to 
understanding ethnic conflict, in particular when examining the roots of ethnic conflict. Many of the 
explanations for ethnic conflict discussed in Chapter Two dismiss the idea of ethnic groups as 
naturally occurring phenomena, but treat them as such in order to arrive at their respective 
understandings of how ethnic conflict arises. This was because ethnic groups needed to be 
understood as internally cohesive in order to treat ethnicity as a causal variable in conflict. It 
appeared that in order to explain ethnic conflict, scholars were underestimating the importance of 
the formation of ethnic identity in the first instance. In order to better explain the roots of ethnic 
conflict, I began to construct my own understanding of how conflict emerges from the roots of 
identity formation, taking into consideration identity as dynamic, embodied, and intersectional 
particularly with respect to sexual norms. 
 
 In order to ground the research question in a theoretical framework, I turned in Chapter 
Three to the literature on performativity and embodied identity. This provided me with a conceptual 
foundation that could simultaneously account for identity as seemingly natural, and as empirically 
dynamic. As explained by Judith Butler (1990), performativity is a theory of identity that views it as 
productive, that it ‘‘produces’ what it claims merely to represent' (Butler 1990, 3). By acting out the 
norms prescribed by identity markers, individuals ensure that those markers continue to define the 
parameters of that group. Butler argues 'the political construction of the subject proceeds with 
certain legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed 
and naturalised...' (1990, 3). This highlights two important elements of ethnic identity – that it 
appears as natural, and that it is intrinsically based upon binary operations of inclusion and 
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exclusion. That identity appears as natural accounts for the confusion in the existing literature, 
particularly in bridging the gap between the ethnic identity literature and the ethnic conflict 
literature, as viewing identity as performative allows for it to be understood as neither wholly 
enduring or wholly constructed, but appearing as both. 
 
 Viewing identity as performative also allows us to think about violence in a new way. If the 
individual material actions of a subject are productive of his or her identity, then violence is not the 
effect of another underlying cause, but rather is itself productive – an act of violence done either to 
the subject or by the subject constitutes that subject in the moment of violence. Because of the 
emphasis on the materiality of the body in making identity possible, I understand identity to always 
be an embodied force. Identities are understood through performances that are always made 
possible by the body, and so the effects of identity politics are made known through actions done to 
and on bodies. The body is produced as identity is produced, through the material performances of 
the body (Butler 1993). For this reason I have examined violence in terms of the physical acts 
committed against and by bodies, viewing violence as constitutive of the subjectivity of both its 
victims and its perpetrators.  
 
 This theoretical emphasis on performativity and embodiment revealed the importance of the 
concept of the abject in the formation of identity, in particular the emphasis on inclusion and 
exclusion, and the necessity of the body for the expression and performance of identity. In Chapter 
Four I showed that abjection encompasses the exclusion of the other to understand what is included 
in the self, marks and polices the boundary between the self and other, and also accounts for the 
feeling of confusion, revulsion, and fascination with that boundary and what is outside of it. 
Abjection combines a feeling of disgust with a feeling of terror, fascinating as it repels. Kristeva 
(1982) discusses the abject in terms of the individual and the formation of understandings of the 
208 
 
self, as that which must be rejected in order for the self to be fully realised. Because of this, the 
abject is simultaneously constitutive of the self and threatening to it. Butler (2004), in her reading of 
Freud, claims that this rejection of the abject produces a melancholia in the subject, an 
unrecognisable grief over the loss of the abject, that can turn into rage over its denial. Abjection 
therefore delineates the differences between ourselves and others both as individuals and as social 
groups, and those acts that represent the border are met with confusion, disgust, fear, and rage. 
Tracing the theoretical roots of this project back to Butler's early formations of performativity 
(Butler 1990), we see that difference as abject behaviour marked through deviant sexual practices 
and norms.  
 
 Taken together, the theoretical foundations in conceptions of performativity and abjection 
have led me to the understanding that the constitution of ethnicity is done through the marking of 
differences. Differences are produced through the discursive production of aberrant or deviant 
sexualities, and are marked through sexualised violence. These markers of difference intersect with 
other markers of difference, such as heritage, religion, or class. Group identity is inherently 
exclusionary, and it views outsiders as threatening and dangerous. The danger of the other is framed 
in terms of the perceived sexual differences between groups – outsider males rumoured as rapists, 
or outsider women as sexually depraved, for example. The concept of ethnicity is formed as the 
normality of the self against the alleged and ascribed deviance of the other, and sexualisation 
demarcates these boundaries. The shoring up of the boundaries of the group along sexualised lines 
produces the practice of endogamy that is mentioned as one of the markers of an ethnic group by 
inspiring fear and distrust of the sexual norms of other groups. These are relaxed in the absence of 
tensions, and strengthened in times of crisis.  
 
 This argument led me to the concept of overkill, introduced and explained in Chapter Four 
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of this thesis, and applied to two empirical case studies in Chapters Five and Six – the 1994 
Rwandan genocide and the prison protests in Northern Ireland respectively. I introduced the concept 
of overkill to the study of violent identity politics in order to begin categorising the extreme 
violence that has so far been under-theorised in the existing literature. It appeared that in cases of 
extreme violence, there were patterns of abjection and sexualisation that emerged from the 
performance of violent identity. Overkill is the sexualised weaponisation and/or brutalisation of the 
body. It is constitutive, productive, and communicative violence, and it utilises the language of 
abjection to confer its meaning. Overkill is violence that strips the target of its subjectivity, and 
remakes both perpetrator and victim in a new kind of subjectivity. The operation of overkill in the 
brutalisation of the body is the more obvious of the two, whilst in the weaponisation of the body it 
is perhaps more subtle, particularly where it involves self-directed violence, and is an evolution of 
overkill from the body's brutalisation. In the Northern Ireland case, the weaponisation of the bodies 
of the prisoners is done through the mimesis of their own abjection – the body-weapon abjects itself 
in order to communicate the denial of and to reconstitute its subjectivity. Unlike other forms of 
violence, overkill does not attempt to police, to render docile, or to alter, but rather seeks to identify 
difference, shame the bearers of that difference, and to eradicate that difference.  Violence in these 
cases becomes a new kind of identity that is performed and embodied. 
 
 The relationship between violence, identity, the body, and performativity plays out in two 
dynamics of overkill – the brutalisation and the weaponisation of the body. Each explains a 
different aspect of the relationship between embodied abjection and embodied identity that make up 
overkill. It is important to note that these two case studies are not intended to be compared against 
one another, but rather are being used to discuss two different claims about the dynamics of 
overkill, the brutalisation of the body in Rwanda and the weaponisation of the body in Northern 
Ireland. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the identity of the genocidaire was bound up in the 
brutalisation of the body of the Tutsi, and through rendering the Tutsi body abject through violence, 
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the identity of the Hutu was likewise produced and performed. Through the prison protests in 
Northern Ireland, we gain an understanding of how abjection is itself performative. The prisoners 
through their protests performed their own abjection as they assumed the identity of protesting 
prisoners, and using the vocabulary of that abjection weaponised their bodies in resistance to their 
own othering.    
 
 What each of these case studies has demonstrated is the importance of the intersection of 
ethnicity and sexuality in abjection in certain instances of violent identity politics. Whether the 
body is brutalised, weaponised, or both in overkill, we can see the emergence of a pattern in the 
sexualisation of the ethnicised, abject other. This sexualisation has been unaccounted for in 
previous examinations of violent identity politics yet does appear as a common feature. We can see 
that in both case studies, the sexualisation of the Tutsi and the republican prisoners respectively 
constituted their identity, and did so such that they were starkly distinct from the Hutu and the 
loyalists. The boundaries that set the limits of their identities were each policed by abjection, and 
their subjugation was iterated through sexualised violence both iterative and physical.  
 
Contributions: Ethnicity as intersectional and the conditions of possibility for overkill 
 One critical claim of this thesis is that ethnicity should be viewed less as a cohesive, 
coherent category and more as the intersection of numerous identities, the boundaries of which are 
policed by sexualised norms. Ethnic identity is intersectional with other types of identity. This is not 
to suggest simply that people will have an ethnic identity in addition to their class, religious, or 
gender identities, but rather to argue that ethnicity is intrinsically and inextricably tied in to these 
other modes of identification. Viewing ethnicity not only as performative but as intersectionaly 
performative with gendered and sexualised identity is a departure from previous conceptions of 
ethnic identity especially as it relates to conflict. Ethnicity in this view is not essentialised as a 
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causal variable in violent identity politics, but is rather a larger categorisation for several markers of 
difference. These markers are in turn policed by abjection and are often sexualised. When these 
differences become overtly marked by sexualised difference and become radicalised, we find the 
conditions of possibility for overkill.  
 
 The concept of intersectionality is vitally important to an understanding of overkill. I 
understand ethnic identity to be a constellation of difference markers, some which are sexualised, 
and which are policed by abjection. The intersectionality of ethnicity blurs the lines around 
ethnicity as a cohesive category, which produces the same kinds of uncertainties that emerge when 
faced with the abject. This uncertainty leads to sexualised brutalisation, whilst the concurrent 
mimesis of abjected alterity leads to sexualised weaponisation. The evisceration of pregnant women 
in Rwanda is a visceral example of the interaction between sexualised brutalisation and uncertainty, 
while the Hunger Strike Protest is a clear example of sexualised weaponisation.  
 
 The constitution of ethnicity is done through the marking of difference through sexualised 
violence. These sexualised differences intersect with other markers of difference, which can be 
racialised physical markers, cultural markers such as food and dress, many of which are rolled 
together under the category of ethnicity. Ethnicity is formed as the normality of ingroup practices 
against the deviance of outgroup practices, and these differences can begin as divisions of language, 
food, religion, and so on – whatever is available to make divisions clear. In Rwanda, this is clear in 
the sexualisation of the Tutsi as deviant, and the alleged differences in sexual practices and 
preferences that were produced as part of the propaganda leading up to and during the genocide  
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 By examining the prison protests in Northern Ireland, I demonstrated the intersectionality of 
ethnicised and sexualised identity in the abjected body through weaponisation as one kind of 
overkill. We can see the processes of sexualisation and brutalisation at work in the interactions of 
the prisoners with the prison guards, in particular abuse surrounding menstruation and strip and 
mirror searches. Outside the prison, the republican struggle was delegitimised as criminal by the 
policies of Margaret Thatcher, with further subjugated the prisoners. Their ethnicisation was 
accomplished not only by their production as other, but internally as well, as the Blanketmen 
solidified their Irish identity through, among other things, learning Gaelic. The prisoners, through 
their protest and in what Feldman calls the mimesis of alterity but that I have more explicitly 
referred to as a mimesis of the abjection experienced through their brutalisation, weaponised their 
own ethnicised and sexualised bodies.  
 
 This sexualisation is an important condition of possibility for overkill, and in particular is 
important to the asynchrony of the violence that occurs and what it attempts to accomplish. 
Violence or the threat of violence here is not about the communication of the strategic presence of 
the self, which is how a theory of overkill differs from an understanding of the security dilemma, 
but rather is about the demonstration of the abjection of the other and the conference of a new 
subjectivity based upon that violence. Above all, increases in violence through corporeal acts or 
discursive means are not chronologically incremental, where an action by one group leads to a 
proportional stepping up by another. Rather these events are entirely asynchronous, and herein lies 
the considerable problem with predictive models – because the road to the 'threshold' of extreme 
violence is not an instrumental or strategic stepping-up, ethnic tensions can move from banal to 
horrifying rapidly and without a clear logic of escalation. Therefore it is not the purpose of this 
project to map out a series of empirical events for which to look so that the international community 
may have a precise and knowable moment at which to step in and break a cycle of violence. This is 
because I understand violent identity politics to be a fluid, dynamic process that is entirely context 
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dependent and therefore defies neat, predictive modelling. To rephrase David Horowitz (1985), 
bloody and passionate phenomena cannot be explained by a sterile and static (or singular) theory.  
 
 Both case studies illustrate the asynchronicity with which violence of this kind may escalate 
– despite having been prepared in advance of the assassination of Habyarimana, the Rwandan 
genocide erupted into extreme brutality almost at once. That said, an asynchronistic build-up is not 
the same as a random, unpredictable, or inevitable one, and the key is the presence of sexualised 
discrimination and domination. Ethnic identification is formed through the marking and ascription 
of sexualised difference. We have seen this in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland as presented here, 
but this is equally visible in cases outside this project such as Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
wherein ascribing difference through sexualised markers leads to sexualised violence. Even at the 
most banal level, in societies that do not display much in the way of tendency towards extreme 
violence, sexualised deviance of the other is visible. In France, there has been and continues to be 
considerable tension over the so-called 2010 'veil ban', which made any practice of covering the 
face in public illegal.  
 
 What made these laws pernicious was not simply the letters of the laws themselves, which 
can be superficially read as an extension of the Ferry Laws in the case of the 2004 school ban and 
the increasing securitisation of civil society in the case of the 2010 veil ban, but rather their spirit- 
the ways in which these bans were framed and the people who were directly targeted. The bans 
were discursively produced in terms of stopping the public displays of Islamic religious practice, 
but specifically the practise of Islam by women. It framed Muslim femininity as something in need 
of rescue from the West, rendering Muslim women passive, infantalised, and Orientalised. In turn, 
it produces Muslim masculinity as aberrant and deviant, framing the veil solely terms of oppression 
to the exclusion of other narratives (See Al-Saji 2010, 877). The Muslim community as a whole was 
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alienated to its own sphere, through considerable emphasis on placed on what set them apart from 
the 'normal' French population. This compounds the point of difference being produced as the 
sexualised differences between the normal self and the aberrant other – while this is not to suggest 
that France is about to erupt into extreme violence, it speaks to the importance of recognising the 
production of sexualised difference. Such differences are encoded in the very structure of society, 
naturalised and accepted, and they can therefore go unnoticed and unquestioned.  
 
 Finally, abjection is an important condition of possibility for overkill. Overkill, importantly, 
emphasises the considerable importance of abjection to an understanding of extreme political 
violence, and how violence can tip the threshold to extremity. Abjection, in particular embodied 
abjection, is a concept that is new neither to the social identity literature nor, in recent years, the 
literature on political violence. Particularly within the study of suicide terrorism, abjection has 
emerged as the language through which the message of the terrorist is communicated (Wilcox 
2014). Abjection becomes a tool for communicating difference, and for destabilising the status quo 
and conceptions of normality, particularly when weaponised. The primary target of abjection is, 
according to the literature that has recently emerged on the politics of abjection, states and state 
sovereignty as a concept (see Linos 2010, Wilcox 2014). This is largely indebted to the work of 
Achille Mbembe (2003), and his theory of necropolitics, and the role of death in sovereignty.   
 
 While there is this emergent vocabulary of abjection in political violence, the terms are still 
being negotiated. In their book Beyond Biopolitics, Debrix and Barden (2012) discuss the 
relationship between alterity and what they call enmity, saying '[t]his theme of enmity derived from 
the notion of abnormality or counter-conduct is crucial to biopolitical understandings of alterity 
(90). They argue that the production of otherness lends 'credibility to the implementation and 
proliferation of biopolitical practices' (91). They also recognise the inability of the biopolitical 
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thesis to account for extreme violence, relaying the story of a teenage suicide bomber whose 
mutilated remains became so fused with those of her victim that the victim was only identified 
when her severed head, previously thought to belong to the bomber, was identified by her mother 
(Debrix and Barden 2012, 93). Their assessment of extreme violence, but with a considerable and 
specific focus on events like suicide bombings, is that the victims and attackers are so destroyed as 
to be indistinguishable from one another. 'Terror', which they hold to be distinct from 'horror' is a 
tool of the biopolitical, and it relies upon both 'recognition and rejection' (Debrix and Barden 2012, 
92) – horror remains outside the biopolitical.  
 
 More recently, Laura Wilcox (2014) uses abjection in her discussion of the weaponisation of 
the body in such a way that it refers not 'to corpses or bodily fluids per se, but rather, that which 
does not obey borders and challenges the existence of such borders' (Wilcox 2014, 68). In contrast, 
here and elsewhere (O'Branski 2014), I argue that abjection refers to corporeal states and actions 
explicitly. Abjection is not only that which marks borders by challenging them – it is the message 
from the other side of that border as well. Abjection is the response to both the membrane between 
the Self and what is outside, while at the same time, abjection is that which is outside, the corpse, 
the faeces, and the menstrual blood. Abjection is uncertainty, terror, and disgust, but it is also that 
same uncertainty, terror, and disgust made material by the corporeality of the abject itself, as well as 
the body of the abject other.  
 
Contributions: Overkill as a specific form of political violence 
  This thesis has argued for a shift in the understanding of violence, specifically for an 
understanding of the extreme violence that can occur in some instances of violent identity politics 
as a specific form of political violence, overkill. Violence is not a symptom or an extension of 
behaviour stemming from underlying prejudices, but rather violence is itself constitutive of the 
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subject. Violence is therefore inherently political – it produces the subjects that it claims to be used 
by, and it confers a new subjectivity upon them. Recent work on violence in politics has put 
forward similar arguments that violence should be viewed as productive and above all political – 
Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013, 176) argues that violence is itself a 'discursive tool' in international 
politics. She argues that violence, and specifically torture, ‘destroys language' (Health-Kelly 2013, 
23), which allows for the remaking of not only the subject, but the regime.  
 
  Torture for Health-Kelly is used to 'substantiate the symbolic order of the group while de-
realising the narrative governance of the state' to create a new 'name' under which power operates 
(Health-Kelly 2013, 44). Her work is an important intervention into the study of political violence 
in international relations for its examination of violence as indistinct from the political, and 
therefore arguing against the notion of violence as an interruption of the political.  As Feldman 
(1991) points out, violence is not a point at which a fixed subject arrives. Extreme political violence 
is not an outlier, or a symptom, nor is it the end product of a linear cause and effect chain. Far from 
being either systematic or aberrational, violence is productive and constitutive of political 
subjectivity, and rape, hunger-striking, beatings of the naked body comprise the constitution of 
subjects through violence.  This concept of sexualised violence as subjectivity-driven, which is to 
say that it reconstitutes the subjectivity of the victim as abject (or a non-subject) while affirming the 
perpetrators' subjectivities is an important point for overkill as a distinct form of political violence. 
 
  The asynchronistic build-up of overkill is another point of departure from other forms of 
political violence. If we know how difference is framed and we know that the tipping point between 
tension (as in France) and extreme violence (as in Kosovo) is more akin to a spark in a powder keg 
than a set of scales, what can be done to prevent events such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide or the 
degrading torture in Northern Ireland? There are a number of recommendations to be made, some 
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practical and short-term, others systemic and long-term. Because of the extremity of violence in 
cases such as the Rwandan genocide, the tendency of the international community has been to write 
the violence off as depraved, which leaves us without a legal system with which to either intervene 
or to satisfactorily prosecute after the violence has ended. The Rwandan genocide is a good 
example of this – intervention was of little use, and the sheer scale of participation in the genocide 
has meant that many of the survivors come face to face with their attackers on a daily basis. Rather 
than the viewing extreme political violence purely through the lens of its extremity, it must be 
recognised as the politically constitutive act that it is.    
 
  Short-term, any increase in sexual violence in ethnically divided societies can and should be 
taken more seriously – rape, violence against women, and sexual assault should be treated as causal 
events, not as symptoms of existing tension. Intervention in these cases would need to be swift – 
every time violence is committed in these situations, a new subject is constituted, and the battle 
against the solidification of violent identities is lost. This would mean any peacekeepers or other 
authorities on the ground in divided societies would require a stronger policing mandate so that they 
could effectively respond to sexually motivated crimes. This will be particularly visible in locations 
where women's rights are not recognised, not enforced, or otherwise drowned out by patriarchal 
systems. In Rwanda women were largely considered to be the dependence of first their fathers, then 
their husbands (Human Rights Watch 1996, 19), and domestic violence was common enough that 
'[o]ne Rwandan proverb states that a woman who is not yet battered is not a real woman' (Human 
Rights Watch 1996, 20). Violence constitutes subjects that are themselves violent, or who are 
targets of violence, and stopping this cycle of iterative violence requires intervention before that 
subjectivity is constituted.  
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  Longer term, this would call for considerable effort to be made in halting banal, every day 
sexualised discrimination and domination. This could be accomplished through a mapping of sexual 
violence, degrading sexualised discourse, and hate speech. Similar projects are already under way 
through social media and other grass-roots campaigns. One such project is Hatebase, an online 
repository that identifies and catalogues hate speech as part of the Sentinel Project for Genocide 
Prevention.  The website provides a visual map of where hate speech is occurring and what kind of 
speech is taking place – and included in the project's definition of hate speech is the use of 
degrading sexualised terms. Butler (1997, 18) argues that hate speech works to 'constitute the 
subject in a subordinate position', and so the importance of hate speech in the formation of 
identities, and in producing the norms under which the identities will operate and which they will in 
turn produce, cannot be underestimated. Viewing dominating and hate speech acts as banal and a 
normal – and therefore excusable – part of society encourages their naturalisation, and resistance in 
the form of calling attention to these speech acts goes a long way in disrupting their normalisation. 
 
Development in future research projects 
  There are multiple potential avenues for developing the concepts of intersectionality in 
political violence and of overkill. Two of these that I am interested in exploring are the ways in 
which space impacts upon performances of violent identity, and the extension of the examination of 
sexualised identities in suicide protests in order to further develop the understanding of the body as 
a weapon in overkill. The necessity of a border or boundary has been an important consideration 
throughout this thesis as it is through the creation and subsequent protection of a boundary between 
groups that identity politics, and especially violent identity politics, arises. Abjection polices the 
border between groups and defines the kind of violence that occurs in overkill, and is itself a 
condition of possibility for overkill. Moreover, the spaces in which overkill operates within the case 
studies presented in this thesis are specifically gendered. This raises questions about the impact of 
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space on the radicalisation of identity in extraterritorial spaces such as prisons or camps, as well as 
domestic or 'safe' spaces such as churches and schools. These gendered spaces could provide an 
interesting lens through which to examine the ways in which the communication and performance 
of boundaries lead to an embodiment of sexualised and violent identity, and gendered space could 
be another condition of possibility for overkill.  
 
  The second area to be developed is the impact of certain practices of sexualisation and 
gendering in radicalising identity towards bodily weaponisation. There is a significant and 
interesting gap in the study of political violence and in particular the use of the abject body as a 
weapon in political violence. While the weaponisation of the body in the context of suicide 
terrorism has been the focus of some academic inquiry, and some important contributions have been 
made to its understanding, the body that is itself weaponised has emerged relative recently (Linos 
2010, Bargu 2011). The transition to the focus on the body, and its utility as I see it, is this – once 
suicide terrorism was posited as having some kind of internal logic (Pape 2003), the object of that 
logic became the value of that logic. Suicide terrorism was clearly attempting to achieve something, 
and whatever it was attempting to achieve was embodied by its target. Pape (2003) argues for quite 
stable, coercive, and instrumental concerns as the goal of suicide terrorism, where the value of the 
attack is determined by the number of people killed and/or the amount of property destroyed.  
 
  In contrast, I argue that there is something else that needs communicating, a target beyond 
the victims, and this requires the abjection of the terrorists' or suicide protesters' bodies. Some 
(Linos 2010, Wilcox 2014, Biggs 2008) argue that the message is a challenge to the state or the 
status quo. I argue that challenge to be to othering, and suicide terrorism to be a challenge to 
dominate power relations that is communicated through the sexualisation of the body-weapon. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Six of this thesis, the power of the body-weapon is in its embodiment of 
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the abject and its weaponisation of that abjection, but this argument would benefit from further 
exploration and development. Specifically this would involve exploring to what extent different 
practices of gendering or sexualising lead to different modes of bodily weaponisation. Put another 
way, it would interrogate questions such as the factors that drive suicide bombers in Palestine and 
how these factors differ from those that drive self-immolation in Kurdistan.  
 
 Through these two potential avenues for future research, the arguments made in this thesis 
can provide a foundation for further projects and allow for deeper insight in to the research 
questions, namely how does this kind of violence, overkill, come about, and make further 
contributions to the existing literature on violent identity politics. Each would expand upon the 
work done in this thesis, which has introduced a different way of viewing and understanding 
extreme violence through the introduction of the concept overkill as abject violence done through 
the brutalisation and/or weaponisation of the abject and sexualised body. Further questions about 
the role of gendered spaces or examinations of suicide protests could lead to new understandings of 
the conditions of possibility of overkill, and deeper insights into this kind of violence.  
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